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Abstract
Use of social networking sites has grown exponentially over the last decade. Facebook,
a popular social networking site, currently boasts membership of over 500 million users
(www.facebook.com). In the present research, four studies were conducted to examine
factors that impact on self-disclosure and privacy settings use. The primary goal for
Studies 1 A, B and C involved developing methods for organizing and understanding the
information that individuals disclose through social networking sites. Specifically, in
Study 1 A, a scoring tool was developed in order to comprehensively assess the content
of the personal profiles. In Study 1 B, grouping categories (default/standard information,
sensitive personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information) were
developed to examine information pertinent to identity threat, personal and group threat.
Finally, in Study 1 C, an alternative grouping strategy was developed to include all
information present in Facebook, organized as a function of the content that was
presented. Overall, these studies indicated that approximately 25% of all possible
information that could potentially be disclosed by users was disclosed. Presenting
personal information such as gender and age was related to disclosure of other sensitive
and highly personal information as well as greater disclosure. As age increased, the
amount of personal information in profiles decreased. Those seeking a relationship were
at greater risk of threat, and disclosed the greatest amount of highly sensitive and
potentially stigmatizing information. Study 2 examined whether giving participants
stories to read that did or did not alert participants to potential dangers of disclosure and
the media context (electronic or hard copy formats) impacted on disclosure and privacy
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settings use. In addition, the predictive power of gender and the virtual other (the
audience in mind) was also examined. Females disclosed less sensitive information than
males after reading a personal privacy invasion story. Disclosure was less when the
target for whom the information was being posted was the same gender as the
participant, and more when the target was the opposite gender of the participant.
Disclosure of specific content areas also differed by gender of the discloser. Only 20.3%
of participants employed privacy settings. When a virtual audience consisting of
referents other than friends or the self was in mind, use of privacy settings increased.
Lastly, participants who filled out Facebook profiles on paper-and-pencil disclosed more
as compared to their online Facebook counterparts. Overall, these findings shed light on
some of the factors that may be related to over-disclosure, and help to identify those
users who are at particular risk when online. In addition, these studies examined a
relatively novel but highly important area, privacy settings and the factors that relate to
use. The notion of the virtual other is one that demands further examination and may
prove useful in understanding how and why people choose to share highly personal
information online, and most importantly, employ privacy settings.
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To tell or not to tell: Predictors of Disclosure and Privacy Settings Usage in an Online
Social Networking Site (Facebook).
"Hike Facebook because I can post
things about myself and also see what other
people have posted" (female, 23)
Throughout history, technological advancements have changed the nature of
social communication. Before the age of the telephone, people corresponded either faceto-face, or through written letters. With the advent of the telephone, people were able to
communicate across long distances, and could exchange verbal messages virtually
instantly. Over the last few decades, with the advent of the Internet, social
communication has gone through yet another transformation. Email, instant messaging
(IM, MSN) and online profile sites have become a quick and easy mode for
communicating with close friends and strangers alike. The Canadian Internet Survey
conducted in 2009 asked 23,000 Canadians about their Internet use. Results reported that
21.7 million Canadian households (80%) were connected to the Internet and reported
using it for personal reasons. When frequency of Internet use per day was examined,
results revealed that 3/4 of the population used the Internet every day. Eighty-one percent
of men and 80% of women used the Internet in 2009. When asked about specific use of
the Internet, approximately 7 out of every 10 users resorted to using the Internet for
information seeking (e.g., reading the news, searching for health information) and online
banking. The top reason for going online in 2009 was for social communication purposes,
specifically for accessing email (91%). Interestingly, those who had been using the
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Internet for more than five years were less likely to be concerned about online security.
As the popularity of the Internet continues to grow, researchers may expect to see a
continued increase in the frequency of online social interaction. Even more, as popularity
with online media increase, it is possible that the ease with which users can communicate
coupled with a growing familiarity with technology may contribute to drastic reductions
in the use of more traditional forms of communication, including the telephone and
written letters. How people are using this technology, and how the online social context
differs from offline interaction warrants investigation. The concomitant arrival of
wireless technology has made the possibility of online communication even more
prevalent by increasing the opportunity for connection (Internet World Stats: Usage and
Population Statistics, 2010). Wireless connection to the Internet can be attained remotely
(from any location) that provides a wireless router. Plugging in a cord to access the
Internet is no longer required to connect.
It has been proposed that the Internet operates as a powerful 'Triple A Engine',
consisting of accessibility (anytime, anywhere), affordability (most sites allow for free
use), and anonymity (the ability to protect one's identity) (Cooper, Shapiro & Powers,
1998). This combination of factors makes the Internet a very appealing outlet for social
communication. Given the prevalence of computer technology in society and the
opportunities it affords for social interaction, it is important to understand the unique
role that computers may have in social communication. The present research is a first
step to understanding the role computer technology, and more specifically online social
networking plays in social interaction. More specifically, the present research examines
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variables that might impact on disclosure online as well as use of privacy settings in
social networking profiles.
What are Social Networking Sites?
Social networking sites (SNSs) (e.g., Facebook) are web-based social
communication tools designed to allow users to contact and communicate with other
users. The three key features that define SNSs according to Boyd and Ellison (2007) are
that the sites "allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a
bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection,
and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the
system" (pg. 2). Personal web-pages and online profile networks have emerged at an
increasing rate on SNSs and continue to gain popularity (Yum, 2007).
Why Do People Use Social Networking Sites?
Researchers have started to examine how and why people are drawn to SNSs and
social media platforms. Research examining Facebook, for example, has identified
multiple reasons that explain why users establish and maintain personal profiles
including: interconnection and the desire to bridge offline and online relationships (Boyd
& Ellison, 2007), maintenance of existing offline friendships (Ellison, Steinfield, &
Lampe, 2007; Lenhart & Madden, 2007; Madge, Meeks, Wellens, & Hooley, 2009;
Wiley & Sisson, 2006), identity formation (Selwyn, 2009; Stutzman, 2006; Valkenburg,
Schouten, & Peter, 2005) self-expression and self-disclosure (Wiley & Sisson, 2006), and
"lurking" or browsing information of other users (Pempek, Yermolayeva, & Calvert,

6

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
2009). Additionally, SNSs allow users to express themselves openly and freely, and in
fact, encourage just that.
Although SNSs may represent potentially new learning tools, their introduction
requires careful consideration in order to avoid pitfalls that could lead to vulnerabilities
for the user. Access, information, building relationships and sharing with others are the
hallmarks of social network sites. By simply typing in a person's name, an abundance of
information can be accessed, ranging from relatively benign pieces of personal details
such as favorite quotes, to highly personal pieces of information including profile
pictures, home addresses and birth dates.
Users may not consider the implications of their disclosures online, and may not
realize that they can put themselves and others at risk either directly or indirectly by
sharing information in an open forum. The very openness, connectedness and
accessibility offered through SNSs have the potential to place users at risk, but the sites
also have mechanisms to minimize risks. The following sections will describe a popular
SNS (Facebook) and identify the pitfalls associated with use of SNSs.
What is "Facebook"?
Facebook, founded in 2004, was originally designed as a SNS for students at
Harvard University. Its popularity has grown immensely and expanded beyond the initial
Harvard setting with the potential to include anyone anywhere in the world who is older
than 13 years of age. Facebook currently has over 500 million active users and as such is
the leading social network site in the world. The infrastructure of Facebook is comprised
of a variety of networks. Each network represents a company, school (e.g.,
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university/college) or geographical region (e.g., city, state, or province). Individuals
create a profile within one network. Creation of an account is necessary for membership
and requires that the user provide basic information including a valid email address, as
well as identify a gender, and provide a birth date. Once a member, users can create a
personal profile for themselves which may include information such as their age, gender,
personal preferences, and location. They can also upload pictures, describe interests,
education, relationships, and more. Facebook offers users the opportunity to search for
friends by typing their names into the search bar (these can be actual friends,
acquaintances or even strangers), and add them to their "friends list". Users can interact
with one another either through a personal message, similar to an email inbox, or by
posting more public messages on the profile wall, a feature similar to a bulletin board.
Another attractive feature of Facebook is the capacity to create and join groups that may
be based on similar interests, mutual causes, or are simply for fun. For a complete
glossary of Facebook terms, refer to Appendix A.
What are the Associated Risks with SNSs?
When users initially sign up for a Facebook account, they are required to provide
at least a few personal details (e.g., date of joining, birth date, email address and name).
Once a member, many users go beyond just the bare minimum and provide a wide variety
of personal information in their profiles (e.g., location, mobile phone number, sexual
orientation, personal photos). The default setting for a new profile allows public access to
any other user within the new user's specified network. As well, the new user's profile is
accessible to the friends of all the other users within their network. Given that users are
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providing sensitive information online, they may place themselves at considerable risk.
For example, Facebook users may subject themselves to potential embarrassment,
identity theft, "lurking" or stalking by other users, and blackmailing (Gross & Acquisti,
2005).
Just How Serious Can Over-Disclosure of Personal Details Be?
In some cases, Facebook users have posted directions to personal residences and
cottages along with wall updates notifying others that they are out of town for the
weekend - providing an open invitation to thieves to come over to an empty,
unsupervised house. During a two month-long investigation that tracked more than a
dozen Canadians through their open social-networking profiles, a reporter for a national
newspaper, "The Globe and Mail", built profiles for individual users (Hartley, 2008).
Here are examples of some of the information extracted about individual users:
"A 24-year-old Calgary woman posts her cell phone number, e-mail address, and
the name of the Kelowna motel where she and three of her friends will spend a
June weekend partying. In addition to nicknaming the event the "Erotic Party,"
the women joke about finding "some hot men to buy us dinner and drinks."
"A Toronto teen posts comments about her favourite sexual positions; a 24-yearold Saskatchewan man posts details for a huge house party he plans to hold while
his parents are out of town."
The reporter went on to explain that while some of these stand alone details may
not amount to much, through use of freely available web tools including directory
searches (e.g., Canada411) and Google (e.g., using the reverse phone search on
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Canada411), other users could easily look up related personal information, including
home addresses and directions to personal residences. In one instance, the reporter even
went so far as to meet up with a 17 year old female, whose profile he found on Facebook.
The teenager's cell phone number was posted on her open Facebook profile, and this is
how he contacted her. After agreeing to meet, he showed her the profile he had
constructed for her based on information she had posted, including, but not limited to,
where she lived, where she worked, her home and cell phone numbers, and her birth date.
Defining Self-Disclosure
Self-disclosure generally refers to any message conveyed about the individual,
and can be subdivided into various types. First, there are two broad categories of selfdisclosure that describe the statements made by an individual in terms of descriptive or
affective content. Self-disclosure that consists of general facts about a person, such as
"My favorite colour is blue", or "My family comes from Germany" is called descriptive
self-disclosure (Derlega, Metts, Petronio & Margulis, 1993). Messages that convey
expressions about feelings and opinions are called evaluative self-disclosures and
include statements such as "I hate writing exams", or "I feel angry that you said that to
me". Aside from the two broad categories of self-disclosure, it is also useful to
distinguish the type self-disclosure based on the referent, that is, whether the disclosure
involves divulging information about one's relationships and interactions with others
{relational self-disclosure) or information about oneself {personal self-disclosure).
Relational self-disclosure has been the main focus of self-disclosure research
(e.g., Levesque, Steciuk & Ledley, 2002). This form of self-disclosure has been deemed
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particularly salient in close relationships as it may have a very beneficial role in
relationship maintenance. For example, when romantic couples are able to talk to one
another about the status of a relationship it may help the couple deal with conflict
(Waring, 1987). In comparison to research examining relational self-disclosure, no
known studies have looked at self-disclosure online from a personal standpoint where
disclosure occurs without the expectation of interaction. The relative lack of literature
exploring personal self-disclosure calls for examination of this less researched form of
communication.
The act of self-disclosing is a key component of close relationship formation and
maintenance (Altaian & Taylor, 1973). Many things can affect what information is
disclosed and for whom it is disclosed. Both theory and research on self-disclosure have
attempted to identify variables which impact on what is disclosed, how much is
disclosed, and who is the recipient of disclosure, including: gender differences (e.g.,
Derlega & Chaikin, 1976; Dindia & Allen, 1992), and trust (Wheeless, 1978; Wheeless &
Grotz, 1977).
Gender Differences in Self-Disclosure
A large body of research has examined how males and females differ in terms of
self-disclosure. Effect sizes from a meta-analysis of gender differences in self-disclosure
conducted by Dindia and Allen (1992) revealed that, in general, females disclosed more
information about themselves than did males. In addition, when compared to their male
counterparts, females disclosed more to strangers. Moreover, same-sex and opposite sex
dyadic interactions showed that female-female disclosure was the highest and male-male
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disclosure was the lowest, with male-female disclosure in the middle. In line with
reciprocity theory, it was speculated that these results occurred because of more female
and less male disclosure overall, thus canceling out the polar effects, and resulting in
moderate disclosure. That is, while females disclose more, and males disclose less,
partners either encouraged or discouraged disclosure, resulting in the observed moderate
level of overall disclosure.
Early psychologists attributed these gender differences in self-disclosure to sex
roles, such that males were expected to be emotionally unexpressive and females were
taught to be emotionally expressive (Derlega & Chaikin, 1976), thus encouraging
differential levels of disclosure as a function of gender. In the case of self-disclosure, it
would not be appropriate or acceptable for a man to disclose intimate details about the
self, without fear of rejection or social disapproval from peers and/or strangers.
Researchers even went so far as to imply that men who exhibited higher levels of selfdisclosure were less psychologically stable (Derlega & Chaikin, 1976) due to the conflict
between gender role expectations and behaviours.
Perhaps males may not be as expressive emotionally as females in everyday
conversation, but they may still be inclined to disclose. It is possible that this disclosure
may be content-dependent. Men may be comfortable talking about topics related to
popular activities and less feminine activities such as sports or even on more taboo topics
including sexuality. For example, men felt more positive about sexual material, and were
also more likely to seek out this material (Nosko, Wood, & Desmarais, 2007). It is
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proposed that disclosure by males may be topic dependent (Derlega, Durham, Gockel &
Sholis, 1981), especially in settings where there are fewer social pressures (e.g., online).
Disclosure and Trust
Trust plays an important role in self-disclosure. Early work examined and
conceptualized trust in several ways including situations that require trust in order to
achieve mutual goals (e.g., Giffin, 1967); risky behaviours which indicate trust (e.g.,
Pearce, 1974); and positive perceptions of those who are trustworthy (e.g., Giffin, 1967,
Wheeless & Grotz, 1977). Revealing personal information can be seen as a risky
behaviour in many situations. When personal information is offered to someone, the
threat of exposure or unwanted revelation of intimate details to a public audience is everpresent. In order for people to feel comfortable disclosing, they need to feel as though
they can trust the receiver of their disclosure. Self-disclosure, therefore, may be a
behavioural indicator of trust, whereby the more trustworthy someone is perceived to be,
the greater the likelihood of that person receiving intimate disclosures. This same
phenomenon may occur online where, instead of a person being perceived as trustworthy,
the system (i.e., the Internet) or a specific site is perceived as trustworthy, thus
encouraging greater self-disclosure.
Impact of Vivid Stories
Aside from gender and trust, it is suggested that anecdotal stories may also play a
role in disclosure. Various studies in the area of decision making have noted the powerful
influence of anecdotal stories (de Wit, Das, &Vet, 2008; Fagerlin, Wang & Ubel, 2005;
Hamill, Stanovich, 2009; Wilson, & Nisbett, 1980). Not only do vivid anecdotes engage
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learners, but they increase meaning making (Bruner, 1996). While this can be seen as
beneficial in certain cases, an affinity for stories can sometimes lead to the disregard of
more reliable and accurate sources, including statistical and legal information (Stanovich,
2009). In the case of disclosure, it is suggested that the impact of a vivid anecdote about
the potential consequences of disclosing personal details may encourage greater vigilance
when disclosing. Moreover, because personal accounts are such powerfully persuasive
tools, vivid anecdotal stories may also overshadow the impact of more formal legal
documents, and may be more likely to impact on disclosure than formal privacy policies.
Self-Presentation (Impression Management)
Self-presentation is defined as a form of self-impression management and positive
display of personal details (Goffman, 1959). Goffman (1959) originally developed a
theory of self-presentation to explicate people's self-disclosure motives. Social life,
according to Goffman's theory, is described as a multi-staged drama that highlights the
actor-audience relationship. Strategic manipulation of presented information in this
"drama" occurs in two ways, through information given (e.g., verbal communication) and
information given off (e.g., non-verbal cues such as body language). The interaction
between actor (presenter of information) and audience (the receiver of information)
occurs based on the agreement that each person will accept the information revealed by
the other, and will react accordingly to the information presented. Goffman posited that
people assume their audiences will take seriously the self that is presented to them, and
by extension, the impressions formed as a function of the presented information.
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Goffman went on to identify various components of self-presentation. He asserted
that the performance by an individual that is consistent and strong enough to influence
the observers is called the 'front'. Moreover, the setting, or the items that are most
commonly associated with a particular individual (e.g., gender, race, physical features,
habits) are part of the overarching concept of the 'front'. The actor can manipulate how
these features are displayed, and by extension, alter their performance to fit their
audiences' expectations.
Self-presentation theory posits that social interaction is a dramatization and
people are inclined to present themselves in an idealized way. What people choose to
present to others may be dictated by their particular society, and often reflects or
exemplifies the more desirable qualities of that particular culture. Goffman distinguished
this idealized self, and called it our "social self. In comparison to our "flawed" or
"realistic" self, in which we express genuine qualities (both positive and negative) and
exhibit more variability in our behaviour, the "social self tends to adhere more strictly to
a set of consistent and desirable behavioural patterns. People present different variations
of their "social self depending on the social context and their interaction partners. In the
case of online communication, where non-verbal cues are lacking, the opportunity to
present an "idealized self or the "social self may be even greater (Cornwell &
Lundgren, 2001; Walther, 1996). With fewer cues to base impressions on, there may be
more room for misinterpretation, and for exploitation of desirable characteristics on the
part of the user/actor. In the case of online profiles, users may take full advantage of the
limited interactive aspect, and display highly idealized aspects of the self.
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Self-Disclosure and Self-Presentation
Self-disclosure often occurs in tandem with self-presentation, and both processes
are important in relationship development offline (Taylor & Altman, 1987). People have
the desire to present themselves in a way that is seen as positive (Godfrey, Jones & Lord,
1986), and tend to display or convey their best qualities (e.g., best characteristics or most
admirable accomplishments), while avoiding presenting aspects of the self that may be
seen as less desirable, especially in the case of initial relationship development. Even
when interacting with strangers, people engage in self-enhancement (Schlenker &
Pontari, 2000). As choices are made about which self-relevant details to present, levels of
self-disclosure are adjusted to match the guidelines of what is acceptable as set out by
society or the situation. These processes are crucial during initial social encounters,
because this information is used by interaction partners to determine whether or not to
pursue and/or maintain the relationship (Derlega, Winstead, Wong, & Greenspan, 1987).
While these two terms are related and important components of relationship formation,
they are not interchangeable (Schlenker, 1986). Self-disclosure is primarily used to
explain relationship formation, whereas self-presentation applies more generally to the
strategic presentations of self-relevant details, in spite of a relationship context.
Theories of Self-Disclosure: Social Exchange & Social Penetration, Reciprocity,
and Social Information Processing Theory
Several theories have been derived with the purpose of characterizing and
clarifying the self-disclosure process. Specifically, four theories will be addressed in the
following sections, including social exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), social
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penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973), the reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 1960), and
social information processing (Walther, 1992).
Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory is based on the exchange of social and material resources,
and lies at the heart of social interaction. Social exchange theory can be applied to selfdisclosure by highlighting the reward/cost aspect of self-disclosing. Generally,
relationships proceed from non-intimate to more intimate interactions (e.g., verbal and
non-verbal communication and mutual activities) and are determined by the rewards and
costs associated with past, present and future exchanges (Altman & Taylor, 1973). For
example, when considering whether or not to develop a close relationship with another
person, people may be inclined to assess what is being put into the relationship, and what
is gained from being in the relationship. For the most part, people aim to maximize the
benefits and minimize the costs associated with close relationships. When the benefits
outweigh the costs associated with a particular relationship, then people may be more
inclined to develop a close relationship and, by extension, may be more likely to disclose
personal details. As people invest more into close relationships, disclosure increases and
the relationship grows.
Social Penetration Theory
Similarly, social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973) focuses on
reward/cost and how this affects the acquaintance process or "getting to know" process.
This theory takes into account the joint effects of verbal as well as non-verbal
interactions, and stipulates that there is a gradual, orderly process by which relationships
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are formed. If this process is disrupted, relationships may suffer (e.g. too much disclosure
initially may result in dislike). Social penetration theory consists of five stages that
progressively increase in intimacy: the orientation stage; the exploratory affective stage;
the affective stage; the stable stage; and the depenetration stage. In the first stage of this
theory, the orientation stage, people are more cautious about the types of information
they divulge. Typically, small talk occurs, whereby partners exchange trivial personal
details, and generally adhere to socially acceptable disclosure. In the exploratory affective
stage, people begin to express basic opinions (e.g., their political opinions) and continue
to disclose increasingly more personal details. At this stage, interaction partners are still
concerned with acting in socially desirable ways, and are not fully comfortable exposing
themselves completely to their partner. This stage generally encompasses casual
relationships. In the affective stage, more intimate details are discussed. People may
disclose personal information to their partner, and discussions and disagreements may
arise. In the stable stage, partners are able to fully disclose intimate personal information,
and can often predict how their partner will react to the information received. At this
point, the social relationship plateaus. In the last stage of the theory, or the depenetration
stage, relationship dissolution may or may not occur. The costs begin to outweigh the
benefits associated with the relationship, and partners are faced with the choice of
whether or not to terminate the relationship.
The Reciprocity Norm
In addition to social exchange and social penetration theory, norms outlining
expected behaviour impact on personal information exchange. Research suggests that
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self-disclosure operates according to what Gouldner (1960) originally termed 'the norm
of reciprocity' (Jourard, 1959; Jourard & Landsman, 1960). The norm of reciprocity
stipulates that people feel obligated to comparably return the services given to them by
others. These services can come in the form of various things, including favours and selfdisclosure. Reciprocity of self-disclosure, in particular, refers to the expectation that
disclosure will be returned at a comparable level of intimacy. A study investigating this
phenomenon conducted by Chaikin and Derlega (1974), involved showing participants
videos of two women having a conversation. One woman was the initiator (she started
the conversation) and the other was the respondent. The intimacy level (either high or
low) of the initiators' disclosure was manipulated, and participants' ratings of liking for
the respondent in the videos were then assessed according to intimacy levels. Results
showed that liking was influenced by the norm of reciprocity, in that respondents who
disclosed at similar levels of intimacy were better liked by participants than those who
responded with a discrepant level of intimacy. It appears that perceptions of selfdisclosure may be heavily influenced by social norms, and that people may feel they are
obligated to return the favour of disclosure. Not only do people feel the need to
reciprocate disclosure, but this disclosure is expected to occur at similar intimacy levels.
Social Information Processing (SIP) Theory
Walther (1992) originally developed the Social Information Processing (SIP)
theory of computer mediated exchange, which outlines the extent to which people gain
information through social communication, and how people use this information to
establish impressions of others. He proposed that getting to know someone is based on a

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
small initial amount of information in text based form, and that relationships develop to
the extent that there is information first available. Walther developed this theory to clarify
the mechanisms of social interaction online, and went on to explore how one uses the
initial available information to develop first impressions in online settings. He argued that
while there is a lack of non-verbal cues in computer-mediated communication, this does
not necessarily imply that online relationships are any less meaningful or strong as
relationships offline.
People are still able to get to know someone based on the verbal cues available
online. Walther (1996) suggested that people are inherently good at assessing both verbal
and non-verbal cues, and that people can establish affinity (liking) for their online
partner, regardless of the lack of non-verbal cues (e.g., gestures). Walther asserted that
while computer-mediated relationships develop at a slower pace, they are equally as
strong as offline relationships.
The anticipation of future interaction is another important component of this
theory, as this motivates people to be more intimate in their disclosures online. For
example, people who expect to meet their online partner at some point in the future may
be more likely to exchange more relational messages with their partner (Walther, 1996),
and motivate people to further develop their relationships.
Social exchange theory, social penetration theory and the reciprocity norm
attempt to explain establishment of relationships, however they do not necessarily take
into account relationships that are already formed and how these existing relationships
function over time. In addition, because these theories for the most part are meant to
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explicate social communication offline, they may not map as easily onto online social
interaction, and, more specifically, personal self-disclosure online.
The Shift in Social Communication
With the shift in social communication from face-to-face interaction to online
communication, theorists have sought to extend their current knowledge of standard
theory in offline contexts to an online setting. Walther's (1996) attempt to apply offline
theory to online relationship formation resulted in the formation of the online hyperpersonal theory. In the following sections, his theory will be reviewed and the
implications of existing research in an online context will be explored.
Online Hyper-personal Theory
Following from social information processing theory, Walther (1996) established
the hyper-personal theory of online relationship formation. Walther coined this "hyperpersonal" because he noted that, in several instances, communication online could
surpass the level of intimacy found in parallel face-to-face interactions. This theory
applies to relationships formed and maintained solely online, and focuses on electronic
communication that is devoted to social or recreational interaction (e.g., chat rooms,
social networking). Despite the argument that offline relationships are far more intimate
and of a higher subjective quality than online relationships (Sproull & Keisler, 1986),
Walther argued that online relationships are at least just as, and in some cases more
intimate than relationships offline.
Walther noted that "selective self-presentation" may occur online, whereby
senders of information online may opt to convey more favorable aspects of the self. He
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identified two elements common in online interaction that may enhance self-presentation:
asynchronous communication and reduced cues.
Asynchronous time (where there is time lag in between messages) allows for
careful planning of communication, unlike spontaneous talk where responses are
expected almost immediately following the delivery of a message. Walther argued that
this form of communication is more relaxed, and thus allows for more efficient allocation
of cognitive resources. He cites Ochs's work (1979) on discourse and goes on to assert
that "asynchronous verbal communication is more inter-subjective and less egocentric
than in unplanned (spontaneous) discourse (Walther, 1996, p. 26). In essence, Walther
argued that asynchronous communication may be more socially desirable and effective.
Walther posited that first impressions are highly controlled and manageable in
online communication. Because information is conveyed verbally in most cases and often
lacks physical cues that users cannot otherwise control, editing and self-censorship occurs
more often. As a result, the receiver of the information may over-attribute the reduced
cues provided by the sender, and form a more positive image of their partner (Spears &
Lea, 1992). Walther explained that this "over-attribution" occurs when the receiver of
information builds stereotypical impressions of the partner. Given minimal amounts of
information to base impressions on, receivers over-rely on verbal cues in the absence of
physical ones, and may idealize the interaction partner.
While this may seem detrimental to relationship formation, Walther concluded
that hyper-personal interaction has the potential to be highly rewarding. Quoting
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Schlenker (1985), "People are more satisfied in particular relationships and situations to
the extent that their desired identity images are supported, validated or elicited" (p. 93).
Disclosure on the Internet
While the majority of studies in this area have focused on self-disclosure in faceto-face contexts (i.e., interviews and case studies), fewer investigations have examined
the mechanisms and predictors of self-disclosure in different media contexts (e.g., online,
computer-mediated communication). Over the last few years, only a small number of
studies have emerged investigating how context plays a role in self-disclosure (e.g.,
Joinson, 2001; Locke & Gilbert, 1995; Tidwell & Walther, 2002). In order to test this
assumption, Joinson (2001) compared levels of self-disclosure in computer-mediated and
face-to-face contexts. In addition, visual anonymity and self-awareness were examined as
potential predictors of self-disclosure. In Study 1, participants were paired up and were
instructed to discuss dilemmas either in a chat room or laboratory face-to-face setting. As
expected, participants in the computer-mediated communication setting disclosed more
spontaneous personal details (i.e., details about themselves) than those in the face-to-face
condition. In Study 2, the same dilemmas and procedure were employed, and a visual
anonymity factor was included. To achieve visual identification or visual anonymity, half
of the participants were shown a video picture of their discussion partner, and half were
not. Results revealed that visual anonymity (i.e., no video image of interaction partner)
encouraged higher levels of self-disclosure.
Joinson went on to manipulate levels of private and public self-awareness (high
and low). For private self-awareness, video images were transmitted to the participant so
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that they were either able to see themselves (high private self-awareness) or a
"Simpson's" episode (low private self-awareness) displayed on the screen. For high
public self-awareness, participants walked down a well lit hallway and were seated facing
two video cameras, encouraging a sense of reduced anonymity. For low public selfawareness, participants walked down a dark hallway to the study room, and sat in a
cubicle with no video cameras, encouraging a sense of anonymity. As anticipated,
induced high private self-awareness combined with induced low public self-awareness
resulted in the highest levels of spontaneous self-disclosure when compared to low
private/low public and high private/high public conditions. This study stresses how
situations that encourage salient private selves (i.e., high private self-awareness) and
lessened public selves (i.e., low public self-awareness) result in increases in selfdisclosure. More recent examination of computer mediated communication, in particular
instant messaging (IM), showed that even non-anonymous communication (i.e., where
public selves are known) online encouraged self-disclosure (Schouten & Valkenburg,
2007).
Tidwell and Walther (2002) looked at the effects of computer-mediated
communication on self-disclosure, impressions formed about interaction partners, and
evaluations of interaction partners. Similarly to Joinson's study (2001), participants were
assigned to either a face-to-face meeting, or a meeting through use of an email system
(i.e., they sent email messages back and forth). Results showed that computer-mediated
communication participants used more interactive questions and self-disclosed more than
did their face-to-face counterparts. In addition, computer-mediated communication users
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asked and offered more intimate details. In terms of impressions and evaluations, face-toface participants initially felt more confident in their partner attributions (i.e., how well
they felt they knew their partner) than computer-mediated communication participants,
but by the end of the conversation, this difference had disappeared. It could be that
initially, face-to-face participants feel more confident in their attributions due to the
added benefit of physical cues. As conversations progress, computer-mediated
communication users ended up feeling equally as confident in their impressions of their
partners, even despite the lack of visual/physical cues, lending support to Walther's
theory of online hyper-personal communication. Even despite suggestions that online
relationships were not as strong, and that interaction partners online were not able to 'get
to know' their partners as well without other more visual or physical cues, these findings
imply that the online medium is equally as effective for forming close bonds and positive
impressions of interaction partners as offline interactions.
The combined results of studies investigating online interactions highlight how
interpersonal communication and self-disclosure may change as a function of whether the
interaction takes place online or offline (e.g., Joinson, 2001; Locke & Gilbert, 1995;
Tidwell & Walther, 2002). While offering insight into communication online (e.g., email,
instant messaging, chat rooms), studies looked at the quantity of information presented
and not the specific content, such that they reported how much people disclose, but not
on which topics they disclose. For instance, Tidwell and Walther used the proportion of
conversations, not the specific topics, to obtain a gauge of how much self-disclosure
resulted in each group. In Joinson's (2001) study, intimate conversations were examined,
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but were not coded for types of disclosure. Locke and Gilbert (1995) compared
perceptions of sensitivity of material, self-disclosure, comfort, and enjoyment across
contexts (online versus paper-and-pencil), but did not analyze specific responses. The
next step in self-disclosure research is to compare how traditional (paper-and-pencil) and
new media contexts (e.g., Facebook) affect people's decisions about how and, more
importantly, what to disclose or, in other words, which topics in particular people are
choosing to share with others. Moreover, in the case of online social networking profiles,
a large majority of disclosure is presented by users without the expectation of interaction,
such that details are simply displayed for others to view. Therefore, examination of
information broadcasted about the self, rather than interactive information sharing where
feedback and reciprocal communication is expected merits examination. The Internet
offers an anonymous forum for personal communication and, as the Internet becomes an
omnipresent aspect of interpersonal communication, we may expect to see an increase in
self-disclosure patterns for online contexts (e.g., Henderson & Gilding, 2004).
Personality and Online Communication
Associations between various personality factors and online communication are
mixed (Amichai-Hamburger, Wainpel & Fox, 2002; Ross, Orr, Sisic, Arseneault,
Simmering & Orr, 2009; Swickert, Hittner, Harris & Herring, 2002). In most cases,
studies have employed the Five Factor Model (McCrae, 1992) of personality to examine
how various personality traits are related to patterns of technology use and disclosure
online. Findings revealed that those with higher scores on neuroticism tended to use the
internet more to avoid loneliness (Butt & Phillips, 2002). Researchers suggest that
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because these individuals reported lower levels of social support, they may have resorted
to online activities to achieve an unfulfilled need with hopes of obtaining support through
online interactions. Conscientiousness was negatively related to online communication
(Swickert, Hittner, Harris & Herring, 2002). This relationship was explained by a reduced
desire to procrastinate, and thus, an active avoidance of distracting tools including online
social networking sites. Those scoring higher on extraversion were less likely than their
more introverted (lower on extraversion) counterparts to engage in online communication
(Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel & Fox, 2002). Amichai-Hamburger and colleagues
(2002) argue that this pattern is dependent on the location in which a person perceives
their true identity. They suggest that for those scoring higher on extraversion, true
identity resides offline. In contrast, for those scoring higher on introversion, true identity
resides online. According to Amichai-Hamburger and colleagues, because true identity
resides online those who are more introverted are more likely to use online social
networking sites. Wehrli (2008) found that extraversion played an important role in social
networking. Specifically, in their sample of 1560 students, extraverts were more likely to
sign up for social networking sites, adopted the technology at a faster rate and had larger
friends' lists than their less extraverted counterparts. Wilson and colleagues (2010) found
that extraverted individuals reported higher levels of social network use. Finally, Ross
and colleagues (2009) found that while those higher on extraversion belonged to
significantly more social groups on Facebook, scoring higher on this trait was not
significantly associated with time spent online or use of certain features of Facebook,
such as frequency of status updates. Because findings are mixed, the associations
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between personality and use of social networking sites including Facebook require
further investigation. While it is possible that personality may impact on the likelihood to
disclose, this factor may also be related to the use of other features of the site, including
privacy settings.
Familiarity with Technology
Perceived comfort, ease and expertise with computers strongly predict actual use
of computers (Mueller, Wood, Willoughby, Ross & Specht, 2008; Spitzberg, 2006). In
short, individuals who are more accustomed to and are more comfortable with a
technology, also use the technology more frequently. As Lewis and Fabos (2005) have
proposed, as time progresses highly competent users may not consciously think about
how they are communicating, and instead communicate without hesitation. Because
Facebook is such a pervasive communication tool, it is proposed that as familiarity and
comfort with the site increases so too does the propensity to disclose information. Aside
from disclosure, it is possible that familiarity with technology may or may not predict to
use of privacy settings. On one hand, as familiarity and expertise increases, use of all the
various features of Facebook, including privacy settings, may increase. Alternatively, if
highly competent users do not consciously think about how they are communicating,
perhaps they will not be thinking about privacy settings either. This possibility will be
explored.
In the following sections, the relation between privacy and self-disclosure will be
addressed, followed by an overview of privacy theory offline and online.
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Privacy and Self-Disclosure
There is a fine balance between maintaining privacy and emotional distance, and
sustaining close, intimate relationships. While it is essential for most people to protect
and have control over their personal information, self-disclosing intimate details is a
necessary component in establishing and maintaining close, healthy relationships
(Altman & Taylor, 1973). Privacy, defined as a boundary regulation process that controls
the degree of contact one has with others, is strongly linked to self-disclosure. Selfdisclosure adjustment can be considered a boundary regulation process, in that increased
control over information that is exchanged is related to greater levels of privacy in a
social relationship (Derlega, Metts, Petronio & Margulis, 1993). Regulation of
interpersonal boundaries dictates the kinds of relationships that are formed (Derlega &
Chaikin, 1977), and influences levels of closeness and intimacy within social
relationships. In a study examining privacy and disclosure, results revealed that for initial
encounters, less private people (low privacy preference) exhibited higher levels of selfdisclosure, were more likely to open up to their interaction partner, and felt more
comfortable interacting with their partner (Larson & Bell, 1988).
Theories of Privacy
Privacy Offline
Two distinct theories of privacy developed in the 1970s have been established and
recognized in the literature (Westin, 1970; Altman, 1975). Westin's (1970) theory of
privacy is defined as a boundary regulation process that focuses on the types and
functions of privacy that operate on individuals, groups and organizational levels. He was
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interested in understanding and explaining how privacy served to protect the individual
from exposure, by temporarily limiting access to themselves by others. Westin identified
the ways in which privacy is attained and maintained in everyday life, and posited four
states of privacy (how privacy is achieved): solitude; intimacy; anonymity; and reserve.
Solitude is freedom from the observers' gaze, and can be obtained by sheltering oneself
from the public eye. For example, taking a getaway to a remote wilderness retreat might
offer solitude and release from the observer. Intimacy occurs when a small select group
of individuals achieves a close, honest relationship, in which they share personal details
with specific close others. Anonymity is freedom from identification through censorship
of personal information. By controlling what information is presented, one can ensure
that their unique identity is not revealed. For example, in the absence of personal
information including name and birth date, one remains unidentified, and therefore
maintains their anonymity. Lastly, reserve is the act of limiting the amount and type of
information that is accessible about the self. For example, by choosing to disclose certain
superficial details (e.g., hair colour or favorite food) one limits access to private thoughts
and more sensitive personal details.
In addition to the mechanisms through which we maintain privacy (how we obtain
privacy), Westin went on to distinguish four functions of privacy (the reasons why we
need privacy). These functions include: personal autonomy; emotional release; selfevaluation; and limited and protected communication. Personal autonomy is the desire to
avoid the threat of manipulation, or control by others. Emotional release is relief from
one's social obligations such as role demands, and emotional states. Self-evaluation is the
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sense of self-reflection/contemplation and integration of experiences into meaningful
lessons learned. Lastly, limited and protected communication is composed of two related
factors. Limited communication refers to setting communication boundaries and
restricting accessible personal information, whereas protected communication refers to
sharing personal information with certain trustworthy others. These states (or types) and
functions have helped researchers to develop measures of privacy in various settings
(e.g., Marshall, 1974).
Altman (1975) suggested that the functions of privacy (why we need privacy)
were hierarchical and that the overarching and most important function of privacy is to
obtain a self-identity. His theory of privacy consists of four components, which focus on
the process by which people regulate levels of social interaction. The first component is
the temporal boundary regulation process, whereby individuals adjust their levels of
required privacy depending on the surrounding environment and their own internal state.
As time passes, and situations change, people continually adjust their levels of privacy.
Second, in contrast to Westin's theory, Altman's theory distinguishes between desired
and actual levels of privacy by discriminating between privacy that is required, and
privacy that is experienced. Altman proposed that an optimal level of privacy exists, in
which our desired levels of privacy match our actual levels of privacy. For example, if
someone wishes to have complete privacy with little contact from others and they achieve
this, they are at their optimal level of privacy. When this optimal level is not achieved,
too much (i.e., isolation) or too little privacy (i.e., crowding) may occur. Altman also
suggested that privacy is bidirectional in nature, involving both input (e.g., regulating if

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
we are observed or not and noise from the environment) and output (e.g., verbal
communication/disclosure). Third, similar to Westin's theory, Altman's theory
considered that privacy should be applied both to the individual and group level, rather
than just from the individual's point of view. Fourth, Altman's theory takes into
consideration input as well as output, such that he focused on both how people exercise
control over input (e.g., protecting themselves from the observers' gaze) and output (e.g.,
what types of information they disclose). By taking into account the interaction between
these two processes, Altman extended previous notions of privacy to include a more
comprehensive overview.
In addition to these four components, Altman incorporated behavioural
mechanisms used to regulate privacy (e.g., shutting the door, verbal expression).
Inclusion of behavioural techniques (e.g., shutting the door, personal space) used to
maintain and regulate their optimal levels of privacy contributes a unique aspect to the
existing privacy theory originally set forth by Westin.
While Westin primarily focused on psychological aspects of privacy, Altman
went on to highlight the importance of the environment or context in privacy regulation.
More specifically, Altman proposed that understanding of the psychological components
of privacy required systematic consideration of the social world, interactions between
people, the physical environment, and the temporal nature of social relationships
(Altman, 1990). Even as Altman's theory has been deemed an "environmental theory of
privacy", environment does not always strictly imply physical environment. Environment
has been conceptualized in two distinct ways. First, environment has been characterized
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as an objective, physical environment in which we move (Margulis, 1977). Second,
Wohlwill (1973) referred to the 'environment' as the perceptual, symbolic environment
that we construct in our minds. This conceptualization of 'environment' is linked to
psychological descriptions of privacy. According to the perspectives of both Altman
(1990) and Wohlwill (1973), environment can be physical and/or psychological in nature,
and must be addressed when describing definitions of privacy.
Both Westin and Altman's privacy theories address the notion of limited access
approaches to privacy regulation. In contrast, Altman highlighted how perceptions of
privacy may be specific to one's culture, while Westin referenced privacy in terms of
political values. Although both Westin and Altman's theories of privacy offer deep
insight into how and why privacy occurs in relational settings (i.e., between interaction
partners, in group settings or in an organization), these theories fail to address how
privacy occurs in online settings where there is a lack of direct interaction. For example,
in the case of personal online profiles, where users display information without the
expectation that someone will respond directly to this information, how do the states
(how privacy is achieved) and functions (why privacy is necessary) of privacy operate ?
What mechanisms are at work in this context? Although Altman went on to describe how
people exercise control over both input and output of information, these components are
again, specific to offline self-disclosure.
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Privacy Online
In an attempt to apply the concept of privacy to online settings, theorists have
formulated a newer online privacy theory. Two key theorists in this area are Moor
(1997) and Tavani (2007).
Originally introduced by Moor (1997) and later revised by both Moor and Tavani
(2001), the theory of "restricted access/limited control" centers around the idea that
information is shared with specific people at specific times. Central to the framework of
this theory is the idea of control, and more specifically, limited control. Both Moor and
Tavani acknowledged that in the computer age it is virtually impossible to control one's
personal information at all times, and therefore proposed that instead, it is important to
ensure that the right people have access to certain information at the right time. A key
component of this theory is the notion of the "situation". A situation can include various
contexts that are normally regarded as being private, including relationships, activities in
a specific location, or storage, access or manipulation of information in a database.
Activities involving the internet can, therefore, be considered situations. Tavani (2007)
argues that it is the situation in which personal information can be used by others, not the
information itself, that dictates whether or not the information should be declared private.
In addition, he goes on to say that details about access to personal information should be
"completely public" (p. 16) and known to all who are involved. This theory then has
great implications for privacy policy construction, highlighting the need for clear and
openly communicated roles and responsibilities. With the inclusion of clear policies,
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debate over when normative laws should be established to protect online privacy in
various situations (e.g., faculty salaries) can be resolved.
While theories of privacy have clarified different mechanisms and components
driving the boundary regulation process, less is known about individual definitions of
privacy and how they vary. How and why do perceptions of privacy differ, and what
influences these differences in perceptions? Do computer experience and usage relate to
perceptions of privacy and privacy behaviours? Do personal experiences and the intended
(or mental) audience relate to perceptions of privacy and privacy behaviours? Does
context play a role in perceptions of privacy and privacy behaviours? Do privacy related
behaviours differ when disclosures occur online? It could be that users view their online
behaviours as more anonymous and therefore feel as though their information is more
private when, in fact, this may not be the case. It is important to consider how people
perceive privacy, because these definitions may very well impact on what they choose to
disclose and use of privacy settings. Given the relative lack of research assessing selfdisclosure as it relates to perceptions and awareness of privacy online, the present
research provides an exploratory examination of these issues.
Identity Theft and Threats to Personal Security
Identity theft and personal security are ever-present concerns associated with
information disclosed online (e.g., Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; LaRose & Rifon, 2006; Lee,
Im, & Taylor, 2008). In apparent opposition to the numerous warnings issued by law
enforcement and public awareness groups regarding the need to be cautious in disclosing
personal information (e.g., Child Online Protection (COP); McCandlish, 2002; Willard,
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2006), one of the primary goals of social networking sites is to encourage disclosure of
personal information with others online. This personal information can include full
names, addresses, birthday and year, contact information, and photos. Even a select few
pieces of personal information, however, has the potential to provide identity thieves with
the means to acquire "identity -based" information such as social insurance numbers,
credit cards, driver's licenses, etc. With these pieces of information, even more critical
legal documents can be procured, such as passports (Sullivan, 2008). Apart from
concerns regarding the protection of identity, disclosure of personal information (even if
limited) can be sufficient, when combined with other Internet based tools such as reverse
directory checks, to secure home phone numbers, full addresses, age and gender and
other information that could leave a person vulnerable (Messmer, 2007).
Given the widespread use and potential dangers associated with online
communication, a thorough understanding of the features of networking sites, and how
people are using these sites is critical in developing ways to educate users about how to
protect their information and themselves. The overarching goal of the present research
was to gain a better understanding of what can be found in online social networking
profiles, specifically, Facebook. Apart from collecting data on the kinds of information
users were choosing to include (and exclude) in their personal profiles, the following
studies sought to examine the impact of individual characteristics on the type of
information that is likely to be present in an online profile (i.e., information that is selfdisclosed as a function of characteristics including age, gender and relationship status).
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The Current Research: Predictors of Disclosure and Privacy Settings Usage in an
Online Social Networking Site.
The Online Social Context
Due to the nature of online media, the social context in which online
communication occurs may be fundamentally different from social interactions in offline
contexts (e.g., face-to-face). Features inherent in online interaction may encourage or
hinder self-expression (e.g., Henderson & Gilding, 2004; Walther, 1996). Researchers
have argued that a large proportion of the meaning derived from social communication
comes from non-verbal feedback (Argyle, 1975). Given that certain cues are "filtered
out" in online communication (Hian, Chuan, Trevor & Detenber, 2004), debate has
arisen over the benefits and drawbacks of online social interaction. Though elements
such as accessibility and anonymity may encourage users to disclose intimate details
about the self, without worry of exposure (Carnes, 2003; Cooper, Shapiro & Powers,
1998), many users are not fully aware that they may be sharing personal information in a
public domain. Given that the Internet has been available for public use since the 1990s
and the rapid advance in the number of methods for communicating on the net with
growth in Internet usage (blog, email etc.) increasing by 146% from 2000-2010 (World
Internet Users, 2010), it would be surprising that many users possess a relatively naive
technical understanding of what can and does happen to the information they share on
the net. This naivete may put users in a position of vulnerability. Even long-time Internet
users may not understand exactly how the Internet works. Furthermore, amount of
experience with online communication may not necessarily imply technical knowledge.
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For example, without knowledge of the underpinnings of computer technology and
security, users may disclose potentially damaging or very personal/intimate information,
without realizing it. It may therefore be useful to assess factors including personality and
familiarity with technology, and how these are related to use of technology. Moreover,
users' perceptions about communication online, and the factors that influence what they
are willing to disclose, such as who users are targeting when disclosing, may be of
paramount importance for understanding the predictors of online information sharing.
Roadmap and Overview of the Current Studies.
This dissertation presents four studies. The fours presented are based on data
collected from Facebook between the years 2008-2010. Studies 1 A, B and C were
archival and looked at the same 400 publicly accessible profiles on Facebook. The main
purpose of Study 1 A was to create a comprehensive scoring that could be used to assess
the kinds of information disclosed in personal Facebook profiles. Study 1 B utilized the
scoring tool developed in Study 1 A to categorize and examine information disclosed in
terms of three types of threat: identity threat, personal security threat and the potential for
stigmatization. Study 1 C extended Study 1 B by including an examination on all content
available to users, rather than just the three limited categories. In both Study 1 B and C,
factors that predicted disclosure within the three categories and overall content areas were
investigated in an exploratory fashion to gain a better sense of how users were disclosing
online.
Study 2 was a three-part experimental study that extended the findings of Studies
1 A, B and C by examining the impact of various factors on the creation of a Facebook
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profile. Part 1 investigated experimentally the impact of story, gender of the participant
creating the profile and gender of the target person for which the profile was created on
disclosure and use of privacy settings. In the current study, in order to obtain a clearer
picture of disclosure, it was necessary to control the information disclosed in the
profiles. As such, information was fabricated for a target individual, and participant
disclosure of information for this target person was examined. Based on privacy policy
literature and research highlighting the saliency of anecdotal stories (Stanovich, 2009;
Metzger, 2006, Spiekermann, Grossklags & Berendt, 2001), it was anticipated that
participants who read a story about personal privacy invasion would disclose less
information than those who read either Facebook's legal privacy policy or a story about
the history of the internet (control). In addition, having read the privacy invasion story
was expected to encourage greater use of privacy settings among users.
In keeping with research examining gender differences in self-disclosure (e.g.,
Dindia and Allen, 1992), it was expected that female participants would disclose more
overall, but that this difference may be dependent on the topic of disclosure (Derlega,
Durham, Gockel & Sholis, 1981). More specifically, male participants were expected to
disclose more in specific content areas (e.g., activities, views, education). Lastly, given
that females are more often the victims of online abuse (WHOA, 2008) it was expected
that participants would disclose less about female targets than about male targets.
Part 2 consisted of an exploratory examination of predictive factors such as
personality (private and public self-consciousness, extraversion), the virtual audience
(i.e., who they had in mind when posted information), perceptions of online privacy,
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online privacy attitudes and behaviours and reported self-disclosure on actual disclosure
and privacy settings use within Facebook profiles.
Part 3 examined experimentally the impact of the context in which the profile was
created, gender of the participant creating the profile and gender of the target for whom
the profile was created on disclosure and use of privacy settings. Based on online hyperpersonal theory (Walther, 1996) and previous research showing that online media
generated higher levels of disclosure (Joinson, 2001; Schouten, Valkenburg & Peter,
2007, Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & Irvine, 2006), it was expected that participants
filling out a profile on paper and pencil would be less inclined to disclose information
than their online counterparts. In terms of privacy settings usage as a function of context,
no specific hypotheses were set forth. There is no known research examining the impact
of context on settings use, and therefore this examination was exploratory in nature.
An Archival Examination of Information Disclosed in Existing Facebook
Profiles
Given the vast array of information that can be shared and the number of users,
concerns regarding security and privacy issues are a recurring issue (Acoca, 2008). Some
concerns involve potential threats to personal safety from the abundance of information
that is assumed to be available and accessible about an individual on their online profile.
Specifically, there are concerns regarding identity theft if users provide too much
information (e.g., birth date, address, phone, full name etc.). In addition, there are
concerns for personal safety for vulnerable users who could be stalked, or otherwise
threatened. A less commonly considered threat is the possibility of social risk as a
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function of self-identification with minority or stigmatized groups. Although some of
these concerns have surfaced in the popular media (e.g., news.cnet.com), there is little
empirical investigation documenting how much and what kind of information is present
in personal Facebook profiles to determine the potential for threats of any type, nor is
there any information regarding how users differ in the information disclosed in their
profiles to provide clues as to who is most likely to be at risk.
Study 1 A
Creation of a Scoring Tool for Assessing Disclosure in Facebook
The primary purpose of Study 1 A was to develop a scoring instrument to
summarize what information could be disclosed on Facebook profiles. To do this, a
comprehensive coding tool was required. From this tool, we then examined the frequency
for each piece of information to determine what is and is not likely to be found in online
profiles.
General Method
Participants. A sample of 400 randomly selected, accessible, personal profiles
from 8 Canadian Facebook networks was collected. The networks included 4
community networks (Toronto, Vancouver, Charlottetown and Kitchener) and 4
university networks (Mount Allison University, Memorial University of Newfoundland,
University of Toronto and Wilfrid Laurier University). Networks varied in size, ranging
from small to large. Small networks contained up to 14000 profiles (39.2 % of the
sample), medium networks contained 36000 to 150000 profiles (37.2 % of the sample),
and large networks contained 720000 profiles or more (23.6 % of the sample).
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Specifically, 12.3% of the sample came from a network exceeding a million people,
11.3% from a network of approximately 720000 people, 15.2 % from a network of
approximately 150000 people, 12.2% from a network of approximately 56000 people,
9.8 % from a network of approximately 36000 people, 15.9 % from a network of
approximately 14000 people, and 23.3 % from a network of approximately 5000 people.
Of the 400 personal profiles, 328 indicated gender (116 females, 155 males).
Additionally, 301 profiles disclosed age. Among the females, ages ranged from 19-47
years (M= 22.90 years, SD = 3.91 years). Males ranged in age from 17-61 years (M=
23.90 years, SD= 5.03 years). The mean age of males and females who reported both
their age and gender did not differ, t (269) = 1.73,/? = .09.
Procedure
A scoring tool was developed in order to assess the content of the personal
profiles. Construction of the scoring tool was a multi-step process. First, a blank template
of a Facebook profile was examined to identify potential pieces of information that could
be included in a profile. Two raters independently created checklists from this blank
profile template. Following these independent content analyses, an aggregated 90 item
checklist was constructed which was comprised of all items from both raters. Six
independent coders then used the aggregated coding checklist to code actual online
Facebook profiles. Each coder noted any items missing from the checklist that would be
required to code their profiles. Coders met and discussed content that was not captured by
the aggregated coding checklist. Following this discussion a final checklist comprised of
3 identification items (i.e., username link, the network searched, and the size of the
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overall network) and 97 dichotomously scored items (i.e., whether the piece of
information was present or absent) was constructed (see Appendix B for the complete
checklist and descriptions of items, note that the first three items are the identification
items).
Once the coding checklist was established, six raters coded the 400 participant
profiles. Each coder coded 50-100 profiles. Networks searched were counterbalanced
across coders. Random selection of profiles was achieved using a randomization feature
of the Facebook program where 10 profiles are generated at random. These 10 profiles
would include profiles that were and were not publicly visible. On average, 50% of
profiles that were retrieved were publicly accessible. Coders scanned the 10 profiles and
selected the first one from the list of 10 that was publicly visible. The search for profiles
was continued until all raters coded their full allotment of accessible profiles. In order to
ensure consistency between coders, reliability was conducted on 40 profiles,
representing 10% of the data. Percentage agreement was 99%, indicating high intercoder reliability for the 97 dichotomous items. Differences were resolved through
discussion.
Results
Descriptive summaries were calculated for each item on the checklist that was
available among the accessible profiles (See Table 1 for a summary). Overall, the
fifteen most consistently disclosed/provided pieces of information (available on 63% or
more of the profiles) described personally identifying information (i.e., birth date,
gender, profile pictures, photo albums, tagged photos and general photos of the user) as
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well as social connections (i.e., groups joined, and friends viewable). In addition,
education information (college/university attended) and regular update information
(status, wall and mini-feed) were included. Finally, playful communications such as
acceptance of pokes, messages, and gifts, and applications were frequently provided. In
contrast, the fifteen least frequently included items (9% or less) described key personal
information (Zip/Postal Code), phone numbers (both land line and mobile), home
address, city or town, website and former name. In addition, there was also a limited
amount of information provided regarding some aspects of educational experience (i.e.,
school mailbox, courses, degree, awards, and room). Finally, optional "wall features"
(i.e., Super Wall and Advanced Wall), market place listings and events as described in
the mini feed were also infrequently included. Of the 97 items that could be
dichotomously scored, 26 items were disclosed by at least 50% of the sample (see Table
1 for summary).
Discussion
Two important outcomes were apparent from the descriptive summary of
Facebook profile content. First, despite the potential for significant disclosure through
these online social networking profiles, on average, people were choosing to display
approximately 25% of possible information for other users to view. This clearly
indicates either a reticence to invest heavily in developing online profiles, or active
decisions to limit disclosure. Interestingly, the pieces of information that were disclosed
were neither consistently "safe" nor "unsafe". Specifically, for both the most prevalent
and least prevalent pieces of information included, there were highly personal pieces of
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information. That is, in some cases profiles contained the most salient pieces of
information required for identity theft and personal safety threats including identifying
pictures, birth date, and regular mini-feed updates. These pieces can be used to obtain
social insurance numbers and physical location, posing both identity and personal safety
threats (Messmer, 2007). However, equally critical pieces of information viewed by the
police as particularly risky and pertinent to identity theft such as land and mobile phone
numbers and zip/postal code were not readily apparent. Although it makes sense that
features such as walls might be less frequently present because these features require
active creation and generation to establish and maintain, it is surprising to see
information that is prompted being selectively included/disclosed. Therefore, users are
demonstrating some discretion regarding what kinds of revealing information they are
willing to share. In keeping with Westin's theory of privacy (1970), it appears that even
online, users still maintain certain levels of anonymity and reserve by limiting disclosure
of certain pieces of information, albeit there are inconsistencies in the information
provided. Specifically, users with publicly accessible profiles are, at the same time,
choosing to display and censor personal information that can be considered risky.
In an attempt to understand who is likely to include revealing information and
what types of information are likely to be produced together, two additional studies were
conducted.
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Study 1 B
Assessing Three Types of Information Threat on Facebook: Personal Identity,
Personal Security and Potential for Stigmatization
With a rapid rise in popularity and use, online social networking sites have
introduced new and potentially harmful ways for individuals to access personal
information. Identity theft and personal security threats are ever-present online, and thus
calls for research examining specific kinds of information disclosed online that may pose
a particular risk to the user (Acoca, 2008). Two kinds of threats are possible. One deals
with identity theft, which occurs when personal information is used to commit a crime or
theft (e.g., impersonation) without the discloser's consent and/or knowledge. Full names,
addresses, phone numbers and birthdates are all pieces of information that can be
potentially harmful to the discloser if used the wrong way, because other potentially
harmful information (e.g., social insurance numbers, credit card information) can be
accessed through indirect means using these core pieces of information (Acquisti &
Gross, 2009). Another kind of threat is social threat or potential danger to the self and/or
group(s) that an individual belongs to. Information such as contact information, sexual
orientation, group membership, religious affiliation, and political affiliation are all details
that can potentially be used to harm and stigmatize an individual. In this second study, we
explored means for examining identity threat, personal and group threats.
Method
Materials and Procedure. Three disclosure categories were developed through
qualitative analysis (Patton, 2001). All individual items were considered and based on
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these items, categories were generated. Any discrepancies were compared, discussed and
resolved by discussion. Development of each of the three categories is explained in
further detail in the sections below. The first category reflected personal identity
information, the second involved sensitive personal information, and the third involved
potentially stigmatizing information. Refer to Table 2 for category descriptives.
Personal Identity Information (Default/Standard Information). The first
category involved revealing basic personal identifying information, or what was deemed
default/standard information. This information was defined as details people might
disclose in banks, schools, jobs etc., but that could be used in potentially threatening
ways.
To develop this category a three stage process was used. First, two researchers
conducted a content analysis of the 97 items in the full checklist. The number of items
was first reduced based on frequency. Items that were very infrequently disclosed (less
than 5% of users disclosed the information) were omitted. In addition, items that lacked
variability or did not cohere with the other items were omitted. Items were further
reduced based on whether the item did or did not reveal default or standard personal
information that is typically required to identify a person. Items that failed to meet this
requirement were omitted. Next, separate from the sample of 400 profiles, 18 research
assistants with experience working in psychology labs examining technology and
technology applications in daily life, were recruited to participate in a pilot study to
construct the final category of standard/default information. First, these research
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assistants were asked about their familiarity with Facebook through two questions.
Specifically they were asked to use a 7-point Likert-type scale (1= not at all familiar
with Facebook, 1- extremely familiar with Facebook),
"Please rate on the 7 point scale below how familiar you feel you are with
Facebook".
Among these research assistants the level of familiarity with Facebook was
relatively high (M = 5.67, SD = 1.82), however, scores ranged from 1 to 7.
The research assistants were also asked about their log in behavior. Specifically,
they were asked,
"On average, how often do you log into Facebook in a one-week period?"
On average, the majority of research assistants logged into Facebook multiple
times per week (M = 19.17, SD = 22.92), although the range from 0 to 85 times per week
was variable, with two participants never signing in. The majority of participants (50%)
indicated that they logged in between 12 and 15 times per week.
The research assistants were asked to use the checklist to respond to one
question. Research assistants were asked to indicate (with a checkmark) which items
they felt were standard or default requirements for the construction of a personal profile
or information typically required on personal profile websites. Specifically participants
were asked,
"We are trying to determine what pieces of information people consider to be "standard"
or typical information requested on personal profile sites. We would like you to look
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through the list below to identify the elements that you believe are customarily required
in online profiles?"
Items from the checklist that were positively identified by more than 50% of the
assistants were considered for inclusion in the scale. Five items were identified as default
or standard by more than 50% of the participants. The items and percentage endorsement
included: gender (83.3%), birth day (61.1%), birth year (72.2%), email (61.1%), and
profile picture (55.6%).
Third, consultation with a local police department and police college was
conducted to gain insight into which items were viewed by the police as particularly risky
and pertinent to identity theft. Through consultation, 3 additional items (i.e., street
address, city /town, postal code) were added to the default/standard information scale.
These items identified personal information that could be used in potentially harmful
ways.
Finally, this yielded an 8 item default/standard information scale, comprised of
street address, city /town, postal code, gender, birth day, birth year, profile picture and
email (possible scores ranged from 0 - 8). Higher scores indicated higher levels of selfdisclosure for default items.
Sensitive Personal Information (Personal Security). The second category
reflected personally revealing/sensitive information. This information was defined as
details that could be used to locate an individual, and could be used to threaten or harm
another.
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To develop this category, two researchers conducted a systematic thematic
analysis of the checklist items to determine which variables should belong in the
sensitive information category based on the nature of each variable and the potential
danger in disclosing each item. After all items were considered, and through discussion,
the following were placed in the sensitive information category: email, employer, job
position, status, mini-feed, regular wall, profile picture, photo albums, self-selected
photos, tagged photos, message, poke, send a gift, and friends viewable (possible scores
ranged from 0-14). Higher scores indicated higher levels of self-disclosure.
Potentially Stigmatizing Information. The third category reflected sensitive
personal information that could result in stigmatization within society.
To develop this category two researchers conducted a systematic thematic
analysis of the items to determine which variables should belong in the stigmatizing (as
well as sensitive) category based on the nature of each variable and the potential for
stigmatization of the user by viewers. After all items were considered, and through
discussion, the final scale was comprised of religious views, political views, birth year,
sexual orientation, photos, friends viewable, interests, activities, favorite music, favorite
movies, favorite TV shows, favorite books, favorite quotes, and about me (possible
scores ranged from 0-14). Higher scores indicated higher levels of self-disclosure.
Results
Analyses based on the full sample of 400 profiles explored whether any
differences in self-disclosure emerged for profile information. Analyses consisted of 15
independent t-tests with 5 t-tests for each of the grouping categories (default/standard
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information, sensitive personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information).
Comparisons assessed potential differences as a function of network type (university vs.
community), gender revealed (indicated/not indicated), gender (male vs. female),
relationship status revealed (indicated/not indicated), and age revealed (indicated/not
indicated). Using a Bonferroni correction, the probability for each comparison was
corrected to p < .003 to accommodate the number of tests conducted. Examination of
variables dealing with relationships and with age was carried out using multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) and regression analyses. Refer to Table 3 for a
summary of analyses.
Comparisons among Network, Gender Revealed, Gender Identified,
Relationship Status Revealed, and Age Revealed. Overall, within each set of 5 t-tests,
the same three comparisons were statistically significant. Specifically, users who
provided information about their gender (present or absent), relationship status, and age1
disclosed more default/standard information, more sensitive personal information, and
more potentially stigmatizing information in their online profiles than their peers who did
not disclose their gender, relationship status or age (smallest t (1, 398) = -2.81, p = .005).
See Table 3 for a complete summary.
Relationships Status (single, in a relationship, status not indicated/missing).
For each of the three grouping categories (i.e., default/standard information, sensitive

1

To avoid redundancy, the default/standard information scale was revised, and birth day and year were

omittedfromthe scale for the analysis examining age as a predictor.
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personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information), a multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to compare the amount of disclosure of
default/standard information, sensitive personal information, and potentially
stigmatizing information as a function of one of three relationship status possibilities
(single, in a relationship, missing) . Relationship status served as the between subjects
factor.
Results for the default/standard and sensitive personal information categories
provided similar outcomes. Specifically, there was a significant main effect of
relationship status condition {F{2, 397) = 15.37,/? < .001 and F{2, 397) = 12.85,/? <
.001, for default/standard information and sensitive personal information, respectively).
Tukey-b post hoc comparisons revealed that users who indicated their relationship status
as either single or in a relationship disclosed significantly more default/standard
information {Msingle = 3.34 & Mrelationship = 3.11) and sensitive personal information
{Msingle = 10.12 & Mrelationship = 10.08) than users who did not indicate their
relationship status {Mmissing = 2.54 and Mmissing = 8.94, for default/standard
information and sensitive personal information, respectively).
Although the analysis for stigmatizing information also yielded a significant main
effect of relationship status condition {F (2, 397) = 14.46,/? < .001), the Tukey-b post hoc
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Only two statuses (i.e., single and in a relationship) and status missing (did not indicate their relationship

status) were used in these analyses due to very small cell numbers (largest n < 19) for the remaining four
statuses (i e , married, engaged, it's complicated, in an open relationship).
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comparisons revealed that all three relationship statuses significantly differed from one
another. Single users (M= 8.61) disclosed the highest amount of this grouping of
information in their profiles, followed by users in a relationship {M= 7.16), and finally,
users who did not indicate their relationship status disclosed the least amount of
stigmatized information (M= 6.03). See Figure 1.
Analysis of Age. Three linear regressions were conducted to explore whether
age predicted disclosure of information for each of the three categories (default/standard
information, sensitive personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information).
The default/standard information was altered for this analysis through the removal of
birth day and birth year in order to prevent redundancy in this measure. Age was entered
as the predictor variable, and the new default information aggregate scale was entered as
the dependent variable. The overall model was significant in all three cases, R = .06, F
(1, 289) = 18.53/? < .001, R2= .08, F ( l , 289) = 11.31/? < .001 andi? 2 = .08, F ( l , 289)
= 25.74/? < 001, for default/standard information, sensitive personal information, and
potentially stigmatizing information, respectively. In all three cases, as age increased,
the amount of information presented in personal profiles decreased (P = -.25,/? < .001, P
= -.19,/? = .001, and P = -.29, p < .001, for default/standard information, sensitive
personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information, respectively).
Discussion
In summary, all three disclosure categories were relevant, in that all were sources
for disclosure and potentially sources for threat. The results revealed a similar trend for
all three grouping categories (i.e., default/standard, sensitive personal information, and
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potentially stigmatizing information). Facebook users who were acknowledged to have
included information about their gender, relationship status, and age, disclosed more
information in all three disclosure categories than people who did not indicate this
information at all. Further, users who indicated they were single had the highest number
of stigmatizing items, followed by users who were in a relationship, and finally, users
who did not specify a status had the lowest number of stigmatizing items. This trend was
not present for default/standard information or sensitive personal information. Instead,
users who were single or in a relationship did not differ on their disclosure of
default/standard information or sensitive personal information, but users who did not
indicate a status had less of this information in their online Facebook profiles.
Individuals at greatest risk for threat could therefore be those who are seeking a
relationship. It could be that those who are searching for romantic relationships are using
online media as a way to self-present or to advertise themselves to potential dating
partners. In fact, research has shown that a large majority of people looking to date use
the Internet as a means for finding a partner (Madden & Lenhart, 2006). Online daters
not only disclose more intimate details, but disclose these details at a faster pace than do
offline daters (Rosen, Cheever, Cummings, & Felt, 2008). While disclosing details
online may be necessary to attract a potential mate, there is clearly greater potential for
harm.
Interestingly, the type of network and whether the profile was generated by a
male or female did not have an impact on whether or not information appeared in a
Facebook profile. That is, in the community and university samples, and males and
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females did not differ in the amount of information disclosed in their online profiles.
While females are generally high disclosers when compared to males in more traditional
social interactions (Dindia & Allen, 1992), perhaps males feel more comfortable
disclosing in an online setting where there is less pressure to conform or adhere to strict
social rules and male stereotypes for disclosure.
Lastly, for those users who included information about their age, as age
increased, disclosure of all three types of information (default/standard, sensitive
personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information) decreased. Older
individuals may be more cautious when disclosing details about themselves. It could be
that a greater amount of life experience has taught older users to be wary of information
sharing, and they may be more aware of some of the risks involved in disclosure of
personal details. For the younger generation, disclosing personal information across a
variety of domains (e.g., school, online) is part of everyday life, and may have begun to
reduce the gap between private and public selves. Thus, younger people may be less
cautious when disclosing highly personal details and feel more comfortable with online
disclosure (Goodstein, 2007). Alternatively, it is also possible that as age increases,
disclosing certain types of information may not be seen as appropriate. For example, in
Western society it is social custom that one does not ask older people for socially
revealing information as a mark of respect (Man, 2007). Yet another possible
explanation is that social communication that is asynchronous yet personal, such as
online social networks, may not provide the forum for communication that is
comfortable for older users. While older people may be open to technology, they use it
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less (Bucur, Renold, & Henke, 1999), and coupled with a greater awareness of the risks
associated with use of technology, may prefer different media for social connections.
These interpretations must be considered in light of the fact that the age of nondisclosers is not known, and therefore conclusions about age patterns for this population
are not possible.
In summary, although Study 1 A indicated that there were inconsistencies such
that some pieces of personal and revealing information were disclosed and others were
not, the results from Study 1 B provided an initial understanding of potential individual
differences that predict who is most likely to disclose what information. It should be
noted that assessment of the veracity of the information presented online was not
possible, and therefore the possibility remains that while individual differences predicted
disclosure, it is hard to know whether or not these differences were real differences, or
simply fabricated by the user (e.g., creating/using a fake gender and age). In keeping
with self-presentation theory (e.g., Goffman, 1959), it would not be surprising that some
of the users did not display accurate personal information. In some cases this
information may have been completed fabricated and in others, as in the case of selfpresentation, it is possible that the information displayed reflected an idealized version
of the true self. In addition, Study IB examined only publicly accessible profiles, and
therefore patterns of disclosure may be different for profiles that do not allow public
access. Study 1 C further explored variables that explain what is disclosed and by whom.
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Study 1 C
Examination of Disclosure across Various Content Areas within Facebook
One concern in Study 1 B was that only limited information was examined.
Study 1 C provided an examination of all of the content available through Facebook in
order to better understand how to conceptualize the information that can be provided and
who is likely to disclose it.
Method and Results
The sample included the 400 profiles specified in Study 1 A and employed the
same checklist.
A fourth grouping strategy was conducted to include all information present in
Facebook but to organize it in a meaningful way. The process involved several steps.
First, information was sorted as a function of the layout of the Facebook profile
template. However, the template organization tended to include information that was not
obviously related thematically. Two researchers carried out discussion about how to
categorize information based on thematic coherence. Through discussion, the following
10 categories were identified: Personal information, Relationship information, Age
information, Contact information, Education information, Work information, View
information, General Picture information, Message and Poke acceptance (whether or not
users allowed other users to send them private messages and to poke them), and Wall
and Update Information (i.e., regular wall, advanced wall, super wall, fun wall, minifeed, and status).
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A principal components factor analysis with a Varimax rotation was conducted
to confirm these categories and the relationships between these variables. The factor
analysis yielded 11 factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which accounted for a
total of 66.74% of the variance. Overall, the factors corresponded with the thematic
analysis of the two researchers with the exception that one category identified by the
researchers was divided into two categories through the factor analysis. Initial
Eigenvalues ranged from 1.04 to 6.60, and indicated that the factors explained 16.93%,
9.62%, 8.20 %, 6.13 %, 4.80%, 4.54%, 4.31%, 3.50%, 3.08%, 2.96%, and 2.68% of the
variance, respectively. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table 4. The following
eleven aggregate scales were created based on the factor loadings and were used in the
subsequent analyses: Personal information, Tagged and Self-selected Photos and Update
information, Work information, Education information, Message and Poke Acceptance
(whether users allow for receipt of private messages and nudges from other users),
Album and Profile Picture information, Age information, Contact information, View
information, Other Wall Presence, and Relationship information. Higher scores
indicated higher levels of self-disclosure for these items. Reliability was conducted for
scales that had more than 3 items using Cronbach's alpha . The alphas ranged from
moderate to high: .91 for Personal information (8 items), .90 for Work information (4
3

Cronbach alphas for scales consisting of only three items were low. Alpha levels were .48 for contact

information, and .57 for album and profile picture information. Inter-item correlations were carried out for
scales with 2 items. Item correlations were 37 for view information, .34 for wall information, and .34 for
relationship information.
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items), .76 for Education information (4 items), and .84 for Tagged and Self-selected
Photos and Update information (5 items). Refer to Table 5 for a list of items in each
scale and means.
Following the analyses in Study 1 B, t-tests were conducted first to explore
possible differences as a function of network type (university vs. community), gender
revealed (indicated/not indicated), gender (male vs. female), relationship status revealed
(indicated/not indicated), and age revealed (indicated/not indicated) for each of the 11
topic scales. Given the number of comparisons conducted, a Bonferroni correction was
employed and the alpha level for each test was set to .005. These t-tests were followed
by a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) looking within relationship status,
and finally, with a linear regression using age. Refer to Table 6 for a summary of the ttest statistics.
Type of Network. One out of 11 t-tests was significant. Results revealed that
users who belonged to a community network were more likely to include view
information in their personal profiles than were their university network counterparts.
Gender Revealed (indicated/not indicated). Five out of the 11 t-tests were
significant. Results revealed that users who indicated their gender, also had higher
levels of disclosure for: personal information, tagged and self-selected photos and
update information, education information, album and profile picture information, and
age information.
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Male vs. Female. One out of the 11 t-tests was significant. Results revealed that
males expressed more information about their political and religious views than did
females.
Relationship Status Revealed (indicated/not indicated). Five of the 11 t-tests
were significant. Overall, disclosing one's relationship status was related to higher levels
of disclosure of various topics, including: personal information, tagged and self-selected
photos and update information, album and profile picture information, age information;
and view information.
Age Revealed (indicated/not indicated). One of the 10 t-tests was significant.
Users who disclosed their age also disclosed more education information.
Analysis of Relationship Status. A multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was conducted with the relationship status condition (single, in a
relationship, missing) as the between subjects factor and the 11 aggregate scales as the
dependent variables. Results revealed a significant main effect of relationship status
condition for 8 of the 11 scales including: personal information {F (2, 397) = 7.20,/? =
.001); tagged and self-selected photos and update information {F (2, 397) = 8.45,/? <
.001); album and profile picture information {F (2, 397) = 12.40,/? < .001); age
information (F (2, 397) = 10.94,/? < .001); work information {F (2, 397) = 5.80/? =
.003); view information {F{2, 397) = 5.88,/? = .003); relationship information {F{2,
397) = 18.91,/? < .001) and super fun wall information {F{2, 397) = 5.88,/? = .003).
For personal information, Tukey-b post hoc comparisons revealed that single
users {M= 4.51) indicated significantly more personal information than did users who
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were either in a relationship {M= 3.36), or who did not disclose their relationship status
(M=3.04).
According to Tukey-b post hoc comparisons, tagged and self-selected photos and
update information, album and profile picture information, age information, and work
information all yielded consistent patterns. In general, users who either indicated they
were single or in a relationship, disclosed significantly more information related to these
topics than did users who did not disclose their relationship status. Refer to Table 7 for
means.
For information pertaining to religious and political views, Tukey-b post hoes
showed that single users (M=.85) had significantly more information present in their
profiles than did users who did not indicate their relationship status (M= .52). Lastly, for
relationship information, all three groups differed significantly from one another. Users
who were single (M- 1.06) displayed the most relationship information, followed by
users who were in a relationship (M= .78), and finally, users who did not disclose their
relationship status were the least likely to display relationship information in their online
profiles (M= .50). See Figure 2.
Analysis of Age. Ten linear regressions were conducted to explore how age as a
continuous factor was related to disclosure of information online. Given the number of
regressions conducted, the alpha level for each test was set to .005. Age was entered as
the predictor variable, and each of the aggregated topic scales were entered as the
dependent variables. For 5 of the 10 scales, age significantly predicted disclosure of
topic. The overall models were significant for the following scales: personal information
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{R2= .04, F ( l , 289) = 14.11/? < .001, p = -.22,/? < .001); Tagged and Self-selected
Photos and Update information {R2= .05, F ( l , 289) = 16.46/? < .001, p = -.23,/? <
.001); education information {R2= .04, F{\, 289) = 10.82/? = .001, p = -.19,/? = .001);
Album and Profile Picture information {R2 = .09, F (1, 289) = 28.24/? < 001, p = -.30,/?
< .001); and relationship information (R2= .07, F ( l , 289) = 20.78/? < .001, p = -.26,/?
< .001). Overall, as age increased, disclosure of these topics decreased.
Discussion
For the most part, the outcomes of Study 1 C support the outcomes reported in
Study 1 B. Specifically, gender (male versus female) and network membership
(community versus university) were not important variables for distinguishing who
would or would not be likely to disclose information. Differences existed only for one
topic. Unlike traditional face-to-face interactions (Dindia & Allen, 1992), online social
networking profiles may provide a means of communicating that facilitates disclosure
among males to the same level as evidenced in females. Also, whether an individual
belongs to a university-based or community-based network did not strongly predict to
the amount of disclosure of information, with the exception of one topic. Apparently,
both university and community samples share similar knowledge or attitudes toward
revealing information online.
Like Study 1 B, results from Study 1 C revealed that voluntarily providing
personal information related to gender, and relationship status was related to greater
disclosure of certain topics (i.e., for 5 of the 11 scales). One notable difference between
Study 1 B and Study 1 C concerns revealing personal information related to age. In
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Study 1 B, revealing any information about age (i.e., whether they indicated their age or
not) had an impact on the likelihood to disclose information. In contrast, for Study 1 C,
whether an individual supplied information regarding their age or not did not predict
information disclosed. Out of the possible 10 topic categories, revealing age was only
significant for one (i.e., education information).
On the other hand, in both Studies 1 B and C, when individuals provided their
age, it proved to be an important factor in distinguishing levels of disclosure online. As
age increased, self-disclosure decreased on 5 out of 10 scales in Study 1 C (i.e., photo
album information, relationship information, personal information, Tagged and selfselected photos and update information, and education information) and for all
categories examined in Study 1 B. Items in these particular 5 areas tended to overlap
with the items in the three grouping categories used in Study 1 B relative to the 5 areas
that were not significant in this analysis.
Consistent with earlier discussions, older adults may be less likely to reveal
information due to less familiarity and trust with technology or due to more experience,
wariness or social prohibitions regarding disclosure of private information (Bucur,
Renold, & Henke, 1999; Mann, 2007). In keeping with the norm of reciprocity
(Gouldner, 1960), it may be that there is a disclosure "culture" whereby peers within the
same age group or social sphere grow to expect certain levels of reciprocal disclosure,
therefore encouraging or discouraging information sharing. Perhaps for younger users
who have publicly accessible profiles to start off with, disclosure norms are higher,
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whereas for older users, disclosure norms set out by their "culture" are lower in
comparison. Again, these conclusions apply only to publicly accessible profiles.
Relationship status was very important in distinguishing levels of disclosure for
the different topic categories. Overall, those seeking a relationship were far more
inclined to disclose on a variety of topics including views, relationship information, and
personal information than were their counterparts who were in a relationship or who did
not disclose a status. The current outcomes highlight the importance of relationship
status for identifying those users who are more likely to reveal highly personal
information. Those seeking a relationship may be using Facebook as a less overt dating
site, and, thus, may be differentially motivated to disclose highly personal information
across a variety of topics regardless of the dangers or threats associated with disclosing
this information. Motivation therefore may prove to be an important factor, and merits
further investigation in future studies.
Interestingly, contact, other wall information (i.e., Fun Wall, Advanced Wall and
Super Wall), and acceptance of messages and pokes yielded non-significant results. In
the case of acceptance of pokes and messages, a very high percentage (99.3% and 99%
for pokes and messages, respectively) of users had these features present in their
profiles. It may be that because these features are a prompted or automatic feature
present in a Facebook profile, less variability may result for these particular items.
Alternatively, these may also be perceived as more "playful" and social opportunities to
interact and may not carry any perceived threat in having them as part of the profile. For
other wall information, those that occurred in less than 10% of the profiles, there might
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be less use as a function of the amount of effort and time required to generate the
materials required to develop these features.
Interestingly, items involving contact information did not result in any
significant outcomes as a function of age, gender, network, or relationship status.
Perhaps this is a function of the acknowledgement of the high sensitivity of this
information with this information being reported very infrequently. Given the many
other alternatives for communicating with someone in the social network, including
sending a wall post, these other alternatives may be accepted more readily than highly
sensitive personal information because these former alternatives leave the door open for
connection without exposing oneself to information theft or invasion. Thus, it appears
that regardless of group membership, people did not voluntarily disclose this
information.
Understanding What is Disclosed
In order to make meaningful conclusions about the data found in the publicly
accessible profiles, grouping procedures were used to aggregate various items within
descriptive or associated categories (i.e., default/standard, sensitive personal and
potentially stigmatizing, as well as according to specific topics). While the same effects
were being interpreted in both Study 1 B and C, the different grouping strategies
permitted a novel, exploratory examination of the impact that individual difference
factors have on disclosure. For the most part, age and relationship status were salient in
describing who would or would not be likely to disclose information, while traditional
variables such as gender were not significant. In fact, across the grouping strategies
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there was considerable overlap in outcomes suggesting that some types of information
were particularly salient for some groups.
Overall, this research was important because it provided evidence that highly
personal, sensitive, and potentially stigmatizing information is being disclosed in
publicly accessible profiles on social networking sites such as Facebook. However,
findings also depict users who are expressing discretion regarding at least some
personally revealing information. In light of the prevalence of online identity theft, and
social threat issues, the results of this study can be used to partially support the need for
developing programs and interventions that further caution users of online social
networks against placing themselves at risk, especially in the case of those who are not
employing basic settings. In addition, Study 1 C provided insight indicating that, in the
case of publicly accessible profiles, some pieces of personal information may be more
likely to be grouped together, as supported by factor analysis of topic. Examination of
profiles that are not publicly accessible would therefore enhance our understanding of
disclosure in online social networking profiles.
Study 2
An Experimental Examination of Stories as a Mechanism for Increasing the Use of
Privacy Settings in Facebook and Potential Contributing Predictors.
Some level of disclosure is a requirement to participate on social networking
sites. As a result, users who otherwise would not disclose personal information may feel
compelled to disclose information as a function of the way social networking sites are
constructed (Joinson, 2008). For example, in the case of Facebook, users are required to
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disclose at least a few key pieces of personal information (e.g., name, birth date and
valid email address), as part of constructing an account. The concern with even this
small amount of disclosure is that this particular constellation of information, if provided
in a public forum, opens the discloser to the potential risk of privacy invasion. Even
despite the possibility that users may choose aliases and submit false personal
information upon sign-up, the possibility remains that a substantial proportion of users
are signed up on Facebook based on their actual information. Therefore, examining
mechanisms which might minimize risks associated with disclosure was a key
motivation for the present study.
Design and Rationale for Study Two
The focus of this study was threefold. First, the study examined the impact of
having individuals read stories about safety and privacy issues as a potential means for
reducing the amount of disclosure and increasing the use of privacy settings. The
specific design involved two story conditions and a control condition. One story group
read privacy information prepared by online social networking site developers and the
other group read about a personal case of stalking which resulted from too much
disclosure online. The control condition read general information about the history of
the Internet that did not raise issues related to privacy or disclosure. It was expected that
a simple story manipulation alone might not change disclosure behaviours or use of
privacy settings, therefore the second focus was to identify other potentially important
variables that might impact on what was or was not disclosed and that might also impact
on the story conditions. Specifically, gender and the target person were included.
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Participants in the study generated a Facebook account for another person, and the
gender of that Facebook target person was manipulated. It was made very clear to
participants that this target person was in fact a real person who had provided their
personal information for the study. In addition, to further emphasize the presence of the
target person, participants were told that the person for whom they were creating the
profile may have the chance to view the profile once it was completed. In addition to
the target person, the study also addressed the target audience for the Facebook profile.
Specifically, the notion of who the account was being constructed for was tested through
some preliminary questions targeting the "virtual other". In addition, personality and
computer use variables were examined as potential predictors. These variables were
added as an exploratory investigation. Finally, the third focus followed from previous
research which suggests that the media (electronic versus hard copy) may generate
different behaviours. To extend this to a social networking context, half of the
participants constructed the new Facebook accounts online and half created them using
paper-and-pencil replicas of the sites. Rationales for these specific manipulations are
outlined below.
Background: How Can Users Protect Themselves and Others?
Although the system design of Facebook requests users to disclose potentially
risky information, the system design also includes features which would allow users to
protect themselves and others with whom they connect from privacy threats.
Specifically, Facebook gives users the opportunity to change privacy settings for their
personal profile information, photo, and video information. Users can also control who
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can contact them, who can see their profile and can limit third party access to their
personal information. Alternatively, users may also keep an "open" profile, allowing
anyone to freely browse through their information. If a user is particularly open with
their information and does not change available settings, the default option is to have
their profiles entered into search engines such as Google and Yahoo. While this option is
selected, a simple Google search of a users' name will pull up their profile and list it in
the search results. Online sites have taken steps to educate users and help them to protect
their personal privacy. Privacy policies are in place to educate users about their privacy
rights and the rights of the site and how information is shared and used by the company.
Privacy Policies and Settings: What Impacts When They Are Being Used?
Although privacy features protect the user and any information that the user may
have posted about other people (e.g., pictures, posts, and personal details), many users
do not employ available privacy settings, nor do they read the privacy policies (Berendt,
Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Milne & Culnan, 2004). Gross and Acquisti (2006)
found that the majority of Facebook users did not employ the available privacy settings,
allowing for complete access to their profiles, even when they knew about the settings.
If any settings were used they were minimal, and allowed, for example, friends of
friends or a user's entire network to view their profile. Most people, however, express
concern about their privacy, both offline and online (Cranor, Reagle, & Ackerman,
1999; Nosko, Wood, & Kenney, manuscript in preparation; Statistics Canada, 2009).
While the general consensus is that privacy is important (Acquisti & Gross, 2006), there
appears to be a discrepancy between attitudes and behaviours (Acquisti & Gross, 2006;
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Metzger, 2006; Spiekermann, Grossklags & Berendt, 2001). The following section
explores this discrepancy further by examining variables that could influence users'
decisions to employ privacy settings.
Presentation of Privacy Policies
Given that online privacy is a concern for most users, it is surprising that most do
not read the privacy policies. One concern is that the privacy policies may not be
presented in a user friendly way. Specifically, the language used may be too "legalistic"
or formal to be accessible to most users. Indeed, research has found that, even when
users do read the privacy policies many do not fully understand what they have read
(Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Milne & Culnan, 2004). Legal privacy
policies frequently contain wordy, incomprehensible statements (Jensen & Potts, 2004),
with readability levels of the majority of privacy policies falling above the capacity of
most adults (Anton, Earp, Bolcini, Jensen & Stufflebeam, 2003). Language constraints
may, therefore, be an important consideration in understanding why users do not
understand and hence, do not utilize the privacy policy information. In addition,
especially challenging text that does not inherently appear to be personally relevant, may
serve as a deterrent but also may simply be less interesting especially in a media
environment where many more attractive visual stimuli are available. In summary,
complex text, along with text only presentation may lead users to by-pass reading
policies entirely or to terminate their reading shortly after starting. This presents a
challenge to policy makers, and perhaps calls for a more engaging and easily understood
alternative. In the present study, reading a short yet representative subsection of a formal
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privacy policy statement was required prior to completing a Facebook profile. Reading
this type of information may encourage less disclosure and greater use of privacy
settings.
Saliency of Anecdotal Stories: The Decision to Employ Settings
The power of anecdotal storytelling is robust in decision making research (e.g.,
de Wit, Das, &Vet, 2008; Fagerlin, Wang & Ubel, 2005; Hamill, Wilson, & Nisbett,
1980; Stanovich, 2009). Humans are natural story tellers (McAdams, 1993, 2001), and
prefer personal stories to other forms of data (Kida, 2006) due to ease of processing,
retrieval and mental vividness of stories (Hamill et al., 1980; Stanovich, 2009). The
power of anecdotal stories for learning has been demonstrated in educational contexts.
Anecdotes have proved useful for engaging students during lectures by enhancing
interest and encouraging meaning making and greater recall (Bruner, 1996; Cosmides,
1989). This positive impact of personal stories also has a negative counterpart in which
personal stories can overshadow more reliable and accurate sources of information
(Stanovich, 2009). For example, people may accept the account of one personal story
even when it contradicts a body of consistent research findings. This highlights the
importance of personal anecdotal stories and their potential impact on employing
privacy settings. In the present study some participants were provided with a brief
anecdotal story relaying a stalking situation following too much disclosure online. It was
expected that the presentation of a salient, vivid anecdotal privacy story may address
both the issue of getting people to read privacy related documents, while at the same
time persuading them to use the available privacy features. In addition, it may be that a

71

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
well told anecdotal story may prove more persuasive than even the most convincing
statistical or legal information.
Gender Differences in Online Privacy Attitudes and Behaviours
Various studies have noted gender differences in terms of online privacy
attitudes and behaviours (Bartel-Sheehan, 1999; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Kehoe et al.,
1997; O'Neil, 2001; Westin, 1997; Youn & Hall, 2008). When compared to males,
females perceived greater privacy risks when online, reported higher levels of privacy
concern, were more concerned about instituting laws aimed at protecting privacy online,
were more likely to review and control available privacy settings online and were more
likely to provide aliases on web-pages (Kehoe et al., 1997; O'Neil, 2001; Youn & Hall,
2008). Recent research by Grubbs-Hoy and Milne (2010) found that females engaged in
various privacy protection behaviours more often than males, including greater
discretion when posting and un-tagging photos, accepting friends and joining groups.
Gender differences also seem to be important in understanding who is and who is not
likely to read privacy policies. Milne and Culnan (2004) found that men were less likely
than women to read privacy policies. Based on previous research, it was anticipated that
females would report higher levels of online privacy concern, as well as report
exhibiting a greater number of behaviours geared toward protecting online personal
privacy. Moreover, it was expected that females would be more likely to employ privacy
settings than their male counterparts.
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The "Virtual Other"
"People's willingness to share depends on who they are sharing the information
with" (Olson, Grudin & Horvitz, 2005, p. 1987). Presumably, in the case of online
profiles and personal web-pages, users have a receiver in mind when constructing or
deciding to share personal details. While this 'other' is not an interactive partner per se,
that is, they do not respond directly to the profile creator, they are nonetheless an end
goal or target. It is suggested that the virtual other may best be characterized as a
psychological other, or a mental representation of an audience. For example, a young
woman posts her best pictures on her online profile, and highlights all of her best
qualities in hopes that an old flame might come across her profile and see how she has
progressed since their break-up. Alternatively, a young woman might choose not to post
certain personal details (e.g., pictures of her drunk at a party or in compromising poses
at a nightclub) due to the fear that a relative, co-worker or even stranger might see her
profile and form negative judgments about her person based on the information
presented. Decisions about how much and what types of information to share may very
well be dependent on who the user is thinking about at the time. At present there is no
literature addressing the "virtual other" in an online setting. The current research
provides a first exploratory investigation of the target "other".
Impact of Media (Context)
The context in which information is shared has an impact on levels of disclosure
(Joinson, 2001; Schouten, Valkenburg & Peter, 2007; Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross &
Irvine, 2006). The general consensus is that online media, when compared to more
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traditional media such as paper-and-pencil, over the telephone, and face-to-face, tend to
encourage higher levels of disclosure (Joinson, 2001; Locke & Gilbert, 1995; Tidwell &
Walther, 2002; Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & Irvine, 2006). Research has proposed
the presence of the online disinhibition effect (Suler, 2004), whereby various features of
the online context (e.g., anonymity, invisibility, and asynchronicity of communication)
may help to explain why patterns of disclosure differ online and offline. Specifically, as
a result of the perceived psychological distance fostered by anonymity offered online,
users are more relaxed, are more likely to "open up" and may even feel less restrained
(Suler, 2004), thus resulting in greater disclosure. In the present study, the impact of
media on users' decisions to share information in personal profiles was examined. It was
anticipated that the online condition, as compared to disclosure on paper-and-pencil,
would generate higher levels of disclosure. No known studies exist comparing the
impact of media on privacy setting use in personal profiles, therefore this aspect of the
investigation was exploratory in nature.
Summary of the Present Study
The purpose of Study 2 was to further explore the factors that may influence the
choice to self-disclose various types of information online in Facebook profiles and the
choice to employ privacy settings. The three main lines of inquiry outlined above were
addressed as follows. First, this study addressed the impact of type of story read prior to
constructing a profile. Specifically, two groups were exposed to privacy relevant
information prior to constructing a Facebook account. One group read an anecdotal story
depicting the case of a young woman who was stalked and found as a result of the

74

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
information she had posted about herself on her Facebook account. A second group was
required to read a more formal review of privacy policies that is found on the Facebook
website. These two groups were compared to one another and to a third group who read
a story that simply reviewed the history of the Internet. It was expected that participants
who read a salient personal privacy invasion story (Personal Privacy Story) would be the
least inclined to disclose information online, and the most inclined to set privacy
settings, as compared to those reading either the Facebook privacy policy (Legal Privacy
Agreement Story), or a story about the history of the Internet (History of the Internet
Control Story).
The second issue sought to address additional variables that might also have an
impact on the decision to disclose information or use privacy settings. Given previous
research identifying gender as a key concern, target person gender (i.e., whether the
profile participants created was for a male or female), and the gender of the participant
(male, female) were also considered. In order to ensure a degree of control and
consistency over the information that was included in the profiles, participants were
asked to create profiles based on information for a target person. Information provided
to participants in the study was consistent across participants with the exception of the
target person's gender (some received information about a female target and others
received information about a male target) and photos of the target individual4.

4

Independent raters (4 females, 3 males) evaluated the photos based on three criteria, attractiveness,

sociability and friendliness. Results indicated that ratings were similar for both sets of photos.
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It was expected that female participants would reveal less and employ more
privacy settings overall. It was also expected that the story type might impact on the
amount of information disclosed and the number of settings employed such that female
participants exposed to the anecdotal story would disclose the least amount of
information and employ the most privacy settings as this story in particular depicts the
particular risks for women on social networking profiles.
Further, this study sought to examine from an exploratory perspective which
factors such as demographic variables (age and relationship status), personality (e.g.,
extraversion, self-consciousness), computer usage (e.g., familiarity with computers,
Facebook usage), reported privacy attitudes and behaviours, the virtual "other" (who it is
the user is thinking about when posting information) and self-report levels of disclosure
predicted actual disclosure and privacy settings use in Facebook profiles.
Finally, the third issue examined the impact of media with a contrast between
online and hard copy (paper-and-pencil) formats for filling out a personal profile. The
role of media was examined within the context of the other variables identified above.
Specifically, the study sought to examine the impact of target gender (i.e., whether the
profile participants created was for a male or female), gender of the participant (male,
female) and type of media used (paper-and-pencil, online in Facebook) for generating
profiles on information that was disclosed and the likelihood to employ privacy settings.
Based on online hyper-personal theory (Walther, 1996) and previous research showing
that online media generated higher levels of disclosure (Joinson, 2001; Schouten,
Valkenburg & Peter, 2007, Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & Irvine, 2006), it was
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expected that participants filling out a profile on paper-and-pencil would be less inclined
than their online counterparts to disclose information. No specific hypotheses were set
forth for privacy settings usage as a function of media context. There is no known
research examining the impact of context on settings use, and therefore this examination
was exploratory in nature.
Summary of Hypotheses
1.

The Personal Privacy Story would result in the least disclosure of

information and the most use of privacy settings among the three story types.
2.

The Legal Privacy Agreement Story would result in less disclosure of

information and use of more privacy settings than the Internet History Story.
3.

If consistent with face-to-face interactions, female participants would

disclose more overall information online, but employ more privacy settings than male
participants.
4.

There would be less disclosure and greater use of privacy settings for female

targets than male targets.
5.

There would be an interaction such that females would employ more privacy

settings and disclose the least amount of information for female targets in the Personal
Privacy Story.
6.

Explorations of variables including the virtual other, personality and

experience issues were exploratory and no specific hypotheses were derived.
7.

There would be more disclosure of information in the online media condition

than in the paper and pencil media condition. The impact of this manipulation on
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privacy setting use was exploratory. The impact of gender was also exploratory in this
analysis.
General Method
Participants. In total, 236 first-year undergraduate psychology students enrolled
in an Introductory Psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University participated.
Participants were recruited through a voluntary sign-up system and were given 2% in
compensation towards their introductory psychology course grade. Participants included
100 male participants and 136 female participants, with ages ranging from 17 to 27
years (Xage= 18.55, SD = 1.16). Independent t-tests revealed that gender differed
significantly by age {t (234) = 2.21,/? = .03), with males being slightly older than
females {Magemaie = 18.74 years, Magefemaie= 18.40 years). Although significant
statistically, this was not considered a meaningful difference given that the mean age of
both groups was 18 years of age. Approximately 65% of the sample reported currently
being in a romantic relationship, 34% reported being single, and the remaining 1% were
either married or engaged. Two-hundred and twenty seven participants indicated that
they currently had a Facebook account. All participants were treated in accordance with
APA ethical guidelines.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 groups: one of three story
conditions, either the female or male target for the profile construction and either the
online or paper-and-pencil media context. Specifically, among the story conditions
participants were randomly assigned to one of three story conditions: History of the
Internet Control Story (N = 78), Legal Privacy Agreement Story (N = 77) and Personal
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Privacy Story (N = 81), and one of two target conditions: Michael (N = 102) and Sarah
(N = 134). (See Tables 8 and 9 for breakdowns of story condition by gender of the target
male and female participants, respectively). For the media context evaluation,
participants were randomly assigned to one of two methodology conditions: paper-andpencil (N = 129) or online (N = 107), and one of two target conditions: Michael (N =
102) and Sarah (N = 134). (See Tables 10 and 11 for a breakdown of context condition
by participant gender for male and female participants, respectively).
Materials
Several sets of materials were constructed for this study, including stories, target
person portfolios, Facebook accounts, paper-and-pencil hard copy materials matching
the online condition, privacy settings booklets and some measures for the survey. Other
materials were drawn from existing research including survey scales and scoring
schemes. These materials are outlined below.
Stories. There were three stories: History of the Internet Control Story, the Legal
Privacy Agreement Story and the Personal Privacy Story (See Appendix C). All three
stories were constructed to be approximately equal in length (506, 496, and 496 words,
for the control, legal and personal story, respectively). Participants read one of three
stories. In two conditions the stories provided information regarding privacy. In the
History of the Internet Control Story condition, participants read a short passage that
described the history of the Internet and its popularity. This vignette did not discuss
privacy issues. The Legal Privacy Agreement Story was an excerpt taken directly from
the privacy statement on the Facebook online website. This excerpt discussed the legal
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privacy terms associated with the online network. The Personal Privacy Story was an
adaptation of a story that appeared in the Globe and Mail (September 2008) which
outlined potential consequences of putting personal information online. This vignette
described the story of a young woman who was stalked and later approached by a
reporter in a local coffee shop. The reporter went on to explain that he had located her
by using only the information she had posted in her Facebook profile. She was shocked
to find out that a complete stranger was able locate her actual whereabouts and identify
her personally, without her awareness.
Facebook Target Person Portfolio. Participants used information from a premade portfolio that included the personal information of two fictional individuals: Sarah
Barnes and Michael Barnes (see Appendix D). Information included a personal resume,
an employment application, a list of the individual's "25 things about me", a short
"About me" summary and a series of photos. Various pieces of information were
included in the booklets that represented default, sensitive and stigmatizing information,
as well as information relevant to various topics, such as relationship information and
work information. For example, sexual orientation, religious and political views were
included in the portfolio, and were considered stigmatizing information. All information
was identical in the two pre-made portfolios (e.g., both Sarah and Michael were 25 years
old, both had the same degree from the same university, the same work history etc.),
with the exception of photos and names. Participants used the information in the
portfolios to create a Facebook profile.
Materials for the Online Condition
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For the online condition, participants were provided with a folder on the desktop
that contained all of the photos that were in the portfolio, so that they could upload the
photos directly into Facebook. While photos for Michael and Sarah depicted a different
person, there photos that were chosen were equivalent in content. For both, photos were
goofy, serious, and contained shots of scenery, friends, family and relationship partners.
Participants were tested individually, using the same make and model of PC based
computers with Internet access. All participants used the standard Facebook website to
construct their profile.
Facebook Accounts. Online Facebook accounts were generated for each
participant in the online condition. Prior to the study session, researchers created a series
of new email accounts in Hotmail which were then used to open up associated Facebook
accounts. Each Facebook account was opened using the newly created email address, a
fictitious name, and fictitious birth date information. The existing blank Facebook
accounts were then used during the study session. Participants were able to upload any
photos and include any information in their profile that they desired, based on the
information provided to them in the pre-made target portfolio.
Materials for the Paper-and-Pencil Condition
Participants in the paper-and-pencil condition were provided with a paper-andpencil version of a Facebook profile (see Appendix E for an example page). This 27
page booklet consisted of one screenshot of each page available to users online when
actually in Facebook, including the pages that outlined privacy setting options. All of the
available drop down tab options and checkbox options were displayed in the screenshots
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so that participants could simply circle their preferred choice. Participants were also
provided with a series of 13 numbered photos printed on paper that they could choose to
include in their profile. These photos were identical to the photos included in the online
condition. They simply indicated by photo number which one they wished to include in
albums or as a profile picture. Participants could include any information in their profile
that they desired, based on the information provided to them in the pre-made target
portfolio.
Privacy Settings Booklet. Participants were provided with a privacy settings
booklet that outlined all of the privacy and account settings available to users in
Facebook (see Appendix F for an example page from the privacy settings booklet). The
eight page booklet contained subheadings with specific types of settings that participants
could easily flip to for reference. All settings were described, and then screenshots of the
actual settings page as seen online were provided. In addition, instructions on how to
employ each setting were provided. For example, participants were provided with
statements such as "If you want to limit or control who can search for you on Facebook,
you can click on "search visibility", and choose from a variety of settings (e.g., only
friends can search for you, all my networks and friends of friends, so virtually anyone).
You can also limit what people can see about you, and how they can contact you after
locating your profile online".
Scoring tool. This study used an existing scoring tool that was established for
coding Facebook profiles (see Study 1 A, B and C). This scoring tool allowed for
assessment of overall disclosure in Facebook (based on coding scheme from Study 1 A),
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disclosure across three categories of information (personal identity information,
sensitive personal information, and stigmatizing information) (based on coding scheme
from Study 1 B), disclosure within various topic areas (e.g., personal information, work
information) (based on coding scheme from Study 1 C), and employment of privacy
settings within Facebook. The pre-established checklist was comprised of 97
dichotomously scored items (i.e., whether the piece of information was present or
absent) and three identification items (i.e., username link, the network searched, and the
size of the overall network). To examine disclosure of content within Facebook, eight of
the topic categories from Study 1 C were adopted for the current study, including:
Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education
information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship
information. These eight were chosen based on the information that participants could
include in the profiles. For example, some of the scales used in Study 1 C contained
items that were not provided to users, and were thus not included in the profiles.
To assess use of privacy settings, an additional 25 dichotomously scored items
were added to the scoring tool. Each of the 25 new items represented a possible change
in privacy settings. A three step process was used to establish the privacy settings coding
scheme. First, a blank Facebook profile was created. Second, a researcher signed into
the blank profile and recorded all of the pre-set or default privacy settings. Third, for all
of the participant profiles, settings were recorded, and for each privacy setting that was
changed from the default setting, a score of 1 was given, if no change was made, a score
of 0 was given. For example, users are able to change the "public search" option, or

83

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
whether or not other users in Facebook can search for them through Facebook by means
of typing their name into a search bar. By default, this option is selected, allowing for
public search. In this case, this setting, if selected, would receive a score of 0 indicating
that no change was made from the default. Alternatively, if unchecked or unselected, a
score of 1 would be assigned indicating that a change had been made to the setting.
Online Survey. Participants completed an online survey at the beginning of the
study session (see Appendix G). This survey contained a broad range of measures,
including standardized and newly created measures. The first section included a
demographic sheet. The second section contained measures assessing perceptions of
technology, uses of technology and Facebook and familiarity with technology. The third
section assessed views about the self (i.e. self-disclosure and public self-consciousness),
personality (extraversion), and privacy attitudes and behaviours (e.g., privacy
behaviours when online, concern for privacy in general and online). Lastly, participants
responded to a scale assessing perceptions of the virtual other (the audience for whom
they are disclosing), and a measure of social desirability.
Demographics. Participants responded to three questions pertaining to age,
gender and relationship status.
Unstandardized/Newly Created Measures.
For descriptive information for unstandardized/newly created measures and items, refer
to Tables 12 and 13. The following scales were chosen based on previous research that
has examined factors related to use of technology (e.g., Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel
& Fox, 2002; Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007; Butt & Phillips, 2008; Mueller,
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Wood, Willoughby, Ross & Specht, 2008) and the need to explore potentially novel
predictors of use such as the virtual audience.
Computer Use. Participants were asked to indicate how many hours per week
they used the computer for three purposes, including: the internet, recreation (e.g.,
games, communication), and work/school. Participants were asked to fill in the number
of hours per week they used the internet for each purpose.
Attitudes towards Computers (Mueller, Wood, Willoughby, Ross, & Specht,
2008). This measure assessed general computer use and expertise (familiarity with
computers) as well as comfort and ease with computers and the Internet. In total, there
were three items in this scale. For example, participants were asked how knowledgeable
they were about using computer software. Response options ranged from 1 (very
knowledgeable) to 7 (not at all knowledgeable). Participants were also asked about how
comfortable they felt when using computers. Response options ranged from 1 (very
comfortable) to 7 (very uncomfortable). Cronbach's alpha was .80, indicating good
reliability.
Internet Security Concerns and Behaviours. This measure contained 26 items
assessing concern with internet security, as well as behaviours related to protecting
security online. This measure employs 7-point Likert type scales, with response options
ranging from 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (absolutely true of me). Participants were asked
to respond to statements such as "Please indicate the degree to which you have used this
strategy to protect your privacy online: Installed Antivirus software". Cronbach's alphas
for the concern subscale were .87 and .91 for Virus Concern and Entity Concern,
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respectively, indicating high reliability. For the Strategy Use Subscale, Cronbach's alphas
were .75 for Software Strategy Use, .60 for and Privacy Strategy Use, and .44 for
Password Strategy Use, indicating low to moderate high reliability.
Facebook Usage Scale. Various items from Viegas' (2005) Blog Survey were
adopted and modified, and new items were created and added to this scale. The
Facebook Usage Scale assessed types of information posted on Facebook, amount of
time spent using Facebook, awareness of other users' Facebook behavior, and
familiarity and use of privacy settings in Facebook. In total, this measure contained 13
items and employed 5-point Likert type scales. For the two subscales Degree of
Disclosure and Consideration of Disclosure, Cronbach's alphas were .65 and .47,
respectively, indicating moderate to low reliability.
Facebook Privacy Settings Behaviours. Participants were asked about their
privacy settings behaviours when using Facebook. For example, participants were asked
to respond to items such as "How familiar are you with Facebook privacy settings?",
and "How often have you advised others to employ their privacy settings?" In total,
this measure contained 3 items, and employed 7-point Likert type scales. Cronbach's
alpha for this measure was .79.
The Virtual "Other". Participants were asked to indicate who they were
thinking of (the audience) when posting personally revealing information. Participants
were asked the following statement, "When you post personally revealing information in
your profile, who are you thinking about?" Response options included: No one in
particular, friends, family, business associates, employer, romantic partners, instructors,
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acquaintances, ex-romantic partners, strangers, and anyone, and were rated using a 1
{not at all true of me) to 7 (absolutely true of me) Likert type scale. Participants were
also asked to indicate with a "yes" or "no" whether or not there was someone or
something limiting them from posting information. The two items in the Myself/Friends
subscale were significantly correlated at the .001 level (r = .57). Cronbach's alpha for
the Other Referents subscale was .83, indicating good reliability.
Short Privacy Survey. Participants responded to items assessing their use of the
privacy booklet provided to them in the study. In addition, participants indicated on a
scale from 1 (not at all enjoyable) to 7 (extremely enjoyable) how enjoyable they found
the profile creation task. In total, this measure contained 6 items, and employed a variety
of question types including 7-point Likert type scales, dichotomous yes or no response
options, and fill-in-the-blanks.
Standardized Measures
For descriptive information for each standardized measure and corresponding
subscale refer to Table 14.
Self-Disclosure: The Temperament and Target Inventory (Cloninger,
Przybeck, Svrakic & Wetzel, 1994). This measure consisted of 13 items assessing selfdisclosive behaviours, and employed a 7-point Likert scale. Participants were asked to
respond to statements such as "I am open about my feelings", with response options
ranging from 1 {not at all true of me) to 7 {very true of me). Higher scores indicated
higher levels of self-disclosure. Previously established reliability for this scale was .86.
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A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample with an
outcome of .91, indicating very good reliability.
Personal Attributes Survey (PAS): Public and Private Self-Consciousness
(Buss, 1980). This measure consisted of 22 items assessing both public and private selfconsciousness, and employed a 7-point Likert scale with response options ranging from
1 {not at all true of me) to 7 {very true of me). This scale consisted of two subscales,
public and private self-consciousness. A total score of 12 was possible for the public
self-consciousness subscale, and a total score of 10 was possible for the private selfconsciousness scale. A higher score on each subscale indicated higher levels of these
factors. Participants were asked to respond to statements such as "I worry about what
people think of me", and "I spend time reflecting on things". Previously established
reliabilities for the subscales were .77 (Public SC) and .81 (Private SC). A Cronbach
alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample with an outcome of
.89, indicating good reliability. Reliability was also calculated for each of the individual
subscales, revealing alphas of .85 for the public self-consciousness subscale and .87 for
the private self-consciousness subscale, indicating higher reliability than reported in
previous assessments.
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) version 6 - Form
40A (Paulhus, 1984). This measure consisted of 40 items assessing social desirability
tendencies and employed a 7-point Likert scale. The BIDR consisted of two subscales,
impression management (IM) and self-deceptive enhancement (SDE). A total score of
20 was possible for each subscale, with a possible overall score of 40 for the entire
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measure. Higher scores indicated more socially desirable responses. Participants were
asked to respond to statements such as "I always know why I like things", with response
options ranging from 1 {not true) to 7 {very true). Reliabilities for the subscales were
.77-. 85 (IM) and .61-.11 (SDE) based on a sample of undergraduates from the
University of British Columbia. A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was
calculated for the present sample with an outcome of .77, indicating similar reliability as
reported in previous assessments. Reliability was also calculated for each of the
individual subscales, revealing alphas of .71 for the IM subscale and .69 for the SDE
subscale.
BIG FIVE: short version (TIPI) (Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003). This
measure consisted of 10 items assessing personality and employed a 7-point Likert scale
with response options ranging from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly). The
TIPI consisted of 5 subscales with 2 items in each including: Extraversion,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness to Experiences.
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with
statements such as, "I see myself as:

Extraverted, enthusiastic". A higher score

on each subscale indicated a tendency towards that particular personality trait.
Correlations between each of the five pairs of items were significant, suggesting good
reliability (.47, .15, .30, .51, and .27, for Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness to Experiences, respectively).
The TIPI is recommended for use in studies that contain multiple surveys and in cases
where time is a constraint, such as in the case of the current study where a large number
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of measures were used. In addition, according to Gosling and colleagues, when
compared to the larger Big Five measure of personality the TIPI yielded adequate levels
of convergence with widely used Big Five measures, test-re-test reliability, and
convergence between self and others ratings. For these reasons, the decision was made
to use the shorter version.
Online Privacy Attitudes Scale (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007).
This measure consisted of 16 items assessing concerns about establishing and
maintaining privacy online. This scale employed a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1
{not at all concerned) to 7 {very concerned). Participants are asked to respond to
statements such as "In general, how concerned are you about your privacy while you are
using the internet?" Higher scores indicated a greater concern for maintaining privacy
online. A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample
with an outcome of .93 indicating very high reliability.
Online Privacy Behaviours Scale (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007).
This measure consisted of 12 items assessing behaviours related to establishing and
maintaining privacy online. This scale employed a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1
{not at all concerned) to 7 {very concerned). Participants are asked to respond to
statements such as "How often do you watch for ways to control what people send you
online (such as check boxes that allow you to opt-in or opt-out of certain offers)?" This
measure consisted of two subscales: General Caution (N= 6) and Technical Protection
(N= 6). Higher scores indicated higher levels of privacy behaviours related to these
factors. A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample
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with an outcome of .80 indicating high reliability. Reliability was also calculated for
each of the individual subscales, revealing alphas of .78 for the General Caution
subscale and .72 for the Technical Protection subscale.
Procedure
Prior to participating, all participants completed a consent form (see Appendix
H).
Upon consent, participants were instructed to complete the online survey at the
beginning of the study session. All participants filled out the online survey on individual
computer terminals. In order to ensure privacy of response, participants were seated at
every other computer terminal, allowing ample space in between participants. Sessions
ranged from one to 15 participants with five participants being tested at once on average,
which enhanced compliance and ensured that participants read the stories provided to
them. Following the completion of the online survey task, participants were given one of
the three privacy stories to read. After reading the story, participants in the online
condition were given Facebook log-in information, including an individual user name
and password. Once participants were logged into a blank Facebook profile, they were
told to construct an online personal profile for the person whose information they had
been given (Michael or Sarah). In the paper-and-pencil condition, participants were
provided with a booklet of screenshots that directly corresponded to each screen
viewable in Facebook and they were told to construct an online personal profile for the
person whose information they had been given (Michael or Sarah). For the cover story,
participants were told that there were two conditions, one in which they created a profile
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for themselves and another where they created a profile for another person. They were
told that they were assigned to the condition where they would create a profile for
someone else based on that person's actual information. In order to encourage
participants to complete the profiles in as natural a way as possible, all participants were
told in the cover story that the target person for whom they were creating the profile was
a real person, that they had volunteered their personal information, and that this person
may have the opportunity to view the profile once it was completed. All participants
were instructed to use as much or as little information as they felt necessary. A verbal
explanation of the constraints of the study was expressed to each participant, including
the inability to add friends, join a network, or upload applications. In order to obtain as
much information as possible about which pieces of information users would have liked
to include in the profile, participants were instructed to indicate on the profile wall any
additional information or features that they would have wanted included in the profile,
but were not able to include (e.g., join a network, add friends etc.). In addition, all
participants were provided with a booklet containing information about all of the
available privacy settings in Facebook. Each participant was told that if they wished they
could find detailed instructions describing the privacy settings on Facebook within the
privacy settings booklet. Once they finished developing the online profile, participants
were given the short 7-item survey. The sessions took approximately an hour and 15
minutes to complete. Finally, after completing the study each participant received a
debriefing form describing important privacy information, along with a summary of the
current study (see Appendix I). Upon completion of the study session, a trained
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researcher came in and coded each Facebook profile for overall content and privacy
settings.
Results
Given the number of analyses and the different focal points in the present study
the results are divided into sections to more clearly depict the analyses specific for each
focal point of the study. Three sections are provided; Effect of Story and Gender,
Additional Exploratory Predictors, and Effect of Media and Gender5.
Question 1
Effect of Story and Gender. The first area of inquiry involved examination of
the impact of the stories on the construction of Facebook accounts.
Design
To address the first line of inquiry, a 3 (Story condition: Personal Privacy Story,
Legal Privacy Agreement Story, History of the Internet Control Story) x 2 (Participant
gender: Male, Female) x 2 (Target gender: Male, Female) experimental design was
employed.
Analyses
Analyses explored whether any differences in disclosure and use of privacy
settings in Facebook emerged as a function of story condition, gender of target and
Cell sizes were insufficient to analyze story, context and gender together. Therefore, the
decision was made to analyze the effects of story and gender and context and gender separately.
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gender of participant6. Examination of these variables was carried out using univariate
and multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA). Three analyses were conducted to
examine disclosure: one for overall disclosure, one for disclosure divided into three
grouping categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive personal information, and
Stigmatizing information), and one for disclosure within eight content areas with
Facebook (Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information,
Education information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and
Relationship information) . Privacy settings were examined using regression analyses. It
is important to note that only 49 participants out of 236 changed at least one privacy
setting.
Overall Disclosure. A univariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine
overall disclosure within the Facebook profiles. Story condition, gender of target and
gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors, and overall disclosure was
entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed that there were no significant main
effects of any of the fixed factors (largest F= 1.38) (See Table 16).
Disclosure of Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information,
and Stigmatizing Information. To address the question of how much information

6

In order to examine disclosure as a function of privacy settings usage, all analyses examining story and

gender were repeated using only those participants who did not employ settings. Patterns were consistent
with results found for the entire sample.
7

Coding categories were adopted from Study 1 B and 1 C (see Scoring Tool in Materials section).
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participants disclosed in three risk categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive
personal information, and Stigmatizing information), a multivariate analysis of variance
was conducted. For disclosure in the three grouping categories, story condition, gender
of target and gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors, and personal
identity information, sensitive personal information, and stigmatizing information were
entered as the dependent variables. Results revealed that although there were no
significant main effects, there were two significant interactions.
First, there was a significant interaction of gender of participant and story
condition for sensitive information (See Table 17). Two follow-up one-way ANOVAs
were conducted, one for males and one for females, to identify where the differences
were occurring. For each, story condition was entered as the between subjects variable,
and sensitive information was entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed that
the difference was significant for females (F (2, 130) = 3.36,p = .04), such that they
disclosed significantly more sensitive information in the History of the Internet Control
Story condition, and significantly less sensitive information in the Legal Privacy
Agreement Story condition (See Table 17).
Second, there was a significant interaction of gender of participant and gender of
target for stigmatizing information (See Table 17). Two follow-up one-way ANOVAs
were conducted, one for male targets and one for female targets, to identify where the
differences were occurring. For each, gender of the participant was entered as the
between subjects variable, and stigmatizing information was entered as the dependent
variable. Results revealed that the difference was significant for female targets {t (129) =
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2.36, p = .02), such that male participants disclosed more stigmatizing information for a
female target than did female participants (See Table 17).
Disclosure within Facebook Content Areas. To address the question of how
much information participants disclosed in eight content areas within Facebook
(Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education
information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship
information), a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. Story
condition, gender of target and gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors,
and all eight topics were entered as the dependent variables.
Results revealed that there was a significant main effect of gender of participant
for one out of the eight topics. Specifically, when disclosing contact information in
particular, males included significantly more than did females (See Table 18). While
there were no significant main effects for either story condition or gender of the target,
the main effect was qualified by significant interactions.
Specifically, results revealed four significant interaction effects, two for contact
information and two for view information. First, there was a significant interaction of
gender of participant and story condition for contact information (See Table 18). Two
follow-up one-way ANOVAs were conducted, one for males and one for females, to
identify where the differences were occurring. For each, story condition was entered as
the between subjects variables, and contact information was entered as the dependent
variable. Results revealed that the difference was significant for males, (F (2, 97) = 3.24,
p = .04), such that they disclosed significantly less contact information in the History of

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
the Internet Control Story condition than either of the Legal Privacy Agreement Story or
Personal Privacy Story conditions (See Table 18). Interestingly, while story condition
did not have a significant impact on disclosure for female participants, it is of note that
females disclosed less overall than males in both the Legal Privacy Agreement Story and
Personal Privacy Story conditions.
Second, there was a significant interaction of story condition and gender of the
target for contact information. Three follow-up independent t-tests were conducted, one
for each story condition, to identify where the differences were occurring. For each,
gender of the target was entered as the grouping variable, and contact information was
entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed that after having read the personal
privacy story, there was less disclosure of contact information for female targets than for
male targets (See Table 18).
Finally, there were significant interactions of gender of participant and gender of
target for both contact and view information. For contact information, two follow-up
independent t- tests were conducted, one for males and one for females, to identify
where the differences were occurring. For each, gender of target was entered as the
grouping variable, and contact information was entered as the dependent variable.
Results revealed that the difference was significant for males, (t (98) = 2.55,p = .01),
such that they disclosed significantly more contact information for male targets than
they did for female targets (See Table 18). For view information, a follow-up
independent t- test was conducted, one for male targets and one for female targets, to
identify where the differences were occurring. For each, gender of participant was
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entered as the grouping variable, and view information was entered as the dependent
variable. Results revealed that the difference was significant for female targets, (t (130)
= 2.10, p = .008), such that male participants disclosed far more view information about
a female target than did female participants (See Table 18).
Privacy Settings Use. While only 48 participants out of 236 (20.3%) changed at
least one privacy setting, this was not unexpected. Previous research has found that very
few users choose to employ privacy settings (e.g., Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann,
2005; Gross & Acquisti, 2006; Milne & Culnan, 2004). Preliminary analyses indicated
that each condition had at least one participant who employed privacy settings. Due to
small sample sizes, only descriptive analyses were available8. A count was conducted to
compare privacy settings by story condition, and revealed that more privacy settings
were employed in the Personal Privacy Story condition as compared to the two other
story conditions. In terms of gender of the participant, females tended to employ more
settings than did males. For target gender, males and females employed more settings
for a target of the same gender. Finally, females in the Personal Privacy Story condition
employed more settings for female targets in particular (See Table 19).
Question 2
Additional Exploratory Predictors. The second area of inquiry involved an
exploratory examination of additional variables that may predict disclosure and privacy
settings use.
8

Non-parametric analyses were not possible given that 71.4% of expected cell sizes that were less than 5.
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Factor analysis: Scale aggregation
In order to firmly establish which items should be aggregated, to confirm the
relationships between these variables, and to identify the factors underlying the data, a
principal components factor analysis with a Varimax rotation was conducted for four out
of the eight created measures used in the current study. Only those items within each
measure that were assessed using the same scale (e.g., 7-point Likert type scale) were
included in the factor analyses.
Items were selected based on two criteria. First, factors were selected that were
measured by more than one item. Second, items that loaded highly on one factor were
retained. Items that loaded moderately on more than one factor were judged not only
based on factor loadings, but on item content and theory. The decision was then made to
group these particular items together with items of a similar nature. Reliability was
conducted for scales that had more than 3 items using Cronbach's alpha.
Attitudes towards Computers. For the attitudes towards computer scale, three
items were subjected to factor analysis, and results revealed that there was one factor
with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.00 (Eigenvalue = 2.48), which accounted for a total of
82.60% of the variance. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table 19. The
following aggregate scale was created based on the factor loadings: Positive Attitudes
towards Computers. Cronbach's alpha was .80, indicating good reliability.
Internet Security Concerns and Behaviours.
Concern Subscale. There were two factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.00,
which collectively accounted for a total of 76.95% of the variance. Eigenvalues ranged
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were 1.04 and 5.12, and indicated that the two factors explained 12.98% and 63.98% of
the variance, respectively. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table 20. Two
aggregate scales were created based on the factor loadings: Virus Concern and Entity
Concern. Virus concern referred to a concern over breaches in security from virus, spam
and spyware. Entity concern referred to a concern over breaches in online security from
hackers, online stalkers and other unauthorized access by a party or individual.
Cronbach's alpha was .87 for Virus Concern and .91 for and Entity Concern, indicating
high reliability.
Strategy Use Subscale. There were three factors with Eigenvalues greater than
1.00, which collectively accounted for a total of 60.03% of the variance. Eigenvalues
ranged from 1.17 to 2.82, and indicated that the three factors explained 12.97%, 15.78
and 31.28% of the variance, respectively. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table
21. Three aggregate scales were created based on the factor loadings: Software Strategy
Use, Privacy Strategy Use and Password Strategy Use. Cronbach's alphas were .75 for
Software Strategy Use, .60 for and Privacy Strategy Use, and .44 for Password Strategy
Use, indicating low to moderate high reliability.
Facebook Usage Scale. For the Facebook usage scale, there were five factors
with Eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which collectively accounted for a total of 58.07%
of the variance. Eigenvalues ranged from 1.02 to 2.50, and indicated that the five factors
explained 19.25%, 13.00%, 9.74%, 8.27% and 7.81 % of the variance, respectively. The
factor loading matrix is presented in Table 22. Results indicated that no items loaded
highly on the fourth factor (highest loading = .40), therefore this factor was omitted.
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Two items, "How well do you feel you know your profile's audience?" and "How liable
do you think you are for the things you post in your profile?" were the only items to load
on factors three and five, respectively, and were therefore omitted from scale
aggregation. The following two aggregate scales were created based on the factor
loadings: Degree of Disclosure and Consideration of Degree of Disclosure. Cronbach's
alpha was .65 for Degree of Disclosure and .47 for and Consideration of Degree of
Disclosure, indicating low to moderate reliability.
Facebook Privacy Settings Behaviours Scale. For the Facebook Privacy
Settings Behaviours Scale there was one factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.00,
which accounted for a total of 70.58% of the variance. The Eigenvalue was 2.12, and
indicated that the factor explained 70.58% of the variance. The factor loading matrix is
presented in Table 23. The following aggregate scale was created based on the factor
loadings: Privacy Settings Behaviour. Cronbach's alpha was .79.
The Virtual Other. For the Virtual Other, there were four factors with
Eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which collectively accounted for a total of 68.49% of the
variance. Eigenvalues ranged from 1.00 to 4.24, and indicated that the four factors
explained 35.31%, 15.37%, 9.44% and 8.37 % of the variance, respectively. The factor
loading matrix is presented in Table 24. No items loaded highly on factor three (highest
loading = .33), so this factor was omitted. One item, "When you post personally
revealing information in your profile, who are you thinking about? No one", was the
only item to load highly on factor four and was therefore omitted from scale
aggregation. The following two aggregate scales were created based on the factor
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loadings: Myself/Friends and Other Referents. The two items in the Myself/Friends
subscale were significantly correlated at the .001 level (r = .57). Cronbach's alpha for
Other Referents was .83, indicating good reliability.
Design
The design of the current study included a number of variables that could
identify what factors predict disclosure of information in terms of personal attitudes,
experiences and behaviours and also variables that could potentially explain disclosure
apart from the experimental manipulations. Analyses of these variables were exploratory
as their impact was not directly associated with previous literature. Specifically, a series
of regressions were conducted to examine the predictive power of various variables
including attitudes towards computers, online privacy attitudes, online privacy
behaviours, personality, social desirability, reported disclosure and the virtual other.
Scales that measured similar constructs were examined together in the analyses. For
example, all the personality measures were examined as potential predictors in one
regression. This was done to increase parsimony in the analyses, and to examine the
predictive power of specific categories of variables (e.g., personality, online privacy
attitudes) that may have been associated with disclosure and use of privacy settings. In
total, there were seven groups of predictor variables. For an overview of the measures
within each of the seven groups, refer to Table 25.
Descriptives
For the short privacy survey, 25.3% of participants reported using the privacy
setting booklet that was provided (65% did not use it, and 9.7% did not answer this

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
question). When asked why they did not use the booklet, of those who gave a response,
40.1% participants indicated that they already knew the settings, .8% indicated they had
no time to read it, 3.5% were not interested in reading it, 3.1% didn't want to use the
booklet, and 2.7% were not interested in using privacy settings. The remaining 15.6%
indicated a combination of reasons for not using the booklet including lack of interest,
already knowing about the settings and lack of time to read through the booklet. Of the
25.3% of participants who did use the booklet, 44.6% reported that they learned
something new about the privacy settings (49.2% indicated they did not learn anything
new, and 6.2% did not answer this question). When asked about how enjoyable the task
was of creating a Facebook profile for another person, the majority of participants
indicated that they found the task to be more than somewhat enjoyable (i.e., indicated 5
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all enjoyable), to 7 (extremely enjoyable).
Participants were also given the opportunity to fill in a comment box about the study. A
common theme emerged, whereby participants commented on how it really made them
think twice about what they were including in the profiles, especially because the
information was for another person.
Analyses
For each regression analysis, one of the seven groups of measures was entered as
the independent variable. One dependent variable was entered per regression. Using a
Bonferroni correction the probability for each comparison was corrected to p < .007 to
accommodate the number of tests conducted. For disclosure, seven regressions were
conducted for each of the dependent measures: overall disclosure, disclosure of Personal
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identity information, Sensitive personal information, and Stigmatizing information, and
disclosure within eight content areas of Facebook (Personal information, Picture and
Album information, Work information, Education information, Age information,
Contact information, View information, and Relationship information). For privacy
settings seven binary logistic regressions were conducted to examine whether the
measures predicted the likelihood of employing settings or not (dichotomous scoring).
Following, seven linear regressions were conducted to examine whether the measures
predicted the number of privacy settings that were changed.
Overall Disclosure. To address the question of which variables predicted
disclosure overall, seven linear regressions were conducted. Results revealed that none
of the seven regressions were significant.
Disclosure of Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information,
and Stigmatizing Information. To address the question of which variables predicted
disclosure in three categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive personal
information, and Stigmatizing information), linear regressions were conducted. Results
revealed that one linear regression was significant. Specifically, positive attitudes
towards computers was a significant predictor of disclosure of personal identity
information (t (224) = 3.03,p = .003, R2 = .04). As positive attitudes towards computers
increased, so did disclosure of personal identity information. No other regressions
significantly predicted disclosure of either sensitive information or stigmatizing
information.
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Disclosure within Facebook Content Areas. To address the question of which
variables predicted disclosure in eight content areas within Facebook (Personal
information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education information,
Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship
information), linear regressions were conducted.
Results revealed that none of the regressions were significant at the .007 level.
While not significant, there was a trend (at the .07 level) such that increased positive
attitudes towards computers were related to a greater likelihood of disclosing both
education and address information.
Privacy Settings Use. Even given that there was a relatively small percentage of
participants who made at least one setting change (approx. 20%), it was important to
examine factors related to privacy settings behaviours. It was not surprising that so few
participants made any privacy settings changes, as previous research has indicated that
this tends to be the case (e.g., Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Gross &
Acquisti, 2006; Milne & Culnan, 2004). The current analysis sought to examine, within
the constraints of the small study sample, which variables predicted privacy settings
usage. To do this, seven binary and seven linear regressions were conducted. Binary
regressions results revealed that none of the seven groups of measures predicted whether
or not privacy settings were employed. When specific number of settings employed was
examined, four out of seven linear regressions were significant. Specifically, results
showed that private self-consciousness, reported self-disclosure, social desirability:
impression management and the virtual other: other referents significantly predicted use
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of privacy settings (t (205) = 2.44, p = .02, R2 = .09, t (220) = 2.30, p = .02, R2 = .03, t
(193) = 1.96, p = .05, R2 = .03 and t (2, 206) = 2.70,/? = .01, R2 = .04, for private selfconsciousness, reported self-disclosure, social desirability: impression management and
the virtual other: other referents, respectively). In all cases, as these variables increased,
so did use of privacy settings.
Question 3
Effect of Media (Context) and Gender
Design
A third set of analyses was conducted to examine the impact of media condition.
Specifically, a 2 (Context condition: Paper-and-pencil, Online) x 2 (Participant gender:
Male, Female) x 2 (Target gender: Male, Female) experimental design was employed.
Analyses
Analyses explored whether any differences in disclosure and use of settings in
Facebook emerged as a function of context condition, gender of target and gender of
participant . Examination of these variables was carried out using univariate and
multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA). Three analyses were conducted for
disclosure: one for overall disclosure, one for disclosure divided into three grouping
categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive personal information, and
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In order to examine disclosure as a function of pnvacy settings usage, all analyses examining context and

gender were repeated using only those participants who did not employ settings. Patterns were consistent
with results found for the entire sample.

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
Stigmatizing information), and one for disclosure within eight content areas with
Facebook (Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information,
Education information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and
Relationship information). Privacy settings were examined using regression analyses.
Overall Disclosure. A univariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine
overall disclosure within the Facebook profiles. Context condition, gender of target and
gender of participant were entered as the between subjects factors, and overall disclosure
in Facebook was entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed a significant main
effect of context, such that participants who filled out their profiles on paper-and-pencil
included significantly more information overall than did participants who filled out their
profiles online (See Table 26).
Disclosure of Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information,
and Stigmatizing Information. To address the question of how much information
participants disclosed in three disclosure categories (personal identity information,
sensitive personal information, and stigmatizing information), a multivariate analysis of
variance was conducted. Context, gender of target and gender of participant were
entered as the fixed factors, and disclosure in each of the three categories were entered
as the dependent variables. Results revealed a significant main effect of context for
sensitive information only (See Table 27). Participants who filled out paper-and-pencil
profiles disclosed more sensitive information than those who filled out profiles online.
While results indicated that there were no significant main effects of gender, there was a
significant interaction of gender of participant by gender of target for stigmatizing
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information in particular. Follow-up independent t-tests revealed that the difference was
significant for female targets, (t (129) = 2.34, p = .02), such that male participants
disclosed more stigmatizing information about a female target than did female
participants (see Table 27).
Disclosure within Facebook Content Areas. To address the question of how
much information participants disclosed in eight content areas within Facebook
(Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education
information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship
information), a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. Context
condition, gender of target and gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors,
and all eight topics were entered as the dependent variables.
Results revealed that there were significant main effects of context condition for
three of the eight topics. Specifically, for relationship information (F (1, 216) = 6.86, p =
.009), work information (F (1,216) = 17.71, p < .001) and contact information {F (1,
216) = 26.95,/? < .001). In all three topic areas, disclosure was significantly greater in the
paper-and-pencil condition as compared to the online condition (see Table 29). There
were no significant main effects for either gender of the participant or gender of the target
(largest F= 2.95).
In total, there were four significant interactions. First, there were significant
interaction effects of context condition and gender of the participant for education
information (F{\, 216) = 7.81,/? = .01) and personal information {F{\, 216) = 3.99,/? =
.05). Follow-up independent t-tests were conducted, one for paper-and-pencil and one for
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online, to identify where the differences were occurring. For each, gender was entered as
the grouping variable, and education and personal information were entered as the
dependent variables. On paper-and-pencil, males disclosed more education information
than females (t (127) = 2.36,/? = .02, Mmale = .63 and Mfemale= .49). In comparison,
when online, males disclosed more personal information than females {t (101) = 2.19,/? =
.03, Mmale = .60 and Mfemale= .48).
Second, there were significant interaction effects of gender of the participant and
gender of the target for relationship information {F (1, 216) = 135, p = .01) and view
information ( F ( l , 216) = 6.38,/? = .01). For relationship information, follow-up
independent t-tests were conducted, one for males and one for females, to identify where
the differences were occurring. For each, gender of the target was entered as the
grouping variable, and relationship information was entered as the dependent variable.
Disclosure of relationship information differed by target gender for females only (t (134)
= 2.07, p = .04), such that they disclosed more for male targets {Mmalechar = .67) than
for female targets (Mfemalechar = .52).
For view information, follow-up independent t-tests were conducted, one for
female targets and one for male targets, to identify where the differences were occurring.
For each, gender of the participant was entered as the grouping variable, and view
information was entered as the dependent variable. Disclosure of view information
differed by gender of participant for female targets only (t (130) = 2.10, p = .008), such
that males disclosed more {Mmale = .60) than did females {Mfemale = .38).
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Privacy Settings Use. Preliminary analyses indicated that each condition had at
least two participants who employed privacy settings (see Table 30). Due to small cell
sizes, this analysis was descriptive in nature. A count was conducted to compare privacy
settings by context condition, and revealed that more privacy settings were employed in
the paper-and-pencil condition as compared to the online condition. In terms of gender
of the participant, females tended to employ more settings than did males. For target
gender, females employed far more settings for a target of the same gender. Finally,
females in the paper-and-pencil condition employed more settings for female targets in
particular (See Table 30).
Discussion
What is Disclosed: Effect of Story and Gender
Overall Disclosure
Overall, in keeping with findings from Study 1 B examination of overall
disclosure did not yield significant findings in Study 2, therefore further reinforcing the
need to assess disclosure in terms of specific disclosure categories, as well as by topic.
However, important outcomes related to the type of story, gender, and subsequent
disclosure were apparent in Study 2. First, while hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported
statistically, the Personal Privacy Story resulted in the lowest amount of overall
disclosure, followed by the Legal Privacy Agreement Story and finally the History of the
Internet Control Story, which contained the highest amount of disclosure. This pattern is
in the hypothesized direction, albeit not significant. It could be that the stories, especially
the Personal Privacy Story, were salient but not as salient as they might have been with

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
more detail and perhaps gender specific information. Perhaps the impact of stories about
both genders or stories that depict a variety of scenarios and incidences of privacy
invasion resulting from over-disclosure rather than a single instance is worthy of
investigation. In addition, if the stories had contained more vivid and negative outcomes
as a result of the over-disclosure, the patterns of results may have been strengthened.
Alternatively, it may be more important to examine the type of information, as will be
conducted below, that can be inhibited as a function of the story rather than sheer
quantity, as some types of information may be more risky to disclose than others.
Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and
Stigmatizing Information
In terms of the three disclosure categories, there were significant differences in
disclosure of both sensitive and stigmatizing information in particular. First, female
participants disclosed significantly more sensitive information in the History of the
Internet Control Story, and significantly less sensitive information in the Legal Privacy
Agreement Story. While it was originally hypothesized (see hypothesis 5) that the
Personal Privacy Story would have the greatest impact on disclosure for females in
particular, it appears that for females there was something especially salient about a legal
document. Gender norms are not supportive of female criminality (Steffensmeier &
Allan, 1996), and favour instead a motherly, caring and responsible image of females. In
addition, females are raised to be moral, nurturing individuals with a strong "ethic of
care", or in other words, a strong sensitivity to the needs of others (Gilligan, 1982). It is
speculated that, due to moral development and socialization processes, females may be
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more inclined to abide by rules and regulations that are framed in a legal way. Therefore,
the strength of a legal privacy policy may be augmented for females, thus resulting in less
disclosure in this condition in particular.
Alternatively, it is also possible that the legal document was seen as more formal,
and as a result, female participants in particular took this story more seriously, resulting
in less disclosure. Second, in regards to stigmatizing information, male participants in
particular disclosed significantly more for a female target. While not significant, there
was also a similar trend for female participants, such that they tended to disclose more for
a male target. Even though the information provided did not convey minority status (e.g.,
homosexual orientation, or extremist political or religious views), examination of less
extreme information that could be used to potentially stigmatize another person (even
including fairly common religious and political views) was of interest and may still be
viewed as threatening. As a result, this information may activate collective group
identification (Tajfel, 1982) and even an inclination to protect one's own gender. In this
case, both genders may elicit behaviours that reflect a greater value for their own gender,
thus limiting disclosure of potentially damaging information. Alternatively, perhaps the
participants identify more with the target of the same gender and act in accordance with
their own disclosure needs. More specifically, it could be that participants are acting as
though the information they are disclosing about the target is in fact information about
them, and, therefore, limit sharing information that could be used to humiliate or discredit
when the gender of the target matches their own gender.
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Different Topic Categories
When disclosure of specific topics was examined, interesting results emerged for
two out of the eight topic scales: contact information and view information. Male
participants tended to disclose more contact information overall than did female
participants. This finding is consistent with research that has found that male disclosure
may be topic dependent (Derlega, Durham, Gockel & Sholis, 1981). It is also suggested
that males may also be more comfortable disclosing topics that are more prohibited,
including contact information. Moreover, it may be that females are more cautious and
feel a greater sense of social responsibility (Gilligan, 1982); especially in the case where
information is being disclosed for another person they have never met.
While males were more likely than females to disclose contact information for
another person, disclosure was also dependent on story. Surprisingly, males who read a
control story about the history of the Internet disclosed less contact information than
males who read either the Personal Privacy or Legal Agreement stories. This finding was
unexpected and surprising as the two other conditions were specifically designed to
reduce not increase disclosure. This may be a spurious finding. Alternatively, after
reading the History of the Internet Control story, which was really not about Facebook
and generally not personally interesting, it could be that this may have made the task less
interesting or engaging. This may have resulted in less overall involvement in the task,
and may have been especially so for the males in the sample.
There were important interactions between story and target gender. In partial
support for hypothesis 5, results demonstrated that the Personal Privacy Story resulted in
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less disclosure of contact information for female targets. Moreover, male participants
seemed to be particularly sensitive to the gender of the target, and disclosed less contact
details for female targets than for male targets, offering partial support for hypothesis 4.
While this is not entirely surprising given that the story depicted an incidence in which a
female was located and confronted by a reporter based on disclosure of personal contact
details, this does reinforce the idea that perhaps females are viewed as more vulnerable
and even less competent (Diekman & Eagly, 2000), especially by males, and as such
disclosures that could result in bodily harm or potential physical harassment are more
carefully considered.
Differences also emerged for political and religious views. Specifically, male
participants disclosed more view information about a female target than did female
participants. This finding is not surprising given that both political and religious views
were included in the stigmatizing information scale and these findings are consistent with
results obtained for the disclosure categories, such that males disclosed more stigmatizing
information for a female target. In addition, this is also somewhat consistent with
findings from Study 1 C where results confirmed that males expressed more information
about political and religious views overall than did females, albeit in Study 2 this is
intensified for female targets in particular.
Privacy Settings
Not surprisingly, only 20.3% of participants chose to employ at least one privacy
setting. This is consistent with previous studies that found that very few users chose to
employ privacy settings (e.g., Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Gross &
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Acquisti, 2006; Milne & Culnan, 2004). In support for hypothesis 5, as expected, by
means of a descriptive count, more settings were employed in the privacy invasion story
condition that in either of the other two story conditions. Moreover, as anticipated,
females tended to employ more settings than males. Interestingly, both genders employed
more settings for a target of the same gender. Consistent with the findings from Study 2
examining disclosure, it appears as though males and females alike are more protective of
targets of the same gender. Lastly, as predicted, females who read the privacy invasion
story employed more settings for female targets. This finding is not surprising given that
the story retold an incidence of privacy invasion occurring to a female, thus, perhaps
encouraging female participants to engage in more protective behaviours for a female
target in particular. The next step might be to provide participants with explicit privacy
settings training and instruction, which would encourage use of settings and foster a
greater understanding of the options available to users.
Additional Exploratory Factors Related to Disclosure and Privacy Settings Use
A secondary exploratory examination of additional predictors was conducted to
assess the predictive power of various factors including: personality, familiarity with
technology, attitudes and behaviours related to online privacy protection and the virtual
audience. Although previous research has examined factors related to use of technology
(e.g., Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007; Mueller, Wood, Willoughby, Ross &
Specht, 2008; Ross, Orr, Sisic, Arseneault, Simmering & Orr, 2009), no known studies
have explored novel predictors such as the virtual audience.
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Disclosure
While none of the exploratory factors were related to overall disclosure, results
indicated that one factor, possessing positive attitudes towards computers in general, was
a significant predictor of disclosure of personal identity information. This finding is
consistent with previous studies that have looked at how attitudes towards technology
relate to use of technology (Levine & Donitsa-Schmidt, 1998; Mueller, Wood,
Willoughby, Ross & Specht, 2008). Perhaps possessing positive attitudes about
technology encourages greater disclosure by buffering fears of information invasion
because users feel more comfortable about their ability to protect themselves, and
possibly have a better understanding of technology in the first place. Moreover, it is
possible that because those individuals with more positive attitudes are more likely to use
technology, the compounding effect of positive experiences with technology and fewer
incidences of problems over time may encourage greater disclosure when using the
technology.
Interestingly, none of the other factors were related to disclosure. This begs the
question; what else drives disclosure? In the current sample, a large majority of
participants were university aged students. Following from Erikson's theory of
psychosocial development (1968), it is possible that users in this age group possesses a
certain degree of naivete about the self and may not have yet achieved a firm sense of
identity (Jensen Arnett, 2000). As a result, these younger users may possess a greater
desire for gratification and require more feedback from peers. As such, disclosure of
personal details overshadows the requirement for information protection or censorship of
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personal details. Even if self-presentation occurs online, and only positive attributes or
the ideal self is conveyed, this may be putting users at risk of identity and security
breaches. In comparison, older users may have a firmer sense of who they are, and may
not possess the desire to disclose to the same degree as their younger counterparts. It is
also possible that motivation to use the site differs between groups. For example, perhaps
older users are using the site for the purpose of social connectivity, and for keeping in
touch with close others within their tight social sphere. In comparison, it could be that
younger users are using the site for a means to explore their possible selves and to selfexpress. While this question was not answered in the current research, it is an area that
merits further examination. Lastly, the notion of "culture" is one that may prove
important in understanding disclosive communication online. Altman (1975) posited that
individuals adjust privacy regulation according to both the environment and the internal
state. He went on to acknowledge the importance of the social world, and the context in
which privacy is negotiated. For some, Facebook may be considered a "culture", such
that certain groups achieve a collective identity whereby standards of disclosure and
access to information are set by the group (or the social world), not the individual.
Consequently, users within these subcultures on Facebook may be inclined to act in a
way that is consistent with what other users are doing. Not only do they act in accordance
with the groups norms, this may even instill a sense of normalcy, indicating that if
everyone else is doing it, it must be okay. While self-presentation may be viewed as a
buffer against presenting more harmful information, given that when self-presenting,
information tends to be idealized and more positive (Goffman, 1959), group standards
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may dictate what is considered "ideal". If ideal information as set out by the subculture is
information that puts the user at particular risk (e.g., posting drunk pictures or pictures of
the user in compromising positions), problems may arise. At the same time, perhaps a
desire for social acceptance within one's culture overrides rational thought about
protecting personal information, and results in over-disclosure of personal information.
There is obvious need for further exploration of additional factors. Even so, while
the majority of the factors measured in the current study did not relate to disclosure, they
may be associated with privacy settings use. This possibility was explored next.
Privacy Settings
In terms of settings, results revealed that the overall amount of variance in use of
privacy settings predicted by the additional exploratory factors was quite small (R =
.19). Even so, personality factors including private self-consciousness and social
desirability: impression management did significantly relate to increased settings use.
Perhaps in the case of private self-consciousness, participants who score higher on this
measure may have been more self-reflective, and consequently more concerned with how
their information might be used. As a result, they were also more likely to employ
settings. Public self-consciousness, on the other hand, was not a significant predictor of
settings use. Given that the premise of Facebook is based on creation of personal profiles
and displaying personal information, perhaps Facebook itself is not viewed as public by
some. It could be that for some users, creating a Facebook account is considered a more
private activity. In addition, even despite the fact that Facebook is designed as a site for
information sharing, this sharing may be considered to occur only within tight social
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networks or within one's personal sphere. Therefore, whether or not one has a public
focus does not relate to use of various features of the site. For social desirability, it is
possible that participants detected the importance of privacy settings as a feature of the
study, and, as such, utilized more of the available privacy settings. Alternatively, Paulhus
(1984) views impression management as reflective of a more communal concern in
individuals. As such, those who score higher on this scale may be more cautious about
their actions, especially when their actions involve others.
Worthy of note, although accounting for a small percentage of variance in privacy
settings, the virtual audience and, in particular, having referents in mind other than the
self or close friends was significantly related to greater use of privacy settings. Although
weak, this finding may be considered encouraging since it seems as though users are
more conscious about employing settings when less close others are in mind, but it is still
a concern that friends are not considered to be a potential risk. In the case of Facebook,
the inability to control accessibility of information displayed by friends may indirectly
expose users to the risk of identity theft, and social and personal security issues. For
example, if a friend tagged the user in their profile or in an album, and this friend did not
have strict privacy settings employed, thus allowing for access to photos, the photos of
the user are available to whoever the friend has in their friends list. If friends were
considered more of a threat, users may be more likely to employ stricter settings so as to
limit what friends can do with their information. For example, users can employ privacy
settings that limit what content friends can view. By creating a group that contains only
specific users (i.e., friends), users have the option to specify exactly which pieces of
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information each group can see, thus selectively limiting access to certain content and
indirectly limiting unwanted exposure of information via friends profiles. This previously
overlooked area may prove to be especially important in understanding further how users
perceive relationships and information sharing online, and how they may be putting
themselves at risk unknowingly, but studying this factor may require revised approaches.
In the current study, participants were asked about who they were thinking about when
simply posting personally revealing information. While they were asked about the
referent, participants were not asked about how each referent related to disclosure of
specific kinds of information (e.g., photos, status updates etc.). Results may produce
significant associations between virtual other and disclosure if topic of disclosure is
broken down more finely. In addition, the virtual other may be a concern more so when
the information is being posted about the self and not for another person, as in the case of
the current study. For both disclosure and use of privacy settings a more in-depth and rich
investigation of the dynamics and perceptions of various relationships both while online
and offline and how they impact on disclosure and privacy settings use may prove
insightful. The next step may be to conduct interviews, and ask users about their choices
when posting specific kinds of personal information about themselves, at the time that the
information is being posted, and who and/or what they are thinking about when
employing specific settings.
Descriptive examination of overall use and effectiveness of the provided privacy
settings booklet yielded interesting results. When asked why they did not use the booklet,
of those who gave a response, 40.1% participants indicated that they already knew the
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settings. Even despite reporting knowing about the settings, and thus having no need to
use the booklet, more than a quarter of these participants (25.7%) indicated that they
learned something new about the settings that they previously did not know. This
highlights the discrepancy between what users are saying they know and what they
actually know. Is it possible that this effect reflects age or cohort differences in terms of
understanding how much one knows in a certain domain (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger &
Kruger, 2003). Presumably, as age increases so does experience and knowledge.
Conceivably, those in their late teens or early adult years could have insufficient
knowledge or expertise necessary to deduce what they know, and more importantly what
they don't know. In the case of privacy settings, these individuals may reflect an
overconfidence or overestimation of their true knowledge.
Alternatively, it may be that users tend to go with the default, and fail to actively
change the settings within Facebook. Users may be more inclined to go with the default
option, either because they do not wish to actively change the option, or because it
requires a certain level of engagement. Because settings are not presented in such a way
that they are readily accessible, perhaps users perceive the task of employing settings as
arduous. Without proper knowledge and the desire to explore available privacy options
due to inaccessibility and incomprehensible explanations, as in the case of privacy
policies, users are left to fend for themselves. In such cases, it appears that this results in
a lack of use of settings entirely. This may indicate a need for more effective and
comprehensive privacy settings training.
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Effect of Media Context and Gender
In order to gain a better understanding of how disclosure of information in
traditional formats compares with disclosure online, the impact of media context on
disclosure of information was examined. In addition, no known studies have compared
privacy settings use across context, and, therefore, this novel area was also examined.
Disclosure
Contrary to expectations (hypothesis 7) and previous studies (e.g., Joinson, 2001;
Locke & Gilbert, 1995; Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross &
Irvine, 2006), overall disclosure was greater on paper-and-pencil than online. This
finding was quite surprising. It is possible that because the information was being
disclosed for another individual and not for the participants themselves, there may have
been a greater concern about the security of the information. This may be supported by
the qualitative comments given by participants that reflected a strong sense of
responsibility as well as hesitation over their disclosures, because the information was not
their own. In the case of online information sharing, perhaps participants felt that this
context in particular was more risky than simply writing personal details down on paper.
Generally, studies have looked at disclosure specific to the self, such as in the case of
survey material about personal opinions, attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Christofides,
Muise & Desmarais, 2009). Patterns of disclosure across context, especially when online,
may therefore be different when the information is being shared about someone else,
especially a complete stranger. On the other hand, perhaps the knowledge or worry of
information leakage is greater in an online setting, where not only the researchers have
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access to the information, but potentially hundreds if not thousands of other users. This
awareness or realization that exposure is greater online may give rise to greater vigilance
when disclosing in this context. Alternatively, the nature of the paper-and-pencil booklet
may have encouraged greater disclosure. Specifically, participants were given numerous
screenshots in a booklet that was visible in its entirety. In contrast to online, where users
must scroll through pull down tabs to access similar pages, perhaps the fact that the
information was presented directly in front of the participants encouraged them to fill in
more. It is also possible that the paper-and-pencil condition was not an authentic task, and
was not as comparable to online as previously expected. A potential next step may be to
have participants simply fill out profile information on a blank sheet, without the aid of a
premade booklet. By allowing them to add in without as many obvious prompts, a better
gauge of disclosure in this context may be obtained.
Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and
Stigmatizing Information
A similar pattern emerged for one out of the three disclosure categories: sensitive
information. More sensitive information was disclosed on paper-and-pencil than online.
Again, there may be something specific to the information disclosed in the sensitive
information disclosure category that is viewed as particularly risky, especially when
disclosed online. Further explanation is provided in the next section. In addition, there
was also a significant interaction of gender of participant by gender of target for
stigmatizing information. Specifically, male participants disclosed significantly more and
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female participants significantly less for a female target. These patterns are identical to
those found in part 1 examining effect of story and gender.
Different Topic Categories
There were significant main effects of context for three of the eight topics,
including work, relationship and contact information. Consistent with findings for
disclosure overall and by disclosure category, disclosure of these topics was greater on
paper-and-pencil than online. Perhaps sensitive information and these topic areas in
particular are considered quite delicate in nature, given that they open up the user to
breaches in personal and financial security. For example, sensitive information consisted
of various items including information pertaining to one's employer and job position. Not
surprising then, disclosure of work information was less online. It is suggested that
disclosing contact information and work information may place users at risk of
harassment and potentially loss of employment should employers access the information
and feel the employee is reflecting inappropriate behavior online. In the case of
relationship information, close others including romantic partners and family may also be
placed at risk indirectly should they be located or otherwise identified via information
found online. There could be something specific to certain content that is considered
more unsafe to share, especially when online.
Significant interactions also emerged between context and gender of participant
for two of the eight topic scales: education information and personal information. On
paper-and-pencil, males disclosed more education information than females. In
comparison, when online, males disclosed more personal information than females. This
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finding was quite puzzling, given the argument that certain types of information may be
seen as more 'unsafe' than others. In the case of education information versus personal
information, one might assume that personal information is more risky to share online
than education information. It is proposed that, for some, online social networking
profiles may be viewed as a less explicit way of meeting romantic partners and may even
be seen as a less overt dating site. Even despite the fact that the target person was in a
romantic relationship, perhaps for male participants in particular, this was an opportunity
to share potentially desirable and insightful information about the target person that could
potentially be used in future for dating purposes. Previous research examining gender
differences in attitudes towards infidelity has found that males possessed more
permissive attitudes (Lieberman, 1988) and also had a stronger desire to engage in
unfaithful behavior (Prins, Buunk & VanYperen, 1993). By advertising information such
as interests, activities and all "about me", items that were included in the personal
information topic scale, it is speculated that perhaps male participants may have been
"putting it out there" for the target and displaying information that another user may be
interested in knowing should they be looking for a relationship.
Finally, significant interactions emerged between gender of the participant and
gender of the target for two of the topic scales: relationship information and view
information. Findings revealed that disclosure of relationship information differed by
target gender for females only, such that they disclosed more for male targets than for
female targets. While this explanation is speculative, this may be a way for females to
assert romantic status and faithfulness in the relationship, especially for the male target.
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This argument stems from a similar argument made for increased disclosure of personal
information online on the part of male participants. Males and females may view
relationships differently, such that females may have less permissive attitudes about
infidelity and may have an increased need to display this qualifying information, whereas
males may view certain interactions as an opportunity to potentially meet new partners.
Madden and Lenhart (2006) have found that relationship seekers often use the Internet as
a means for locating potential dating partners. In terms of gender, Golub and colleagues
(2007) found that males were more likely to report that they would consider dating
someone online.
Privacy Settings
When privacy settings were examined descriptively, results revealed that more
settings were employed on paper-and-pencil. Again, the nature of the paper-and-pencil
booklet may have encouraged greater use of privacy settings. It is possible that users find
it overwhelming to find the appropriate setting online, even when a booklet outlining the
settings was provided. Moreover, given that online the settings are oftentimes not
obviously laid out or in intuitive places, users may have grown tired of looking or
decided that it was not worth the effort to locate and employ to appropriate setting.
Offering partial support for hypothesis 2, based on a descriptive count, females
employed more privacy settings than did males. This may reflect a general caution on the
part of females, and along a similar vein, a greater sense of social responsibility,
especially in the case of a stranger's personal information. For gender of the target
person, females employed more settings for a target person of the same gender. This
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result is consistent with results regarding disclosure in Study 2, albeit this finding only
applies to females. Finally, females in the paper-and-pencil condition employed more
settings for female targets in particular. Given the relatively larger amount of disclosure
on paper-and-pencil, it appears as though females are more consistent in their protective
behaviours. While results were descriptive in nature, it is possible that females in
particular are more inclined to complement their disclosure with use of privacy settings.
This possibility warrants further examination.
Summary
Although the effect of story was not as strong as hoped, overall, this study
provides partial evidence that having participants read certain stories may encourage
them to alter the way in which they display or share personal information, even in the
case of information about another person. Given the relative lack of impact of privacy
policies on over-disclosure, results from this study may help give insight into more
effective ways of reaching a potentially at risk population. In addition, this study offers
insight into differences in information sharing across context, and provides evidence that
previously found patterns of self-disclosure may not be consistent when the information
is being disclosed for another person.
Study 1 B and C did not yield significant gender differences in disclosure, while
in Study 2 gender played a significant role. Not only did males and females differ in
disclosure, but consideration of the gender of the target seems to be important in
understanding what types of information in particular people are willing to share about
another person.
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In contrast to Study 1 C, in Study 2 contact information and personal information
emerged as key topics of disclosure, suggesting that there is utility in examining factors
including story, context and gender in reference to specific content.
Lastly, while a small percentage of the sample chose to employ privacy settings,
this was not a surprise. However, for those who did choose to employ privacy settings,
there were descriptive associations with the type of story read. While effect of story was
not as strong as hoped, the results from Study 2 highlight how a salient anecdotal story
could predict increased use of privacy enhancing features. There was also a gender trend
consistent with previous research (Kehoe et al., 1997; O'Neil, 2001; Youn & Hall, 2008)
whereby females demonstrated greater use of privacy settings, especially when
displaying information for another female. In sum, in comparison to disclosure, similar
factors were related to use of privacy settings. Given the relative lack of research
examining story, gender and privacy settings use, the current study offers a first glance at
factors that may be associated with an increase in privacy settings use in personal
profiles.
General Discussion
Studies 1 A, B, and C provided an initial, systematic exploration of Facebook
profiles. The study identified what kinds of information can be disclosed through these
profiles, as well as when information is likely to be disclosed, and by whom.
Specifically, the first contribution of these studies was the construction of a
comprehensive checklist to identify the types of information available on the Facebook
profiles. This first step was important for establishing a general checklist that can be
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used in future Facebook research. No known checklist that accounted for all of the
possible items contained within online Facebook profiles existed prior to this research.
Developing this tool was a first step in permitting systematic study of what is and is not
disclosed on social networking profiles. Analysis of the information assessed by this
checklist indicated that there is a great diversity of kinds of information that can be
shared and that, for some online social networking users, a great deal of information is
shared through this media and that some information is more likely to be revealed than
others. Information provided in Study 1 A established that there was information that
could be considered both threatening and non-threatening to users. Once this was
established, the purpose of Study 1 B was then to further examine factors that predicted
disclosure within the more threatening information categories. Developing this
instrument and then refining the instrument through the categories identified in Studies 1
A, B, and C represents a substantial contribution to existing research as the categories
provide a systematic mechanism though which subsequent research can assess the
quantity, types and potential risk that disclosed information represents.
Study 2 was an initial systematic investigation using the tools developed from
Studies 1 A, B, and C and examined experimentally the impact of story, gender and
media context on overall disclosure and use of privacy settings. Understanding
mechanisms by which individuals will disclose more 'safely' online is a key concern
today. Study 2 broadened awareness of potential factors that may help to inhibit overdisclosure and the subsequent risk of information invasion in personal profiles, and
indicated a need for further examination of additional factors that may be related to use
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of settings. Gender in particular emerged as a very strong predictor of disclosure across
a variety of topic areas. While Study 2 produced some surprising findings, this may
indicate a need for further examination of the association between various factors.
Keeping in mind that disclosure was for a target person, it appears that patterns of
disclosure in social networking sites such as Facebook may be different from disclosure
patterns found in more traditional studies. Typically, disclosure occurs in the case where
two or more individual already know each other, and where a conversational "back and
forth" occurs, such as in the case of reciprocal information sharing. Online, and more
specifically in the case of Facebook, this back and forth is not as evident. In fact, in most
cases disclosure occurs whereby information is broadcasted to other users, but there is not
always feedback or follow-up from an interaction partner.
In the current study, gender emerged as a strong predictor of disclosure for
another person. Traditional self-disclosure theory boasts strong gender differences in
terms of communication patterns, with females disclosing more than males (Dindia &
Allen, 1992). Results from the current study did not support this and instead revealed that
females consistently censored their disclosures for a target individual more than did
males across a variety of different topics. In the case of disclosure for another person,
gendered communication appears to be different in social networking profiles as
compared to face-to-face. These findings may inform current theory, and may call for
revision to traditional explanations of disclosure by gender.
Careful revision may be required to tailor existing theories of disclosure offline to
fit disclosure online. For example, while speculative, the order of the stages in the theory
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of social penetration (Altman & Taylor, 1973) may require revision. In terms of personal
disclosure in social networking sites such as Facebook, it may be that the orientation
stage whereby people are more cautious about the types of information they divulge,
occurs later on and may be prompted by incidences involving invasion of privacy or
greater experience with the site. At first rather, it appears that there is a moderate level of
disclosure containing both more risky and less risky information, consistent with both the
exploratory affective stage where people begin to express basic opinions (e.g., their
political opinions), and the affective stage where even more intimate details are revealed.
Given that this theory typically addresses the "getting to know" process in a relationship,
in the case of personal disclosure on Facebook where presumably most users already
know their audience, similar stages of communication may occur, but in a slightly
different order.
Current theories of online communication such as the hyper-personal theory of
online communication have attempted to explain online relationships that are formed and
maintained solely online. This theory in particular may require revision to include
relationships that are formed offline and maintained solely online, as in the case of
relationships on Facebook. The "getting to know" process may not apply in these
relationships. Furthermore, examination and consideration of how personal selfdisclosure online (i.e., when users post information without the expectation of direct
reciprocal communication) occurs and differs from relational self-disclosure is necessary.
Features that are important in explaining disclosure relationally may not apply or may
require revision when applied to personal disclosure online in social networking profiles.
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While pitfalls exist in existing online theory, there are a variety of components that can
be applied to personal disclosure in social networking profiles, including asynchronous
time, reduced cues and the norm of reciprocity. First, Facebook users have opportunities
to communicate through various means, including an email inbox or by posting on
another users' wall. In both cases, response from other users is not immediate and
therefore, consistent with the notion of asynchronous time, a lag time in between
messages exists. In this case, users may filter and censor their disclosure messages.
Second, communication via Facebook profiles often occurs in text-based form, but is not
limited to text. Users have the opportunity to convey meaning through use of emoticons,
graphics, and pictures. Therefore, while there are reduced cues when communicating
online (e.g., lack of physical cues including gestures, tone and intonation), the cues
presented by communication partners are not as "reduced" or strict as originally set forth
by Walther (1996). This may be worthwhile considering. Third, the norm of reciprocity,
which refers to the expectation that disclosure will be returned at a comparable level
applies to personal disclosure via social networking profiles. This may be related to the
idea of a "Facebook" culture, whereby users within a specific online social sphere may
set out standards for what is expected in terms of personal disclosure. If other users in an
individual's friends group post highly personal pictures, intimate status updates and
regular wall posts, then that individual may be expected to disclose to the same degree. It
may be that the "culture" dictates what is expected as opposed to the interaction partner,
as in the case of traditional theories of reciprocal communication (Gouldner, 1960).
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While speculative, a variety of other factors that were not examined in the current
research may prove useful in understanding the nature of disclosure and privacy settings
use in social networking profiles, and may inform current theory. Perceived trust in the
system (i.e., how trustworthy the site is perceived to be) may influence decisions about
displaying personal information. The consensus is that Facebook is perceived as more
trustworthy than other social networking sites, such as MySpace (Fogel & Nehmad,
2009). Given that the site is endorsed as being reliable and safe, users may feel more
comfortable disclosing riskier pieces of information. Perceptions of trust in the system
therefore warrant further examination in relation to disclosure and privacy settings use.
Cues from the social environment on Facebook may also be related to information
disclosure. If users are obtaining positive feedback from other users based on the
information displayed, the costs and risks of disclosing highly personal details may be
overshadowed by the benefits associated with over-disclosure, such as popularity or
attention. Moreover, motivation to use the site may play a significant role in disclosure
and privacy settings use when online. Individual goals for using the site may vary from
one user to the next, including social connectivity, identity exploration, self-esteem,
popularity, curiosity, and even revenge. These goals may also drive perceptions of the
benefits and costs associated with disclosing information. For example, social exchange
theory posits that if benefits outweigh the costs of a particular relationship, disclosure
within that relationship increases. Depending on individual motivations, the perceived
cost/benefits may vary, and as a result subsequent patterns of disclosure may differ.
Furthermore, who the user is thinking about (the virtual other) and the perceived risks
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associated with that particular person seeing their information may be related to the
amount and type of information displayed as well as the privacy settings employed.
Disclosure may be higher for virtual others that are perceived as less threatening (e..g,
friends). It could be that users are thinking about various virtual others at the same time.
Management of opposing virtual others (e.g., mother and ex-boyfriend) and how users
make decisions about what to post ultimately is therefore worthy of exploration, and may
also be related to motivation or individual reasons for using the site. Lastly, existence of a
common Facebook subculture and the notion of "birds of a feather flock together" may
prove particularly useful in understanding disclosure and settings use in social
networking profiles. Investigation of the norms and standards that are set out by a
particular online culture and how these expectations are transferred to disclosure and
settings usage within personal profiles is necessary. While even less if known about
privacy settings behavior, the possibility remains that the same factors that explain
disclosure may also explain use of protective mechanisms. Ultimately, further research
examining factors that relate to self-disclosure and information control processes (i.e.,
privacy settings use) in more detail is required before revisions to existing theory and
creation of new theory can be achieved, but may eventually guide the development of
theories of personal disclosure in social networking profiles.
Limitations
Studies 1 A, B, and C examined only those profiles that were publicly accessible,
meaning that profiles with privacy settings limiting access were not included in the
analysis. It is possible that those users who choose to employ settings are very different
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from those who do not (i.e., have publicly accessible profiles). Users with publicly
accessible profiles may be more likely to disclose more overall, while those who do not
allow for public accessibility may be more inclined to censor certain pieces of
information over others. This possibility warrants examination. While this is a
limitation, the findings from these studies offer insight into the kinds of information that
are being shared, and the factors that help to predict who is more or less likely to overdisclose.
Study 1 A allowed for the development of a comprehensive scoring tool that will
guide future research in this area. While this coding scheme was not cross-validated due
to time constraints, additional studies employing this coding scheme may prove useful in
establishing validity.
Study 2 examined disclosure and privacy settings use when the information was
for another person, not the user themselves. While results were not strong, findings
suggest that factors previously examined as predictors of technology use may not relate
to use of privacy settings. This indicates further examination is needed to identify which
factors may have a stronger effect of privacy settings usage. It is suggested that
knowledge about the risks and life experiences may have played a role in predicting use
of privacy settings. For example, if an individual has gone through life experiences
related to identity theft, or has encountered other individuals who have had their identity
compromised, they may be more apprehensive about information security when online.
In addition, by sampling from a more diverse age group, age may have been related to
increased privacy settings usage, with older users exhibiting increased use of privacy
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settings. Unfortunately, in the current sample, age was limited and therefore this factor
could not be examined as a predictor. It is also possible that motivation and education
plays a role in the likelihood to use privacy settings. More specifically, greater exposure
to media though news and media stories online and offline and taking an active role in
pursuing information about the risks may better predict who is more likely to use the
available security features. While information is available about the settings, it is
ultimately up to the user to pursue the information, whether it be clicking on a link or
actively searching for the privacy policy information. The more educated an individual
is about the risks, the more likely they may be to protect themselves. This may also be
dependent on the motivation of the user to pursue the information, and could possibly be
related again to age and life experiences.
Given that social networking sites are based on information sharing and more
importantly, sharing information about others within one's social sphere, understanding
what impacts of the likelihood of over-disclosing about someone else is critical. In Study
2, the impact of the anecdotal story was not as strong as hoped. This may be due to the
fact that the story did not contain any real negative outcomes as a result of overdisclosure. In the case where some negative consequence was reflected, the saliency of
the story may have increased and may have therefore yielded greater differences
between stories.
Until replication can be conducted, it is also possible that the effects found in
Study 2 were being driven by specific elements of the information provided in the target
person's portfolio. For example, it was clear that the target was in the midst of moving to
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a different city. In this case, the gender differences found in regards to posting
relationship information, such that males posted less and females posted more, could be a
by-product of a change in location. By this, it could be that males and females view the
commitment aspect of a romantic relationship as dependent on proximity. Perhaps for
males, relationships are viewed as less stable when partners are further away from one
another (i.e., in different cities). While this is quite speculative, this may be a point to
consider for future studies.
Directions for Future Research
Based on findings from the current studies, the next step may be to examine how
explicit privacy training impacts on disclosure and privacy settings use. It is apparent
that there is a need for additional, more effective ways of educating users about the
options available to them when online. This may illustrate why certain users are not
employing settings and help inform policy and web developers about better ways of
conveying features available to users.
Further, inclusion of different participant groups such as older and younger users
and novice and expert users will allow for a more comprehensive look at how various
groups use social networking sites. In addition to these possibilities, a follow-up study
employing a variety of stories that contain content about both genders, identifying
information (e.g., actual names of the victims) and numerous scenarios including both
negative and positive outcomes may prove useful in narrowing in on the specific
features of anecdotal stories that encourage users to disclose less and better protect
themselves and others through use of privacy settings.

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
Moreover, qualitative examination of content including status updates and text
entries (e.g., wall posts) may prove useful in understanding the links between selfdisclosure theory and disclosure in an online social networking setting, and may aid in
the development of new disclosure theories that apply directly to information sharing in
personal profiles. Qualitatively examining text based entries may offer a richer
assessment of content of messages conveyed in social networking profiles. By taking
into account the differences between disclosure that involves reciprocal communication
and direct feedback, and disclosure of information that is simply broadcasted by a user
for an audience without expectation of interaction, a clearer understanding of how
people are communicating online may be obtained.
In order to gain a more complete picture of disclosure and settings use online,
examination of private profiles (i.e., profiles that are not publicly accessible) needs to be
conducted. Perhaps disclosure and use of privacy settings is very different in this case.
In addition, various other distinguishing factors including familiarity with technology
and how long they have been a Facebook member may be associated with use, and
therefore merits investigation.
Finally, the virtual other warrants further investigation. It may be of particular
utility to conduct interviews with users in order to gain a richer understanding of who
and what they are thinking about when posting information and when choosing, or not
choosing, to use the available privacy features. By specifically asking users who they are
thinking about when posting certain information, at the time that it is posted, will help
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researchers to better understand the relationship between the mental audience and
activities online in personal profiles.
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Table 1.
Frequencies for All Dichotomously Scored Items in the Facebook Checklist
Item

Sub categories within
Dichotomous variables

Can you poke them?
Can you message them?
Mini-Feed
Profile Picture

N

99.30%
99%
97.50%
91.80%
73.80%
22%
11.30%

397
396
390
367
295
88
45

7.30%
7%

29
28

status) in a

4.50%
3.80%
0.50%
0.30%
88%
83.80%
73.30%
87.80%
83.30%
83%
82%
38.80%
29%
81.50%
79.30%
77.50%
75.80%
71.30%
70%
63%
30.30%

18
15
2
1
352
335
293
351
333
332
328
155
116
326
317
310
303
285
280
252
121

status) single
status)

23.80%
4.80%

95
19

3%

12

(Profile Picture) self
(Profile Picture) friends
(Profile Picture)
relationship partner
(Profile Picture) activity
(Profile Picture) random
picture
(Profile Picture) family
(Profile Picture) animal(s)
(Profile Picture) school
(Profile Picture) work
Birthday
Birth day
Birth year
Friends Viewable
College/University
Wall
Gender
(Gender) male
(Gender) female
Applications
Groups (joined at least one group)
Photos of...
Tagged Photos
Can you send them a gift?
Photo Album(s)
Relationship Status
(Relationship
relationship
(Relationship
(Relationship
married
(Relationship

Frequency

status)
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(Relationship status)it's
complicated
(Relationship status) in an
open relationship
High school
Concentration
Graduation Year
Self Selected Photos
Interested in (Sexual Orientation)
(Interested in) women
(Interested in) men
Favorite Music
Favorite Movies
Gifts
Favorite Quotes
Interests
Favorite TV Shows
Hometown
Email address
Favorite Books
Activities
Employer
Political views
Job Listed (have listed at least one
job)
Religious views
About Me
Position
Status
Posted Items
Time Period
Notes
Personal Pages
Looking for (Relationship
Preference)
(Looking for) friendship
(Looking for)relationship
(Looking for)networking
(Looking for) dating
(Looking for)whatever I
can get
(Looking for) random play

1.30%

5

0%

0

62.80%
62.30%
56%
55.30%
54.50%
33%
22.50%
51.30%
50.30%
47.80%
47.30%
46.80%
46.80%
45.40%
43.30%
40.80%
37%
35.3%%
35%
32.50%

251
249
224
221
218
132
90
205
201
191
189
187
187
182
173
163
148
141
140
130

32%
30.80%
30.50%
25.80%
25.30%
24.30%
23.50%
23.50%
19.50%

128
123
122
103
101
97
94
94
78

19.80%
5%
4.80%
4%
2.50%

78
20
19
16
10

2.30%

9

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
Job Description
Tagged Videos
Fun Wall
Residence
Degree
(Degree)
(Degree)
(Degree)
(Degree)
(Degree)
(Degree)
Website
City/Town
Former Name
Mobile Phone
Events (as indicated in their minifeed)
Home Address
Room
Advanced Wall
Super Wall
Market Place listings
Land Phone
Courses
School Mailbox
Zip
Awards

Masters
Bachelors
Doctorate
Diploma
Post-doctorate
Alumni

17.80%
13%
9.80%
9.30%
9%
4.50%
3.30%
2.30%
1.30%
0%
0%
8%
7.80%
5%
5%
4.80%

71
52
39
37
36
18
13
9
5
0
0
32
31
20
20
19

3.50%
3.30%
3%
3%
3%
2.30%
2.30%
1.30%
0.80%
0%

14
13
12
12
12
9
9
5
3
0
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Table 3.
Means, Standard Deviations and T-test Statistics for Default/standard Information,
Sensitive Personal Information and Potentially Stigmatizing Information
Grouping Strategy/ Factor
Default/Standard Information

Mean (SD)

T- test

University

3.12(1.23)

r(l,398) = -281 J ; p= 005

Community

2.77 (1 23)

Network type

Gender Revealed
Indicated
Not Indicated
Gender
Male
Female
Relationship Status Revealed
Indicated
Not Indicated
Age Revealed
Indicated
Not Indicated
Sensitive Personal Information
Network type
University
Community
Gender Revealed

3 14(1 11)

t(1, 398) = -9.92,p<.OOP

1 41 (1.13)

3 23(1.08)

f ( l , 3 5 2 ) = l 74,p = .08

3 03 (1 14)

3 17(1.10)

t (1,398) = -4.94,p< 001*

2 55(1.36)

1 12 (.88)

t(1,398) = -3.81,p< OOP

1.47 (.79)

9.63 (2.27)

r(l,398) = .24,p=.81

9.68 (2.28)

Indicated

9.92 (2.09)

Not Indicated

7 57 (2.59)

t (1,398) = -7 01,/? < 001'
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Gender
Male
Female
Relationship Status Revealed
Indicated
Not Indicated
Age Revealed

9 74(2.18)

f (1,352) = -1.85,/? = 07

10.15(1.93)

10.05(1.95)

/ ( l , 398) =-4.70,p<.OOP

8.97(2.61)

Indicated

9.86(2 15)

Not Indicated

9.09 (2.49)

f(l,398) = -3 05,p> = .002<

Potentially Stigmatizing Information
Network type
University
Community
Gender Revealed
Indicated
Not Indicated
Gender
Male
Female
Relationship Status Revealed
Indicated
Not Indicated
Age Revealed
Indicated
Not Indicated
*Significant at the .003 level

6.80 (3.89)

f(l,398)=143,jP = .15

7.35(3.71)

7.50 (3.65)

t(1, 398) = -6.63,p<.001*

3.74 (3.42)

7.84(3.67)

t (1,352) =1.84,/? = 06

7.28 (3.58)

7.74(3.51)

t (1,398) = -4.73,p< OOP

5 93 (4.04)

7.57 (3.68)
5.74 (3.84)

t (1,398) = -4 36,/? < OOP
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Table 4.
Factor Loadings Based on a Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation for 39 Items
Variable

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Sexual Orientation

017

015

oTl

OH

61)0

OTO

67Tl

61)5

oTl

^007

0/73

Looking for

0.16

0.02

0.16

-0.14

-0.04

-0.02

0.08

-0.03

0.10

0.23

0.70

Birth Day

-0.03

0.10

0.02

0.10

0.03

0.05

0.89

0.04

0.07

0.01

0.13

Birth Year

0.03

0.06

0.01

0.12

0.01

-0.03

0.89

-0.05

0.05

-0.05

0.03

Political views

0.16

-0.01 0.14

0.01

0.02

0.06

0.15

0.05

0.69

-0.09

0.23

Religious views

0.27

0.05

0.13

-0.02

0.02

0.05

0.02

0.16

0.66

0.01

0.01

Address

-0.01

0.00

0.06

0.06

0.06

0.00

-0.03

0.80

0.03

0.02

-0.02

City/Town

0.00

0.11

-0.01

0.12

-0.32

0.00

0.06

0.53

0.26

-0.03

-0.22

Zip or postal code

0.05

0.01

-0.09

0.02

0.03

0.03

0.00

0.83

0.03

-0.02

0.13

Activities

0.69

0.06

0.06

0.07

0.02

0.07

-0.02

0.04

0.05

0.04

0.11

Interests

0.81

0.08

0.06

0.06

-0.03

0.02

0.08

-0.01

0.08

0.06

0.04

Favorite Music

0.84

0.11

0.06

0.05

0.05

0.01

0.01

-0.02

0.04

0.02

0.11
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Favorite TV Shows

0.83

0.08

0.09

0.00

-0.03

0.02

0.04

-0.04

-0.09

0.02

0.17

Favorite Movies

0.86

0.12

0.06

0.04

-0.02

-0.01

0.06

-0.02

-0.03

0.00

0.04

Favorite Books

0.79

0.02

0.06

0.06

0.03

0.05

0.03

0.03

0.07

-0.01

-0.03

Favorite Quotes

0.66

-0.02

0.06

0.00

-0.03

0.11

-0.06

0.00

0.16

-0.09

-0.05

About Me

0.66

0.00

0.08

0.04

-0.08

0.09

-0.12

0.06

0.15

0.02

0.02

College/University

0.00

0.01

0.10

0.76

0.04

-0.17

0.11

0.09

-0.18

-0.10

0.00

Concentration

0.10

-0.02

0.08

0.78

-0.03

0.04

0.06

0.05

-0.06

-0.13

0.16

Graduation Year

0.09

0.06

0.16

0.71

0.06

0.10

0.00

-0.02

0.15

-0.03

-0.16

High School

0.09

-0.01

0.12

0.69

-0.02

0.21

0.08

0.05

0.09

0.04

-0.02

Employer

0.08

0.05

0.89

0.12

-0.02

-0.04

0.06

-0.01

0.03

0.04

0.05

Job Position

0.08

0.03

0.90

0.15

0.00

-0.03

0.04

-0.01

0.04

0.05

0.08

Job Description

0.17

0.05

0.77

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.01

-0.01

0.07

0.05

0.02

Job City/Town

0.03

-0.01

0.49

0.09

-0.13

0.05

-0.16

0.00

-0.01

-0.15

0.27

Job Time Period

0.11

-0.05

0.83

0.11

-0.06

0.08

0.04

0.00

0.10

0.11

-0.01

Photos of...

0.09

0.85

0.05

0.02

-0.04

0.22

0.07

0.05

-0.08

-0.04

-0.02
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Tagged Photos

0.07

0.85

0.07

0.07

0.02

0.26

0.07

0.05

-0.07

-0.05

-0.02

Self-Selected

0.15

0.54

0.19

-0.04

0.02

0.41

0.14

0.11

-0.35

-0.12

0.04

Friends Viewable

0.08

0.70

-0.02

-0.02

0.16

0.06

0.00

-0.05

0.07

0.11

0.11

Wall

0.05

0.80

0.00

-0.10

0.05

-0.13

0.01

0.04

0.05

0.10

-0.01

Groups

0.10

0.55

-0.11

0.21

0.13

0.18

0.02

-0.06

0.19

0.15

0.16

Photo Albums

0.09

0.17

0.17

-0.05

0.05

0.70

0.23

0.07

-0.26

-0.05

-0.01

Send message

-0.06

0.15

-0.06

0.02

0.93

0.06

0.06

0.01

0.03

0.01

-0.06

Poke

-0.02

0.12

-0.05

0.04

0.94

0.07

-0.02

-0.01

0.01

0.00

0.01

Profile Picture

0.12

0.26

-0.06

0.23

0.10

0.65

-0.12

-0.04

0.19

0.02

0.02

Applications

0.13

0.17

-0.05

0.08

0.03

0.66

-0.09

0.00

0.20

0.17

0.09

Fun Wall

0.05

0.05

0.08

-0.06

-0.01

0.02

-0.02

0.02

-0.05

0.78

0.00

Super Wall

-0.02

0.08

0.04

-0.09

0.02

0.07

-0.01

-0.02

0.00

0.77

0.08

Photos

Note Factor loadings > .49 are in boldface
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Table 5.
Variables, Mean Scores, and Standard Deviations for Factor Analyzed Content Scales
(N = 400)
Scale
Personal information

Variables Included in Scale
Activities, Interests, Favorite Music,
Favorite TV Shows, Favorite Movies,
Favorite Books, Favorite Quotes, and
Information "About me"

Mean (SD)
3.51 (3.07)

Tagged and Selfselected Photos and
Update information
Work information

Photos of.., Friends viewable, Tagged
Photos, Self-Selected Photos, Groups, and
Wall
Employer, Position, Description, and Time
Period

4.50 (1.85)

Education information

College/University, Concentration,
Graduation Year, and High School

2.64 (1.41)

Message and Poke
information

Send a Private Message, and Poke (nudge)

1.98 (. 18)

Album and Profile
Picture information

Profile Picture, Photo Albums, and
Applications

2.43 (.84)

Age information

Birth Day and Birth Year

1.57 (.76)

Contact information

Address, City/Town, and Zip/Postal Code

.12 (.41)

View information

Political Views, and Religious Views

.67 (.78)

Other Wall Presence

Fun Wall and Super Wall

. 13 (.39)

Relationship
information

Looking for (relationship, friendship,
networking, random play etc), and Sexual
Orientation

.74 (.73)

1.80 (1.54)
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Table 6.
Means, Standard Deviations, and T-test Statistics for Facebook Content Scales as a
Function of Network Type, Gender Revealed (indicated/not indicated), Gender
(male/female), Relationship Status Revealed (indicated/not indicated), and Age Revealed
(indicated/not indicated)
Factor
Network type

Mean (SD)

T- test

University

.56 (.75)

f ( l , 398) = 2.84/7 = .005*

Community

.78 (.80)

View Information

Gender Revealed
Personal Information
Indicated

3.71(3.05)

Not Indicated

1.93(2.83)

f (1,398) =-3.75 ;?<
001*

Photo and Update
Information
Indicated

4.78(1.60)

Not Indicated

3.07 (2.33)

r (1,398) =-6.19/? <
001*

Education Information
Indicated

2.80(1.33)

Not Indicated

1.41 (1.44)

Photo Album and Profile
Picture Information

t (1,398) = -6.61 p<
.001*

Indicated

2.53 (.72)

Not Indicated

1.72(1.26)

t (1,398) = -6.46 p <
001*

Age Information
Indicated

1.64 (.70)

Not Indicated

1.00 (.94)

t (1,398) = -5.61 p<
.001*

Gender
View Information
Male
Female
Relationship Status Revealed
Personal Information

.93 (.80)

f (1,352) = 5.58/? <

.48 (.70)

Indicated

3.83(3.01)

Not Indicated

2.95 (3.10)

f (1,398) = -2.79/7 =
.005*

Photo and Update
Information
Indicated

4.87(1.63)

Not Indicated

4.10(2.10)

/ ( l , 398) =-4.08/7 <
001*

Photo Album and Profile
Picture Information
Indicated

2.57 (.67)

Not Indicated

2.20(1.03)

Age Information
Indicated

1.68 (.66)

f(l, 398) = -3.86/7 <
.001*
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1.37 (.87)

/ ( l , 398) = -3.77/7 <
001*

Indicated

.77 (.80)

t (1,398) = -3.37/? = 001*

Not Indicated

.50 (.73)

View Information

Age Revealed
Education Information
Indicated
2.78(1.34)
Not Indicated
2.28(1.54)
* Significant at the .005 level

t (1,398) = 3.22/7 = 001*
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Table 7.
Means and Standard Deviations of Each of the Three Relationship Statuses for Tagged
and Self-selected Photos and Update information, Album and Profile Picture
information, Age Information, & Work Information
Scale

Single

In a Relationship

Tagged and Self-selected Photos and
Update information

.
4.98(1.35)

Album and Profile Picture information

2.47 (.68)

2.65 (.62)

2.19(1.03)

Age Information

1.76 (.56)

1.66 (.68)

1 35 (.87)

1.38(1.63)

1.21(1.57)

.76(140)

Work Information

.UI7«
4.81(1.78)

Status
Missing

4f

,7 n njn
4.12(2.08)

4
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Table 8.
Breakdown of Story Condition by Gender of the Target for Male Participants.
Gender of the Target

Legal Privacy
Story Condition Personal Privacy
Internet Control
Total

Male

Female

Totai

18

15

33

20

15

35

15

17

32

53

47

100
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Table 9.

Breakdown of Story Condition by Gender of the Target for Female Participants.
Gender of the Target

Legal Privacy
Story Condition Personal Privacy
Internet Control
Total

Male

Female

Total

15

29

44

17

29

46

17

29

46

49

87

136
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Table 10.
Breakdown of Context Condition by Gender of the Target for Male Participants
Gender of the Target
Male

Female

Tofc

Context

Paper and pencil

36

19

55

Condition

Online

17

28

45

53

47

100

Total
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Table 11.
Breakdown of Context Condition by Gender of the Target for Female Participants
Gender of the Target
Male

Female

Total

Context

Paper and pencil

16

58

74

Condition

Online

33

29

62

49

77

136

Total

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE

158

Table 12.
Descriptives for all Unstandardized/Newly Created Measures

Scale

N

Range

Min

Max.

Mean

SD

Positive Attitudes Towards Computers 230

16

5

21

17.58

3.63

Concern- Virus

227

48

8

56

38.116

11.85

Concern: Entity

228

30

5

35

24.55

8.09

Software Use Strategy

229

18

3

21

16.22

4.77

Privacy Strategy

227

18

3

21

14.53

3.98

Password Strategy

227

18

3

21

11.96

3.90

Inability to Protect

228

27

5

32

11.99

5.53

No Need for Privacy

230

16

3

19

7.23

3.49

Degree of Disclosure

228

25

3

28

15.29

5.75

Consideration Degree of Disclosure

229

12

3

15

10.08

2 43

Privacy Settings Behaviour

229

18

3

21

13.26

4.68

VIRTUAL OTHER: Myself/Friends

230

12

2

14

9 96

2.80

VIRTUAL OTHER: Other Referents

209

54

9

63

27.77

10.58
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Table 13.
Descriptives for Computer Use Scale and Short Privacy Scale,

Frequency
(Yes)

Scale

Item

N

Computer Use: How many hours per
week do you spend using the
computer for:

Internet

230

104

1

105

17.71 15.21

n/a

Recreation

230

65

0

65

13.35 12.77

n/a

Work

230

69

1

70

15.93 12.42

n/a

Did you notice the booklet? (Y/N)

226

1

0

1

.70

n/a

69.9

Did you use the booklet? (Y/N)

232

1

0

1

.28

n/a

28

Did you learn anything new about the
settings? (Y/N)

226

1

0

1

.32

n/a

31.9

How enjoyable did you find the
Facebook creation task?

213

6

1

7

5.21

1.12

n/a

Privacy Survey

Range Min. Max. Mean SD
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Table 14.
Descriptives for all Standardized
Scale

Measures.
N

Range

Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

Self Disclosure

229

75

16

91

62.72

14.10

Public Self-Consciousness

227

66

18

84

47.96

11.99

Private Self-Consciousness

228

54

16

70

48.96

10.18

Extraversion

228

6

7

5.11

1.31

Agreeableness

227

5

7

4.91

1.08

Conscientiousness

226

5

7

5.22

1.19

Emotional Stability

227

6

2

7

5.87

1.19

Openness

228

5

2

7

5.57

1.05

BIDR: Impression Management

212

7

1

8

2.35

1.78

BIDR: Self Deceptive Enhancement

208

7

1

8

2.35

1.95

Online Privacy Attitudes

216

94

18

112

68.12

21.48

Online Privacy Behaviours:
General Caution

225

32

6

38

18.91

7.57

Online Privacy Behaviours:
Technical Protection

221

33

42

28.06

7.26

Online Privacy Behaviours: Total

219

63

79

46.76

12.42

16
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Table 15.
Number of Privacy Settings as a Function of Story Condition, Gender of the Participant
and Gender of the Target
Gender of
the
Participant

Gender of
the Target

Story Condition

Legal
privacy
story
Male
Female

Male
Female
Male
Female
Total

1
2
3
8
14

Personal
privacy story
6
2
1
11
20

History of
the internet
3
4
2
6
15

Total

10
8
6
25
49
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Table 16.
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Overall Disclosure as a Function of Story and Gender
Model
Overall Disclosure

Factor

Mean (SD)

Story

FTest
F(2,210) = .68,p = .51

Personal Privacy

16.60 (6.24)

Legal Privacy Agreement

17.08(6.14)

History of the Internet Control

17.89 (5 56)

Gender of Target
Male

17.47(6.07)

Female

16.96 (5.96)

F(l,210) = .12,/7 = .73

Gender of Participant
Male

17.85 (6.23)

Female

16.67 (5 79)

Story * Gender of Target
Personal Privacy * Male

F (1, 210) = 1.38, p = 24

F(2,2l0)=.89,j7= 41
17.33 (6.53)
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Personal Privacy * Female

15.98 (6 00)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

17.93 (6.05)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

16.50 (6.20)

History of the Internet Control * Male

17.17 (5.56)

History of the Internet Control * Female

18.34(5.56)

Story * Gender of Participant

F (2, 210)

Personal Privacy * Male

17.38 (5.60)

Personal Privacy * Female

16 00 (6.70)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

18.16(6.66)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

16 25 (5 64)

History of the Internet Control * Male

18.07 (6 62)

History of the Internet Control * Female

17.74 (4.83)

Gender of Target * Gender of Participant

F (1, 210)

Male* Male

17.90(6.06)

Male * Female

17 80 (6.49)
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Female* Male

16.98(6 11)

Female * Female

16.51 (5.64)

Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant
Personal Privacy * Male * Male

18 20 (5 93)

Personal Privacy * Male * Female

16.21 (5.09)

Personal Privacy * Female * Male

16 25 (7 25)

Personal Privacy * Female * Female

15.86 (6.49)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male

18.29 (6.45)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female

18.00 (7.16)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male

17 42 (5 66)

Legal Pnvacy Agreement * Female * Female

15.75 (5.65)

History of the Internet Control * Male * Male

16.92 (6.10)

History of the Internet Control * Male * Female

18.94 (7.04)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Male

17 38 (6 70)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Female

17.96 (4.49)
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Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly
different at least the 05 level

Table 17.
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and
Stigmatizing Information as a Function of Story and Gender
Model
Disclosure of Personal Identity
Information, Sensitive Personal
Information, and Stigmatizing
Information
Personal Identity Information

Factor

Mean (SD)

Story

FTest

F(2,215) = .30,/7 = .97
Personal Privacy

4 27(1.45)

Legal Privacy Agreement

4 32(1.41)

History of the Internet Control
Gender of Target

4 24 (1 25)
F(l,215) = .44,/? = .51

Male

4.35(1.46)

Female

4.21 (1.29)

Gender of Participant

F(l,215) = 21,/7 = .65
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Male

4.35(1.42)

Female

4.22(1.33)

Story * Gender of Target

F (2, 215)

Personal Privacy * Male

4.40 (1.59)

Personal Privacy * Female

4.16 (1.32)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

4.33 (1.40)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

4.30 (1.44)

History of the Internet Control * Male

4.33 (1.40)

History of the Internet Control * Female

4.18 (1.16)

Story * Gender of Participant

F (2, 215)

Personal Privacy * Male

4.38(1.44)

Personal Privacy * Female

4 18 (1 47)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

4.55 (1.50)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

4.13(1.432)

History of the Internet Control * Male

4 10 (1.32)
4.33(121)
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History of the Internet Control * Female

Gender of Target * Gender of Participant

F(l,215)

Male * Male

4.51(1.58)

Male * Female

4 24(1.25)

Female * Male

4.24(1.32)

Female * Female

4 20(133)

F(2,215)

Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant
Personal Privacy * Male * Male
4.50(161)
Personal Privacy * Male * Female
4.25(1.57)
Personal Privacy * Female * Male
4.21(1.19)
Personal Privacy * Female * Female
4.14(1.38)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male
4.67(1.53)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female
3.83 (1 03)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male
4.40(1.50)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female
4.25(1.43)
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History of the Internet Control * Male * Male

4.08 (1 61)

History of the Internet Control * Male * Female

4.53 (1.23)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Male

4.12 (1 11)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Female

4 21 (1.21)
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Sensitive Personal Information
Story

F(2,215)= Ti,p = A9
Personal Privacy

2.91 (1.42)

Legal Privacy Agreement

3.04 (1 34)

History of the Internet Control

3 19(1.35)

Gender of Target

F(l,215) = .15,/7 = .70

Male

3.09(1.47)

Female

3 01(1.31)

Gender of Participant

F(l,215) = .00,/7 = .96

Male

3 06(1.44)

Female

3 04(1.34)
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Story * Gender of Target

F(2,215) = 2 02,/> = 14

Personal Privacy * Male

3 14(153)

Personal Privacy * Female

271(1.31)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

3.20(1.49)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

2.93 (1 23)

History of the Internet Control * Male

2 93(141)

History of the Internet Control * Female

3 37(132)

Story * Gender of Participant

F(2,215) = 3.69,p = .03*

Personal Privacy * Male

2.91(1.46)

Personal Privacy * Female

2.91 (1.40)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

3.42(1.78)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

2.73 (1.40)a

History of the Internet Control * Male

2.83 (1.56)

History of the Internet Control * Female

3 43 (1 19)b

Gender of Target * Gender of Participant
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F ( l , 2 1 5 ) = 1.75,/; = .19
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Male* Male

3.23(1.53)

Male * Female

2.93 (1 40)

Female* Male

2 87(1.33)

Female * Female

3 09(1.31)

Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant

F (2, 215)

Personal Privacy * Male * Male
3.40(1.57)
Personal Privacy * Male * Female
2 76(1.44)
Personal Privacy * Female * Male
2 20 (.94)
Personal Privacy * Female * Female
3.03 (1 43)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male
3.50(134)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female
2.75 (1 66)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male
3 33 (1.23)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female
2.71(1.21)
History of the Internet Control * Male * Male
2.62 (1 66)
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female
3 18(1.19)
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male
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History of the Internet Control * Female * Female
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3.00 (1.50)
3.59(1.18)

Stigmatizing Information
Story

F (2, 215) =1.70,/> = .19
Personal Privacy

5.92 (2 96)

Legal Privacy Agreement

6.51(2.78)

History of the Internet Control
Gender of Target

6.79 (2.54)
F(l,215) = .09,/7 = .76

Male

6.39 (2.83)

Female

6.41 (2.77)

Gender of Participant

F(l,215) = .78,/7= 38

Male

6.64(2.81)

Female

6.22 (2.77)

Story * Gender of Target

f (2,215)= 13,Jp = .8

Personal Privacy * Male

5 89 (2.93)

Personal Privacy * Female

5 95 (3.03)
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Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

6.70 (2.73)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

6 37 (2.84)

History of the Internet Control * Male

6.67 (2.82)

History of the Internet Control * Female

6 87 (2.42)

Story * Gender of Participant
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F(2,215) = .22,/> = .81

Personal Privacy * Male

6 03 (3 14)

Personal Privacy * Female

5.84 (2.85)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

6.73 (2.60)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

6.33 (2.94)

History of the Internet Control * Male

7 23 (2 60)

History of the Internet Control * Female

6 50 (2.54)

Gender of Target * Gender of Participant

F(l,215) = .4 30,/?= 04*

Male * Male

6 16 (2.82)

Male * Female

6.64 (2.85)

Female * Male

7 17(2 73)a
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Female * Female
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6.00 (2.71)b

Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant

F(2,215) = .01,/> = .99

Personal Privacy * Male * Male
5 60 (3.00)
Personal Privacy * Male * Female
6 25 (2 89)
Personal Privacy * Female * Male
6.64 (3.34)
Personal Privacy * Female * Female
5.61 (2.86)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male
6.44 (2.73)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female
7.08(2 81)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male
7.07 (2.49)
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female
6.00 (2.98)
History of the Internet Control * Male * Male
6.62 (2 75)
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female
6 71 (2.98)
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male
7.71(2 44)
History of the Internet Control * Female * Female
6 38(2 31)
"Significant at the 05 level
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly
different at least the 05 level
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Table 18.
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Contact and View Information as a Function of Story and Gender
Disclosure within Facebook
Content Areas
Contact Information
F ( 2 , 2 1 2 ) = 1 3 9 , p = .25

Story
Personal Privacy

25 (29)

Legal Privacy Agreement

.23 (.28)

History of the Internet Control

18 (.22)

F ( l , 212)= 1.19,/?= 28

Gender of Target
Male

25 (.29)

Female

19 (.25)

Gender of Participant

F(l,212) = 401,/> = .05*
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Male

.26 (29) a

Female

19 (.25)b

Story * Gender of Target

F(2,212) = 3 93,/? = .02*

Personal Privacy * Male

34 (.30)a

Personal Privacy * Female

.17(26) b

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

21 (.30)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

.24 (27)

History of the Internet Control * Male

.18 (.23)

History of the Internet Control * Female
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18(22)

Story * Gender of Participant

F(2,212) = 3.55,/> = .03*

Personal Privacy * Male

.31 (.28)a

Personal Privacy * Female

.20 (.29)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

.31 (.32)"

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

.16 (.23)

History of the Internet Control * Male

.14 (.23)b
.21 (.22)
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History of the Internet Control * Female

Gender of Target * Gender of Participant

F ( l , 212) = 5.01,/? = 03"

Male * Male

.33 (.31)a

Male * Female

.17 (.23)"

Female * Male

19 (24)

Female * Female

.20 (25)

Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant

F (2, 212) = .39,/?= 68

Personal Privacy * Male * Male

43 (.27)

Personal Privacy * Male * Female

23 (.32)

Personal Privacy * Female * Male

14 (.22)

Personal Privacy * Female * Female

.18 (.28)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male

.31 (.33)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female

.06 (.13)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male

.31(31)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female

20 (.25)
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History of the Internet Control * Male * Male

. 18 (.29)

History of the Internet Control * Male * Female

.19 (.17)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Male

.12 (.16)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Female

.21 (.24)
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View Information
Story

F (2, 212) = .82,/? = .44
Personal Pnvacy

.40 (.43)

Legal Privacy Agreement

.46 (.47)

History of the internet Control

.51 (.44)

F ( l , 2 1 2 ) = 33,/?= 57

Gender of Target
Male

.45 (.44)

Female

.45 (.46)

Gender of Participant

F(l,212)=1.81,/? = .18

Male

51 (.45)

Female

.41 (.45)

Story * Gender of Target

F(2, 212) =1.35,/? = .26
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Personal Privacy * Male

.39 (.46)

Personal Privacy * Female

.40 (.43)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

53(47)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

41 (.46)

History of the Internet Control * Male

43 (44)

History of the Internet Control * Female

56 (.44)

Story * Gender of Participant

F (2, 212) = .00,/?= 99

Personal Privacy * Male

44 (.46)

Personal Privacy * Female

.36 (.44)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male

53 (47)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female

.40 (.46)

History of the Internet Control * Male

.57(.43)

History of the Internet Control * Female

.47 (.45)

Gender of Target * Gender of Participant
Male * Male
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F(l,212) = 4.13,/?= 04*
.43(45)
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Male * Female

.47 (47)

Female * Male

60 (.45)a

Female * Female

.38 (.43)b

Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant
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F (2, 212) = .08, p = .92

Personal Privacy * Male * Male

.38 (.46)

Personal Privacy * Male * Female

.41 (.49)

Personal Privacy * Female * Male

.54 (.46)

Personal Pnvacy * Female * Female

.34 (41)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male

.53 (.50)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female

54 (.47)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male

.54 (.50)

Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female

.34 (.43)

History of the Internet Control * Male * Male

.39 (42)

History of the Internet Control * Male * Female

.47 (.46)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Male

71 (.40)

History of the Internet Control * Female * Female

.46 (45)
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*Significant at the .05 level
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly
different at least the 05 level
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Table 19.
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the Attitudes
towards Computers Scale.

Factor
Item
1
In general, how at ease do you feel about using computers?

.94

In general, how comfortable do you feel about using computers?

.96

In general, how enthusiastic do you feel about using computers?

.82
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Table 20.
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the
Concerns Subscale

Factor

Item

2

Please rate how concerned you are about each item when online:
.26

.85

Viruses
Spam

.24

.81

Spyware

.30

.86

Hackers

.72

.50

Unauthorized access to personal information

.80

.41

Security

.69

.53

Identity Theft

.87

.24

"Online Stalkers"

.81

.12
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Table 21.

Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the Strategy
Use Subscale

Factor

Item

2
For each of the following, please indicate the degree to
which you have used that strategy to protect your
privacy online.
1. Enabled Firewalls.

.85

10

.12

2. Installed Antivirus software.

.85

.12

-.05

3. Been extra careful about the kinds of information
you submit online.

.29

.74

.02

4. Used a nickname, fake name or false information
pertaining to your true identity.

-.02

.71

.03

5. Enabled strict privacy settings when using personal
websites.

.14

.71

.25

6. Changed passwords frequently or used a strongly
encrypted password.

.04

.36

.69

7. Enabled parental controls over Internet use.

.01

.17

.62

8. Password protected your computer log-in.

.25

-.26

.69

9. Installed spyware or malware.

.73

.11

.21
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Table 22.
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the
Facebook Usage Scale
Item
How private are the things you've included in your
Facebook profile? ("private" means either personal
or confidential)
How often have you considered whether something
was too personal to include in your profile?
In general, when you post things about people you
know personally in your profile: do you ask them
permission to do so 9
In general, when you post things about people you
know personally in your profile: do you reveal their
names?
In general, when you post things about
companies/products/employers in your Facebook
profile: do you ask them permission to do so?
In general, when you post things about
companies/products/employers in your Facebook
profile: do you reveal their names
How well do you feel you know your profile's
audience?
If you were aware of all the people who look at your
Facebook profile, how likely is it that you would
become more careful about what you write?
How often do you written highly personal things in
your profile?
How often have you gotten in trouble for anything
you posted in your profile?
Are you surprised when someone you meet in
person says they have seen/looked at your Facebook
profile?
Does it bother you that the things you post in your
profile will be available online for a long time?

1
2
.45

.23

Factor
3
-.16

.16

.64

.24

-.08

.33

.51

-.02

.34

-.47

.09

.62

-.25

.07

-.33

.12

.67

-.20

28

.29

-.08

.62

-.37

.32

40

-.09

-.04

-.07

.54

.04

-.16

.19

.56

.16

.15

-.25

.57

-.18

-.40

.01

.28

.42

.06

-.49

.25

.31

.43

.29

-.26

.27

-.27

.30

.62

-.10

.07

-.34

4
-.55

5
-.18
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How liable do you think you are for the things you
post in your profile?

r

-.04
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.42

.30

.20

.63
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Table 23.
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the
Facebook Privacy Settings Behaviours Scale.
Item
How familiar are you with Facebook privacy
settings?
How often have you employed privacy settings
yourself?
How often have you advised others to employ
their privacy settings?

Factor
1
.83
.89
.80
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Table 24.
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the Virtual
Other Scale.

Item

Factor
1

2

3

.46
-.18
.49
.61
.71
.74
.61
.72
.58
.58
.69
.55

.54
-.09
.65
.12
-.50
-.50
.47
-.45
.17
.33
-.19
-.11

.10
.35
.16
.31
.33
.26
.09
.10
-.26
.05
-48
-.62

4

When you post personally revealing information in
your profile, who are you thinking about?
Myself
No one
Friends
Family
Business Associates
Employer
Partners
Instructors
Acquaintances
E-Romantic Partners
Strangers
Anyone

.02
.87
-.00
-.14
-.05
-.10
.18
-.02
-.19
.08
.19
.32
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Table 25.
Overview of Measures within Each of the Seven Grouping Categories Used in the
Privacy Setting Analyses.
Group

Attitudes Towards
Computers
Online Privacy Attitudes

Online Privacy Behaviours

Personality

Disclosure

Social Desirability
Virtual Other

Individual Measures

Positive Attitudes Towards Computers
Concern: Virus
Concern: Entity
Online Privacy Attitudes
Online Privacy Behaviours: General Caution
Online Privacy Behaviours: Technical
Protection
Software Use Strategy
Privacy Strategy
Public Self-Consciousness
Private Self-Consciousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Emotional Stability
Openness
Self Disclosure
Degree of Disclosure
Consideration Degree of Disclosure
BIDR: Impression Management
BIDR: Self Deceptive Enhancement
VIRTUAL OTHER: Myself/Friends
VIRTUAL OTHER: Other Referents

Number of
Measures in
Group
1
3

4

7

3

2
2
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Table 26.
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Overall Disclosure as a Function of Context Condition and Gender
Model
Overall Disclosure

Factor

Mean (SD)

FTest
F(l,214) = 22 51,/?< 001s1

Context
Paper-and-Pencil

18.72(6.14)a

Onlme

15.19(5.20)"

Gender of Participant

F ( l , 2 1 4 ) = 1 0 1 , /? = .32

Male

17.85 (6.23)

Female

16.67 (5.79)

Gender of Target

F(l,214) = .30,/? = .59

Male

17.47 (6.07)

Female

16.96(5.96)

Context * Gender of Participant

F(l,214) = .10,/? = .75

Paper-and-Pencil * Male

19 14(6.25)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

18.45(6.10)
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Online * Female

15 64 (5.36)

Online * Male

14.79 (5.07)

Context * Gender of Target

F (1,214) = .02,/?= 89

Paper-and-Pencil * Male

19.47(6.71)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

18.13(5.63)

Online * Male

15.63 (4.73)

Online * Female

14.89 (5 52)

Gender of Participant * Gender of Target

F (1,214) = 3 26,/?= 07

Male * Male

17.90(6.01)

Male * Female

17.80(6.49)

Female * Male

16.98(6 11)

Female * Female

16 51 (5 64)

Context * Gender of Target * Gender of

F (1,214) = .04,/? = .84

Participant
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Male
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18.94 (6.49)
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Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Female

20.47 (7 18)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Male

19.69(5.71)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Female

17.77 ( 5.60)

Online * Male * Male

15.21 (3.72)

Online * Male * Female

15 85 (5.25)

Online * Female * Male

15.84 (6 00)

Onlme * Female * Female

13.73 (4.75)

"Significant at the .001 level
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly
different at least the 05 level
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Table 27.

Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and
Stigmatizing Information as a Function Context Condition and Gender
Model
Disclosure of Personal Identity
Information, Sensitive Personal
Information, and Stigmatizing
Information
Personal Identity Information

Factor

Mean (SD)

F (1,219) = 2.72,/?.10

Context
Paper-and-Pencil

4.40(1.49)

Online

4 12(1.19)

F(l,219) = .15, /? = .70

Gender of Participant
Male

4.35(1.42)

Female

4.22(1.33)

F (1,219) =1.54,/? = .22

Gender of Target
Male

4.35(1.46)

Female

4 21(1.30)

Context * Gender of Participant

FTest

F (1,219) =1.39,/? =.24
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Paper-and-Pencil * Male

4.42 (1 54)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

4.38(1.46)

Onlme * Female

4.26(1.27)

Online * Male

4.02(1.14)

Context * Gender of Target

F ( l , 2 1 9 ) = 04, p

Paper-and-Pencil * Male

4.53(1 54)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

4.31(145)

Online * Male

4.17(136)

Onlme * Female

4.07(1.04)

Gender of Participant * Gender of Target

F (1,219) = .02,/?= 88

Male * Male

4.45(1.57)

Male * Female

4 24(1.25)

Female * Male

4.24(1.33)

Female * Female

4.20(1.33)

Context * Gender of Target * Gender of
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F(1,219) = 2 94,/?= 09
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Participant

Sensitive Personal Information

Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Male

4.39(1.68)

Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Female

4.47 (1 26)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Male

4 92(1.04)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Female

4.26(1.52)

Online * Male * Male

4.60(1.30)

Online * Male * Female

4.07(1.24)

Online * Female * Male

3.97(1.36)

Online * Female * Female

4.07 (83)

F ( l , 219) = 28.21,/?<.001<

Context
Paper-and-Pencil

Da

3.48

Onlme
?)b
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Gender of Participant

F(l,219) = .28, p = .59

Male

3.06(1.44)

Female

3.04(134)

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
Gender of Target

F(l,219) = .82,/?= 37

Male

3.09(1.47)

Female

3 02(1.31)

Context * Gender of Participant

F (1,219) = .25,/? = .62

Paper-and-Pencil * Male

3.47 (1 60)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

3.48 (1 32)

Onlme * Female

2.52 (.99)

Online * Male

2.51(1.17)

Context * Gender of Target

F (1,219) =1.20,/? = .27

Paper-and-Pencil * Male

3 65(1.54)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

3.36(1.38)

Online * Male

2.51(1.16)

Onlme * Female

2.52 (1 04)

Gender of Participant * Gender of Target
Male * Male
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F ( l , 2 1 9 ) = 34,/? = .57
3.24(1.53)
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Male* Female

2.87(1.33)

Female* Male

2.93(1.40)

Female * Female

3.09(1.31)

Context * Gender of Target * Gender of

F (1, 219)

Participant

Stigmatizing Information

Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Male

3.58(1.61)

Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Female

3.26(1.59)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Male

3.85 (1.35)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Female

3.40(1.31)

Online * Male * Male

2 40 (91)

Onlme * Male * Female

2.59 (1.05)

Online * Female * Male

2.56(1.16)

Online * Female * Female

2 44 (1.04)

Context
Paper-and-Pencil

F (1,219)
6.48 (2.77)
6.30 (2.82)
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Online

Gender of Participant
Male
Female
Gender of Target

F (1, 219) = 29, /? = .29
6.64 (2.81)
6.22 (2.77)
F(l,219) = .07,/?=79

Male

6.39 (2.83)

Female

6.41 (2.77)

Context * Gender of Participant

F(l,219) = 3.19,/? = .08

Paper-and-Pencil * Male

6.38(2.99)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

6.56(2 61)

Online * Female

6.98 (2.56)

Online * Male

5.81 (2.91)

Context * Gender of Target

F (1, 219) = .48, p = .49

Paper-and-Pencil * Male

6.31(2.97)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female

6.60 (2.65)
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Onlme * Male

6.47 (2.70)

Online * Female

6 15 (2.93)

Gender of Target * Gender of Participant
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F ( l , 219) = 5.73,/? = .02*

Male * Male

6.16(2.82)

Male * Female

6.64 (2 85)

Female * Male

7.17(2 73)a

Female * Female

6 00(2.71)b
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Context * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant
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F (1 219) = 25, p = .62

Paper-and-Pencil * Male *Male

5 92 (3 02)

Paper-and-Pencil * Male *Female

7.26 (2.81)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female *Male

7 38 (2.66)

Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Female

6.38 (2.59)

Onlme * Male * Male

6 73 (2.28)

Online * Male * Female

7.11(2 74)

Online * Female * Male

6.34 (2.90)

Online * Female * Female

5.19(2.84)

*Significantatthe 05 level
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly
different at least the 05 level

200

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
Table 28.

Number of Privacy Settings as a Function of Story Condition, Gender of the Participant
and Gender of the Target
Gender of the
Participant

Gender of
the Target

Story Condition
Legal
privacy story

Personal
privacy story

History of
the internet

Total

Male

Male
Female

1
2

6
2

3
4

10
8

Female

Male
Female

3
8

1
11

2
6

6
25

Total

14

20

15
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Table 29.
Means for Relationship, Work and Contact Information as a Function of Context.
Content Area

Context Condition

Mean

Relationship Information

Paper and Pencil
Online

.63
.55

Work Information

Paper and Pencil

.24

Online

.08

Paper and Pencil
Online

.30
.11

Contact Information
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Table 30.
Number of Privacy Settings as a Function of Context Condition, Gender of the
Participant and Gender of the Target

Gender of the
Participant

Gender of the Target

Context Condition
Paper and
Pencil

Online

Total

Male

Male
Female

8
7

2
2

10
9

Female

Male
Female

3
21

3
3

6
24

Total

39

10
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12

10

I Default/Standard
Information

'Wi

: Sensitive Information
• Stigmatizing Information

•J
Single

fn o Relationship

Status Missing

Figure 1 Presence of default/standard information, sensitive personal information, and
potentially stigmatizing information as a function of relationship status (single, in a
relationship and status not indicated/missing)
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Figure 2 Presence of personal information, photo and update, Album and Profile Picture
information, age information, work information, view information, and relationship
information as a function of relationship status (single, in a relationship and status not
indicated/missing)
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Appendices
Appendix A. Glossary of Facebook Terms
About Me/Bio

Users can display personal details about themselves.
For example, I love hot chocolate, I am the eldest of 3
children.

Account

A Facebook account is the sum total of all the information a
user owns on Facebook, including the login and password
information, the profile, the privacy settings, etc.

Activities

Users can name any activity they like to do.
For example, watching television, student council, playing
cards, travelling, cooking, etc.
Common and/or popular activities are often depicted with a
picture icon next to the activity. For example, the cooking
activity is depicted with a plate of food.
Users can provide their street address (e.g. house/building
number and street name) in the Contact Information section
of their profiles.

Address

Advanced Wall

Applications

Birthday
Birth date
Birth year
Chat

The advanced wall is similar to a bulletin board where users
can display information. For example, messages to other
users, large graphics, photos or videos etc.
Any additional features that are not default to Facebook.
For example, Scrabulous is an application that allows users to
play an online word game (Scrabble) with other users signed
into Facebook.
Users can display a "Birthday" that refers to the user's birth
day, month and year.
"Birth date" refers to the day and month that the user was
born.
For example, May 22.
"Birth year" refers to the year in which the user was born. For
example, 1980.
A Facebook feature that allows users to send and receive
instant messages with friends who are also logged into
Facebook.

205

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
College/University

Comment

Users can indicate the university/college they attended or are
currently attending in the Education and Work section of
their profiles. Next to "With" users can indicate other people
they attended the college/university with. Once a
college/university is indicated the school logo will
automatically appear. Below each entered college/university,
users can click on "Add a Class" to include additional
institutions they have attended or are attending.
When viewing a friend's content (like a photo or note), users
can leave a comment, or written observation, on that content.

Concentration

Users can indicate their discipline or area of interest (e.g.
biology) in the Education and Work section of their profiles

Courses

Users can indicate any courses they took throughout their
education within a high school, college/university or
workshop setting.

Current City/Town

Users can name the city in which they live in the Contact
Information section of their profiles.

Degree

Users can indicate the degree they are working on or have
obtained (e.g. bachelors, masters etc..) in the Education and
Work section of their profiles

Alumni

Users can indicate the college/university that they have
graduated from.

Bachelors

Users can indicate that they hold a bachelor's degree.

Diploma

Users can indicate that they have earned a diploma.

Doctorate

Users can indicate that they hold a Doctorate degree.

Masters

Users can indicate that they hold a Master's degree.
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Post-doctorate

Users can indicate that they hold a Post-doctorate degree.

Email Address

Users can provide email addresses in the Contact Information
section of their profiles.
Users can display the name of their current or former
employer.
For example, Bank of Montreal
Users can add a calendar-based resource to their profiles,
pages and groups that lets them share news about upcoming
affairs or social gatherings.
The official Facebook blog where users can find hundreds of
posts on a wide range of subjects.
Users have the option of creating a Facebook Username Link.
A Facebook Username Link is a distinct Web address for
your profile. When the Username is added to the URL your
profile is easily accessed. For example,
http://www.facebook.com is the Facebook homepage. But
adding a Username such as
http://www.facebook.com/appleseed.jonny would take you
directly to Jonny Appleseed's personal profile. A Facebook
Username can be searched on Facebook as well as some
popular search engines so it is also another way for people to
easily find friends.
The official Facebook blog where you will find hundreds of
posts on a wide range of subjects.

Employer

Events

Facebook Blog
Facebook Username
Link

Facebook Blog

Favourite Books

Favourite Games

Favourite Movies

Users can indicate authors, series, comics, or genres of
literature that they like.
For example, Introduction to Psychology
Users can indicate electronic games including computer
games, video games, and personal console games, board
games, and outdoor games they like.
For example, Cranium.
Users can indicate TV shows and genres of shows that they
like in the Arts and Entertainment section of their profiles.
For example, Lord of the Rings.
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Favourite Music

Users can indicate bands, songs, artists, or genres of music
that they like in the Arts and Entertainment section of their
profiles.
For example, Lady Gaga.

Favourite Quotes

Users can indicate quotations and sayings that they like,
believe in, or follow in the Philosophy section of their
profiles.
For example, "Birds of a Feather, Flock Together".
Users can indicate their favourite sports teams.
For example, the Yankees.

Favourite Teams

Favourite Television

Family

Former Name

Friend

Friends List

Friend Request
Fun Wall
Gender

Users can indicate movies, movie series, and genres of
movies that they like in the Arts and Entertainment section of
their profiles.
For example, Two and a Half Men.
Users can display names of siblings, parents, aunts, uncles,
cousins etc. If the family member is signed up on Facebook,
their profiles will be connected. Other users can them click
on the family members name, and they will be directed to
that users profile.
"Former Name" allows the user to specify whether or not
they have a former name that is different from their current
name. The former name may be a maiden name or a given
name used prior to conducting a formal name change.
A "friend" on Facebook is a person with whom you have a
reciprocal, mutually confirmed connection. All friendships on
Facebook must be initiated by one party (through a friend
request) and confirmed by the second party.
Users can display a list of friends that they have accepted or
have invited as Facebook friends. This list can contain a
variety of individuals such as family members, high school
friends, childhood friends, college friends, acquaintances and
even strangers.
A friend request is a request to enter into a mutual friend
connection with the requestee on Facebook.
The fun wall is an upgraded bulletin board where users post
messages or quotes, large graphics such as photos or videos,
for each other to see.
Users have the option to display their gender.
For example, male or female.
This is not necessarily their biological sex but which gender
they identify with.
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Gifts

Users can accept or give virtual tokens of appreciation that
are displayed as pictorial icons. These can be playful, serious
and friendly gifts.
For example, a birthday cake.

Graduation Year

Users can indicate the year in which they graduated or are
planning to graduate.
An admin is a person who's in charge of a group. When you
create a group, you are automatically listed as both an admin
and the group's creator. Admins can invite people to join the
group, appoint other admins, and edit group information and
content. They can also remove members and other admins.

Group Administrator

Group

High school
Hometown
IM Screen Name

Inbox
Interested in

Interests

Job City/Town

A group is not a page or profile. It is a Facebook site created
by bands, companies and other organizations to promote their
activities. Users can join groups based around shared
interests, activities, political or religious causes.
Users can indicate the high school they are attending or
attended in the Education and Work section of their profiles.
"Hometown" allows the user to specify the town in which
they grew up in and consider their hometown. For example,
London, Ontario.
Users can provide Instant Messaging Screen names in the
Contact Information section their profiles. Screen names for
AIM, Google Talk, Windows Live Messenger, Skype, ICQ,
Twitter, and others can be added.
The Inbox is where all messages, updates, and notifications
are stored in Facebook.
Users have the option to display their sexual orientation in the
Basic Information section of their profiles. They have the
option to indicate whether they are interested in men or
women, or both.
Users can name any personal interest in the Activities and
Interests section of their profiles. Common and/or popular
interests are depicted with a picture icon next to the activity.
For example, the photography interest is depicted with a
camera.
Users can display the city that they work in.
For example, Toronto.
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Job Listed

Job Position
Job Time Period

Like

Limited Profile
Looking for

Dating

Users can display their current jobs or jobs that they have
held in the past. For example: Royal Bank.
Users can also list their specific job title. For example,
Banker.
Users can display what their job position is.
For example, a bank teller or a manager.
Users can display how long they have worked in their current
job or in former jobs.
For example, March 1st, 2001 - March 14th, 2011.
A feature that appears as a link next to something on
Facebook that allows users to let others know they appreciate
that something, whether it be a video, a comment or
something else.
A profile that allows only restricted access.
"Looking for" allows the user to specify what type of
relationship they are looking for. A number of relationship
type options are available in a drop down box next to
"looking for."
"Dating" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Looking for." It means the user is looking for a dating
relationship which is a form of courtship, and may include
any social activity with the aim of each assessing the other's
suitability as a partner.

Friendship

"Friendship" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Looking for." It means the user is looking for a friendship.

Networking

"Networking" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Looking for." It means the user is looking to connect with
people who have similar interests.

Random play

"Random play" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"random play." It means the user is looking to connect with a
person on a casual basis without committing to a serious
relationship.

Relationship

"Relationship" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Looking for." It means the user is looking for a relationship
or a state of connectedness that typically includes a romantic
and emotional commitment.
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Whatever I can get

"Whatever I can get" is an option in the drop down menu
next to "Looking for." It means the user is looking for any
type of relationship.

Market Place

The marketplace is a classified ad section posted through
Facebook where users can buy and sell advertised goods
within the following categories: For Sale, Housing, Jobs, and
Other. Ads can be posted as either available and offered, or
wanted.
A listing is an entry in the Facebook Marketplace announcing
that an item is for sale or exchange.
A Mini-Feed is a list of updates detailing a user's recent
activity on Facebook. Recent activity can include posting on
a friend's wall, being tagged in photos and/or videos,
uploading an album, submitting an RSPV to a Facebook
event, etc.
A Mini-Feed provides details about what has been added or
removed from personal profile information (e.g. relationship
status, work information, likes/dislikes).
The Mini-Feed is different from a News Feed in that it
centres on one individual's Facebook activity and is
displayed within a user's Facebook Profile.

Market Place Listing
Mini-Feed

Neighbourhood

Users can name the neighbourhood in which they live or
name the nearest major intersection to where they live.

Network

Users are able to join a Facebook network which is founded
in a real-world community. For example, a user can join their
high school, university, city, or company network.

News Feed

News Feeds highlight what's happening in users' social
circles on Facebook. It is a constantly updating list of stories
about actions a user's friends have taken.

Notes

Users can display written entries detailing personal thoughts,
opinions or general comments. Notes are like mini-blogs.

Notifications

Users will receive a notifications are when a friend takes an
action on them on Facebook.
For example, if someone tags John in a photo, John will
receive a notification.
This status describes whether or not a user is logged into
Facebook chat.
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Page
People Who Inspire
You
Phone

Photo Album
Photos

Political views

Profile

Posted Item
Profile Picture

Relationship Status

Engaged

Users can add links to pages to show friends what they care
about. Only the official representative of an artist or business
can create and make changes to a page.
Users can list names of people that they find inspiring.
For example, Albert Einstein.
Users can display a phone number for other users to see.
For example, mobile phone number, work phone number, or
home phone number.
Users can create online photo albums where they can pick
and choose pictures and upload them to their profile.
Users can upload photos of themselves and others. One can
also post any pictures not related to any person, such as one's
artistic drawings, that one wishes to share with others.
Users can display "Political views" or in other words, specify
their political ideology. For example, Liberal. There are two
boxes, one where the user can state their orientation and the
other where the user can describe their political views in
words.
Users who want to share information about themselves and
socialize with others can create a profile. A profile displays a
user's personal information and their interactions with
friends.
Users can display links to websites, blogs, videos etc. Posts
can include anything users choose to post for others to view.
Users can display a profile picture which is the main photo
seen at the top of each profile. This picture is associated with
the users' name. Any picture can be used as a profile picture.
For example, a picture of the self, a picture with friends, a
picture of animals or even an avatar. An avatar is a computer
generated fictional character that is usually created by the
user using graphical software.
Alternatively, users can take an existing picture and use this
photo or graphic to represent themselves.
Users have the option to display their relationship status
which is found in the Basic Information section of their
profile. A number of relationship options are available in the
drop down box next to "Relationship Status."
"Engaged" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is engaged to
someone.

212

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
In a relationship

"In a relationship" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is in a
relationship with someone else. Users also have the option of
including the name of the person they are in a relationship
with. E.g. Johnny Appleseed is in a relationship with Jane
Doe.

In an open
relationship

"In an open relationship" is an option in the drop down menu
next to the user's "Relationship Status." This term describes a
relationship in which the participants are free to have
emotional and/or physical relationships with other partners.

It's complicated

"It's complicated" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Relationship Status." This term can describe a number of
different relationship situations and can be used if none of the
other options best describe the user's current relationship
situation.

Married

"Married" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is married.

Single

"Single" is an option in the drop down menu next to
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is not in a
relationship with anyone.

Religious views

"Religious views" allows the user to specify their religious
affiliation. For example, Catholic. There are two boxes, one
where the user can state their religious affiliation and the
other where the user can describe their religious views in
words.
Users can name a retirement residence, community residence,
or university residence in which they currently live or have
lived in previously.
Users can name the number of their apartment/room in the
building or residence in which they live.
Users can indicate a school mailbox number.

Residence
Room
School Mailbox
Self Selected Photos
Size of Network

Users can choose to display/upload photos of themselves or
others. These photos can include profile photos or photos to
include in albums.
Number of members in a particular network.
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Status

Super Wall
Tag
Tagged Photos

Videos

Wall

Website

Zip/Postal Code

Status updates are a way for users to keep their friends
informed about what they are thinking, what they are doing,
or how they might be feeling.
For example, users may post things that express their current
feelings, whereabouts, or actions. An update can come in the
form of posted messages for all of the users' friends to read.
Friends can respond with their own comments, and also press
the "Like" button to show that they enjoyed reading it.
An upgraded bulletin board where one gets to post comments,
videos and even graffiti to friends. All posts are public.
Marking a photo or video with text that identifies the image
or the person in the image.
Photos that have been uploaded by another user, and where
the profile user has been identified or labelled in a photo.
When someone is tagged in a photo, the mouse cursor can be
pointed at a person in the photo and his/her name will show
up on the screen.
Users can post links to videos that they are in or that they
like. Users can "tag" their friends in videos they add much
like the way users can tag their friends in photos.
A bulletin board where users post messages for each other to
see. This includes any random messages, such as updating
your status of what you are doing, thinking or feeling, that
you want to post. Once again you can post on your own wall
as well on other user's walls.
Users can name their personal website (e.g. one they have
created for themselves or their business) or an interest
website (e.g. the website for the university they attend/work
for).
Users can input their zip or postal code in the Contact
Information section of their profiles.
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Appendix B. Study 1 A-3 Checklist
Variable Name

Variable Description

1

Facebook Username Link

Web address of the Facebook profile accessed

2

Network Searched

3
4

Size of Overall Network
Status Yes/No
i

5

Gender Yes/No

6

male

7

female

8

Interested m (Sexual Orientation)
Yes/No

9

men

Relationship Status Yes/No

12

single

13

in a relationship

14

engaged

15

married

16

it's complicated

17

in an open relationship

18

19

Update information that notifies other users of your
whereabouts and actions (e.g, what you are thinking,
feeling, doing etc..)
Sex (e.g., male, female)

Whether you are interested in men or women

women

10
11

What network (community or university) you belong
to (e.g., Toronto, ON)
Number of members in the network

Former Name Yes/No
Looking for (Relationship
Preference)
Yes/No

Whether you are: single, in a relationship, engaged,
married, it's complicated or in an open relationship

If you are married and changed your name, what your
maiden name was
Whether you are looking for friendship, dating, a
relationship, or social networking
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20

random play

21

whatever I can get

22

friendship

23

dating

24

relationship

25

networking

26

Birthday Yes/No

The day or month you were born

27

Birth date

The day you were born

28

Birth year

The year you were born

29

Hometown Yes/No

The town you grew up in

30

Political views Yes/No

Your political stance (e.g., liberal, conservative etc .)

31

Religious views Yes/No

Your religious stance (e.g., Catholic, Muslim etc..)

32

Mini-Feed Yes/No

33

Email address Yes/No

Updates/list of your FACEBOOK™ activity (e.g.,
events you are attending, friends you have added,
pictures that have been posted of you etc .)
Your email

34

Mobile Phone Yes/No

Your cell phone number

35

Land Phone Yes/No

Your land line phone number

36

School Mailbox Yes/No

Your school mailbox

37

Residence Yes/No

The residence you live in

38

Room Yes/No

The residence room you live m

39

Address Yes/No

Your home address

40

Current City/Town Yes/No

The city or town you live in

41

Zip Yes/No

Your zip or postal code

42

Website Yes/No

43

Activities Yes/No

Personal or interest website address (e.g., justudents
website)
Things you like to do (e.g, sports, hobbies, leisure
activities etc..)
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44

Interests Yes/No

Your personal interests (e.g, painting, photography)

45

Favorite Music Yes/No

Bands/songs or genres of music that you like

46

Favorite TV Shows Yes/No

TV shows/genres of shows that you like

47

Favorite Movies Yes/No

Movies that you like to watch

48

Favorite Books Yes/No

Favorite books you've read

49

Favorite Quotes Yes/No

Quotations that you enjoy

50

About Me Yes/No

51

College/University Yes/No

Personal details about yourself (e.g., you love hot
chocolate and are the eldest of 3 children)
The university/college you attended or are currently
attending

52

Concentration Yes/No

Your discipline or area of interest (e g., biology)

53

Degree Yes/No

What degree you are working on (e.g, bachelors etc

54

Diploma

55

Bachelors

56

Masters

57

Doctorate

58

Post-doctorate

59

Alumni

60

Graduation Year Yes/No

When you graduated or are planning to graduate

61

High school Yes/No

The high school you are attending or attended

62

Courses Yes/No

Any courses you took

63

Awards Yes/No

Any awards you won

Job Listed (have listed at least one
job)

Who you work for (or have worked for in the past)

64

Yes/No
65

Employer Yes/No

What your job position is (or was in the past)

66

Position Yes/No

What your job duties were
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67

Description Yes/No

The city in which you work(ed)

68

Job City/Town Yes/No

The time period in which you worked

69

Time Period Yes/No

70

Advanced Wall Yes/No

71

Fun Wall Yes/No

72

Super Wall Yes/No

73

Wall Yes/No

74

Profile Picture Yes/No

75

self

76

activity

77

friends

78

relationship partner

79

family

80

work

81

school

82

ammal(s)

83

random picture

84

Photos of. . Yes/No

85

Tagged Photos Yes/No

86

Self Selected Photos Yes/No

87

Tagged Videos Yes/No

88

Friends Viewable Yes/No

89

Can you send them a gift? Yes/No

An upgraded bulletin board where users post messages
and large graphics for each other to see, users can add
applications
An upgraded bulletin board where users create drawings
and post graffiti for each other to see
An upgraded bulletin board where users post messages
and large graphics for each other to see

A bulletin board where users post messages for each
other to see
The main photo seen at the top of your profile
(e.g., picture of yourself, friends, animals etc. )

Users can upload photos of themselves and others
Photos that have been uploaded by another user, and
where the profile user has been identified or labeled in
a photo
Photos that have been uploaded by the actual profile
user themselves
Videos that the user has been identified in and tagged by
another user
All the friends on your friend list
Whether you can send a gift to the user without prior
permission
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90

Can you message them? Yes/No

91

Can you poke them'' Yes/No

92

Applications Yes/No

93

Photo Album(s) Yes/No
Groups (joined at least one group)

94

Whether you can send a message to the user without
prior permission
Whether you can send a poke (like a virtual nudge to
let them know you are there) to the user without prior
permission
Any additional features that are not default to
FACEBOOK™ (e.g., scrabulous, must be added by the
user by signing up for the application)
Users can create online photo albums where they can
pick and choose pictures and upload them to their profile
Any groups that users belong to (e.g., groups based around
shared interests, activities, or anything you like)

Yes/No

95

Events as indicated m their minifeed

219

Any parties, get-togethers or social events you are
attending

Yes/No
96

Gifts Yes/No

Gifts that other users have sent you

97

Posted Items Yes/No

98

Market Place listings Yes/No

99

Notes Yes/No

100

Personal Pages Yes/No

Posted websites, blogs, videos, anything users choose to
post for others to view
A classified ad section online where users can buy and
sell advertised goods
Written entries detailing personal thoughts, opinions or
general comments
Personal web pages or links that are connected to the
users profile
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Appendix C. Study 2 Exposure Stories
Legal Privacy Agreement Story

Facebook's Privacy Policy (Have you ever read it?)
Facebook is a licensee of the TRUSTe Privacy Progiam. TRUSTe is an independent, non-profit
organization whose mission is to build user's trust and confidence in the Internet by promoting
the use of fair information practices This privacy statement covers the site www facebook com
and its directly associated domains. Because this Web site wants to demonstrate its commitment
to your privacy, it has agreed to disclose its information practices and have its privacy practices
reviewed for compliance by TRUSTe.
When you register with Facebook, you provide us with certain personal information, such as
your name, your email address, your telephone number, your address, your gender, schools
attended and any other personal or preference information that you provide to us
When you enter Facebook, we collect your browser type and IP address. This information is
gathered for all Facebook visitors In addition, we store certain information from your browser
using "cookies " A cookie is a piece of data stored on the user's computer tied to information
about the user We use session ID cookies to confirm that users are logged in These cookies
termmate once the user closes the browser By default, we use a persistent cookie that stores your
login ID (but not your password) to make it easier for you to login when you come back to
Facebook. You can remove or block this cookie using the settings in your biowser if you want to
disable this convenience feature
When you use Facebook, you may set up your personal profile, form relationships, send
messages, perform searches and queries, form groups, set up events, add applications, and
transmit information through various channels. We collect this information so that we can
provide you the service and offer personalized features When you update information, we
usually keep a backup copy of the prior version for a reasonable period of time to enable
reversion to the prior version of that information
You post User Content on the Site at your own risk Although we allow you to set pnvacy
options that limit access to your pages, please be aware that no security measuies are perfect or
impenetrable We cannot control the actions of other Users with whom you may choose to share
your pages and information Therefore, we cannot and do not guarantee that User Content you
post on the Site will not be viewed by unauthorized persons We aie not responsible for
circumvention of any pnvacy settings or security measures contained on the Site You
understand and acknowledge that, even after removal, copies of User Content may remain
viewable m cached and archived pages or if other Users have copied or stored your User
Content
Facebook may also collect information about you from other sources, such as newspapers, blogs,
instant messaging services, and other users of the Facebook service through the operation of the
service (e.g , photo tags) in order to provide you with more useful information and a more
personalized experience
By using Facebook, you are consenting to have your personal data transferred to and processed
in the United States
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Could it happen to you?
lennifer Porter is a little freaked out
The 17-year-old is hunkered over a sheaf of papers scattered across a Tim Hortons table in Ajax,
Dnt, one hand flipping pages, the other twirling an oversized blue earring " That's kind of
;reepy," she said.
Indeed. What she's looking at is quite the biography - everything from her cellphone number,
lome address and a map to her work.
She sits with myriad details of her life, furnished by me, a Globe and Mail reporter, who found
Vis Porter's profile on Facebook and then reconstructed her life using nothing but freely
ivailable websites, such as Google Maps and Canada411 com.
\ s i d e from knowing where she lives, where she works and where she will soon rest her head,
3ur investigation also turned up her home and cellphone numbers, and when she's turning 18.
Dh, and pictures, too. She's shocked that someone she has never met could leam so much about
ler.
'It's funny because when you called, I was having dinner with my boyfriend. He asked who it
vas and I said I had no clue but he got my cellphone number off Facebook," she said
Canadians are embracing social-media sites online at a breakneck pace. According to the most
ecent data from Com Score Inc., nearly 17 million Canadians have a Facebook profile. Social
letworkers use these resources to help shape their identity, essentially branding themselves and
lending their public image around the world But the exposure comes at a price.
tVhile our digital footprint expands, privacy erodes. More and more, social networkers who are
lot obsessively careful face the prospect of identity theft, inadvertently marring their own
eputation or even inviting the threat of physical harm
iVhile social-networking sites, such as Facebook, offer varying degrees of security and privacy
>rotection - such as restricting who can view certain parts or the entirety of their profile - many
isers leave the drapes open. Whether by ignorance or simply a willingness to trust their private
letails to the public, they leave their photos, blog postings and personal information freely
ivailable for anyone to discover with a few clicks of a mouse.
)uring a two month-long investigation, The Globetracked more than a dozen Canadians through
heir open social-networking profiles, employing only freely available Web tools to build
)iofiles of each individual user. Here are two examples of what w e found:
There's the 23-year-old Oakville, Ont., woman who posted her home phone number on an
open Facebook profile. Plug the number into Canada411 .com for a reverse address
search, and you'll find her home address, which you can then search on Google Maps and
see she lives on a quiet suburban street near the Queen Elizabeth Way More personal,
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she's "addicted" to the MTV show The Hills, loves Dr. Pepper and sometimes wears
contact lenses.
To celebrate the end of school, a fourth-year University of Toronto student, who has a
private Facebook profile, posted in public a map to his Collingwood, Ont., cottage and
left his cellphone as the contact information.
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History of the Internet Control Story
The Early Years of the Internet
The Internet began as ARPAnet, a U.S. Department of Defense project to create a nationwide
computer network that would continue to function even if a large portion of it were destroyed in
a nuclear war or natural disaster.
Although the basic applications and guidelines that make the Internet possible had existed for
almost a decade, the network did not gain a public face until the 1990s. On August 6,1991,
CERN, which straddles the border between France and Switzerland, publicized the new World
Wide Web project. The Web was invented by English scientist Tim Berners-Lee in 1989.
Today, several Web browsers are available for IBM, Macintosh and UNIX-based computers.
And the Web is growing at a phenomenal rate. During the 1990s, it was estimated that the
Internet grew by 100% per year, with a brief period of explosive growth in 1996 and 1997. As of
June 30, 2008, 1.463 billion people use the Internet according to Intemet World Stats.
Through keyword-driven Internet research using search engines like Yahoo! and Google,
millions of people worldwide have easy, instant access to a vast and diverse amount of online
information. Compared to encyclopedias and traditional libraries, the World Wide Web allows
for easy access to a variety of information and data.
The Internet has made possible entirely new forms of social interaction, activities and
organizing, thanks to its basic features such as widespread usability and access.
Using the Web, individuals can publish ideas and information for an extremely large audience.
Anyone can find ways to publish a web page, a blog or build a website for very little initial cost.
Many individuals use "web logs" or blogs, which are largely used as online diaries. Some
commercial organizations encourage staff to fill them with advice on their areas of specialization
in the hope that visitors will be impressed by the expert knowledge and free information, and be
attracted to the corporation as a result.
Many use the World Wide Web to access news, weather and sports reports, to plan and book
holidays and to find out more about their random ideas and casual interests. Also, many use the
Internet to access and download music, movies and other works for their enjoyment and
relaxation.
People use chat, messaging and e-mail to make and stay in touch with friends worldwide,
sometimes in the same way as some previously had pen pals. Social networking websites like
MySpace, Facebook and many others like them also put and keep people in contact for their
enjoyment.
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Advertising on popular web pages can be lucrative, and e-commerce or the sale of products and
services directly via the Web continues to grow.
Another main area of leisure on the Internet is multiplayer gaming. This form of leisure creates
communities, bringing people of all ages and origins to enjoy the fast-paced world of multiplayer
games. These range from MMORPG tofirst-personshooters, from role-playing games to online
gambling. This has revolutionized the way many people interact and spend their free time on the
Internet.
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Female Target
Sarah D. Barnes
PERMANENT:

276 Eiwo C r t - Apt. 103
Waterloo, ONT - N2K 2M8
519-880-1694
Barnes_RIM@gmail.com
OBJECTIVE:

Programming position with an emphasis in Internet/Web technologies

SUMMARY:

•
•
•

EDUCATION-

BSc expected with Honours in Computer Science & Psychology Minor, June 2009
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario
Current GPA of 8.95 on a 10.0 scale

Three years experience implementing Internet technologies
Potential Honours graduate with BSC in Computer Science
Proficient with Web tools, including Java/J2EE, Cold Fusion and .NET

Courses taken included:
Psychology
Internet/Web Development
Advanced Java Development
Object-Oriented Programming
Internet Communications

Advanced Systems Design
Senior Project (Web Architecture)
Object-Oriented Analysis/Design
C/C++ Programming

EXPERIENCE:

Programmer Internship, May 2007 to September 2007
Statistics Canada, Ottawa Ontario
• Member of New Technologies Development Group.
• Evaluated new technologies for implementation throughout the organization,
including Java/J2EE, HTML, Cold Fusion and .NET.
• Assisted in designing and developing Intranet site for Corporate
Communications.
• Refined interface to applicant tracking system used by HR department.
Departmental Aide, May 2006 to September 2006
IT Dept., University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario
• Assisted in developing the first campus-wide Intranet application for posting
course descriptions and pre-requisites.
• Assisted in developing course grading systems in C++ and integrated into the
Registrar's office for posting of final grades.
ACTIVITIES
• Member, Intramural Soccer Term 2004-2008
• Edward C. Grace Award for Excellence in Computing, 2007
• Volunteer at Elementary Schools teaching computer skills 2005-2008

Employment

Application

226

227

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE
Full
Name:

Sarah

Barnes
Last

D
M.I

First

Dat
e.

November 15,2008

Address

Phon
e-

276 Eiwo Crt.
Street Address

Apt. 103
Apartment/Unit #

Waterloo
City

Ontario
Province
E-mail
Address-

i(519)880-1694

Date
Available

February 1,

Programming Specialist
YES

Are you a Canadian citizen?

ra

YES

Have you

ever worked for this company?
Have you
ever been convicted of a
felony?
If yes,
explain-

High
School:
From:

Barnes RIM(a).gmail.com
Desired
Salary:
J
$55,000/annual

Social Insurance
No.:749 902 487

2009

Position Aapplied
for.

YES

•

NO

NO

If no, <
ire you authorized to work in Canada?
If so, \
vhen?

a

Addres
s:

2381 Ogilvie Rd. Gloucester, Ontario KIJ 7N4
YES

N/A
T
o:
University of Ottawa

Did you
graduate?

NO

•

Addres
s:

College

University

YE
S

NO

„

Colonel By Secondary School
T
Did you
graduate?
1999
°'
2004

From:

N2K2M8
POSTAL Code

YES

NO

Diplom

•
Addres

75 Liaurier Ave. E. Ottawa, ON KIN 6N5

.—.

NO

,—,
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From:

2005

T
o:

2009

Did you
graduate?

Please list three professional references
Full
Name:
Roberto Narbaitz
Compan
y:
Addres
s:
Full
Name:

YES

NO

•

E3

Relationshi
p:

Degree

228

Expected: BSc with Honours in
Computer Science and
Psychology Minor

Research Supervisor
Phone:

University of Ottawa - Faculty of Engineering

( 613 ) 562-5800 EXT 6142

75 Laurier Ave. E. Ottawa, Ontario. KIN 6N5
Relationshi
Kevin Kennedy

P:

Thesis Supervisor

Compan
Phone:

University of Ottawa - Faculty of Engineering
Addres
sFull
Name:

( 613 ) 562-5800 EXT 6133

75 Laurier Ave. E. Ottawa, Ontario. KIN 6N5
Sarah Rizk

Relationshi
p:

Employment Supervisor

Compan
y:
Addres
s:

Phone

Statstics Canada

(613)951-8116

100 Tunney's Pasture Driveway, Ottawa, Ontario KIA 0T6

Company
Statistics Canada
Address

Phone:

(613 ) 951-8116
Superviso
r:
Sarah Rizk

100 Tunney's Pasture Driveway, Ottawa, Ontario
Starting
Salary:
Ending Salary:
$15/hour
Programmer Internship
Responsibiliti
es:
Evaluate new technologies, design and develop new Intranet sites
Reason for
From:
o:
Leaving:
Going back to school
May 2007
Sept 2007
Job
Title:

$16.75/hour
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May we contact your previous supervisor for a
reference?

YES

NO

•

Company

Phone-

University of Ottawa, IT Department

( 613) 562-5800 EXT 3296
Superviso
r:
John Butcher

Address
75 Laurier Ave. E., Ottawa, Ontario
Starting
Salary:

Job
Title:

229

Ending Salary:
$12/hour
Departmental Aid
Responsibiliti
es:
Develop new Intranet applications, research new possibilities for Intranet accessibilities
Reason for
Leaving:
r m
° '
May 2006
°'
Sept 2006
Going back to school
May we contact your previous supervisor for a
YES
NO
reference?

®

$12/hour

•

Company
Phone:

( 613 ) 747-2744
Superviso
r
Eric Dantey

Montana's Cookhouse and Saloon
Address

1750 Ogilvie Road, Gloucester, ON KIJ 7P4
Starting
. .
Salary:
Ending Salary:
$10.75/hour
J
Waiter
Responsibiliti
esEffective and efficient customer service, problem solving and conflict resolution
Reason for
T
From:
Leaving:
o:
May 2006
July 2004
Acquired new employment
May we contact your previous supervisor for a
YES
NO
reference?
Job
Title

m

•

$11.50/hour
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25 THINGS ABOUT ME...
1.
My most productive hours of the day are between 11pm and 3am
2.
I love to be active and play sports, volleyball and soccer are my two favorites ©
3.
If I had one wish, it would be to live on the same street as all of my friends and family,
where our kids could grow up together and we could have street parties
4.
I love the band Metric, and the movies "Zoolander" and "The Abyss"
5.
I really enjoy online shopping
6.
I miss living in Toronto & Ottawa, even though living in Waterloo is pretty good
7.
I've moved 16 times
8.
I'm turning 26 on May 22nd
9.
I lived through a break-in
10.
My boyfriend is my best friend and supports me no matter what I do
11.
I believe in God and consider myself to be Catholic - but I don't go to church
12.
I am musically challenged and absolutely admire anyone who isn't
13.
At first glance, I may look like a nerd, but my friends think I'm the coolest person they
know
14.
1 absolutely love the shows Arrested Development, 24 and the Office, and hope that they will
make an Arrested Development movie really soon
15.
I am really into Tae Kwon Do
16.
I love my dog Muffin and pretty much prefer him to anyone else
17.
1 love to drive and could drive anything with wheels and a motor
18.
Sunday Morning news shows are my favorite not because it's based on government action
but because I get to see how politicians are spinning the week's news. Go Liberals!
19.
I love the beach and I'm trained through PADI as an open-water scuba diver
20.
I am currently feeling pretty pumped about my new YMCA membership!
21.
I own more cereal than the grocery store
22.
I am almost 26 and still afraid of the dark
23.
I love getting lost
sometimes you go places you would never have gone otherwise
24.
I hate roast beef!
25.
Before I went in to Computer Science & Psychology, I took a few Fine Arts courses
"ABOUT ME"
Hey there, my name is Sarah and I'm 26 years old! I am currently about to graduate from the
University of Ottawa with a degree related to computer programming and will soon be heading up
to Waterloo, Ontario to start work at RIM. I LOVE big cities and will miss Ottawa a lot, especially
all of my friends and family, who are absolutely incredible. I love working with computers, whether
it be rebuilding them or programming them —I know, such a nerd © I have the best boyfriend in
the entire world and he is my motivation and support for everything I do in life. I'm really scared to
leave my family, friends and boyfriend to come to Waterloo, but I believe that things happen for a
reason, and I feel I was meant to come to Waterloo to work, as I think I will be able to use my
potential to the highest degree - guess we'll find out © I LOVE being active and I'm really hoping
to find some great intramural activities and/or sports to join when I get to Waterloo this spring. If
you want to know anything else, just ask ©
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PHOTOS "Sarah"
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How to Use Privacy Settings in Facebook: Overview
What are privacy settings?
You can choose to limit who can see information presented in your profile by accessing the privacy
settings. To find these, go to the top right hand tool bar and click on settings, and then click on
privacy settings.
There are a variety of things you can do with the settings, for example, you can control who sees
your profile and profile information. You can also control who can search for you and who can
contact you. In addition, you can control what information gets published about you on Facebook
(e.g., News feed stories that track your activity), and whether photos of you that you personally
upload or that other users upload are visible.
How do 1 select/create privacy settings?
You can click on any of the four privacy setting categories (i.e., profile, search, news feed and wall,
and applications). In addition, you can choose to block certain people from having the ability to
search for your profile on Facebook by typing in their name under the "person" box and clicking
"block". Once you've selected a category, to return to the main privacy page, simply click on the
privacy heading at the top. Whenever you make changes to your settings, BE SURE TO SAVE
CHANGES!!!
Here is what this page looks like:
B. Privacy
P r o f i l e *•
Control who can see your profile and personal information.

Search •
Control who can search for you, and how you can be contacted.

•
9«©

Hews Feed and Wall >
Control what stories about you get published to your profile and to your friends' News Feeds.

Applications •
Control what information is available to applications you use on Facebook,

Block People
If you block someone, they will not be able to find you
in a Facebook search, see your profile, or interact with
you through Facebook channels (such as Wall posts.
Poke, etc.) Any Facebook ties you currently have with
a person you block will be broken (for example,
friendship connections, Relationship Status, etc.). Note
that blocking someone may not prevent all
communications and interactions in third -party
applications, and does not extend to elsewhere on the
Internet.

Person
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Can you walk me through privacy settings step by step?
PROFILE PRIVACY: Basic
If you click on Profile, if will bring you to a screen that has two tabs at the top (basic and contact
information).
By clicking on the "basic" tab, you will be given options that allow you to set limits on who can see
your profile and which information is visible to other users. This is where you can limit who sees
what.
You can choose to only allow friends, friends of friends, anyone in specific networks you are a part
of and their friends, or all of the networks you are a part of to see your information. By clicking on
the drop down menu, you can choose who sees what for each of the components of basic profile
information (e.g., photos, status updates, friends e t c . . ) The most stringent setting is either only
friends or only me (depending on the information). Here is what this page looks like:
& Privacy
nSSBl

Profile

Contact Information |

Control v\ho can see your profile and related information Visit the Applications page in order to change settings for
applications
See how a friend sees your profile
Profile
Basic Info

-jtai 111, p nq o friend s name
1

Only Fnends

vj

[ Customize

v j

Limited Profile
Edit Custom Setting;.

Personal Info

j Customize

v j

Limited Profile
Edit Custom Settings

Status Updates

[Customize

vl

Limited Profile
Edit Custom Settings

Photos l a g g e d of You

1 My Networks and Fnends

vj

Only Me
Edit Custom Settings
Edit Photo Albums Prn a<_y Settings

Videos Tagged of You

[ My Networks and Fnends

v j

Only Me
Edit Custcm Settings

Friends
Wall Posts

[My Networks and Friends

vj

fy Friends may post to my Wall
[OnlyFriends

_

_

v]
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Appendix G. Study 2 Questionnaire
Demographics
How old are you 7
Are you? Male

Female

Other

What is your current relationship status?
Single
In a relationship
Married
Engaged
Divorced
In a common-law relationship

SECTION 2
Attitudes Towards Computers
Please indicate the response that best describes you.
l(notatall)2
3
4
5
6

1.
2.
3.

7(very much)

In general, how at ease do you feel about using computers?
In general, how comfortable do you feel about using computers?
In general, how enthusiastic do you feel about using computers?

Computer Use
How many hours do you spend per week using the computer for: (Please fill in your
response with hrs/week).
Internet use
Recreation (e.g., games, connecting with friends, communication, shopping,
banking)
Work/School (e.g., word processing, research, writing papers)
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Facebook Usage Scale.
1. How private are the things you've included in your Facebook profile? ("private" means either
personal or confidential)
1 (not at all)
5 (extremely)
2. How often have you considered whether something was too personal to include in your
profile?
1 (not at all)
5 (extremely)

3. In general, when you post things about people you know personally in your profile:
1 (never)
5 (always)
4. In general, when you post things about companies/products/employers in your Facebook
profile:
1 (never)
5 (always)
5. How well do you feel you know your profile's audience?
l(notatall)
5 (extremely well)
6. If you were aware of all the people who look at your Facebook profile, how likely is it that
you would become more careful about what you write?
1 (not at all likely)
5(very likely)
7. How often do you written highly personal things in your profile?
l(never
5(all the time)
8. How often have you gotten in trouble for anything you posted in your profile?
1 (never
5 (all the time)
9.Are you surprised when someone you meet in person says they have seen/looked at your
Facebook profile?
1 (not at all)
5(extremely)
10. Does it bother you that the things you post in your profile will be available online for a long
time?
1 (not at all)
5(extremely)
11. How liable do you think you are for the things you post in your profile?
l(notatall)
5(extremely)
Perceptions of Technology and Uses of Technology
Do you CURRENTLY have a Facebook account?
YES
If no, have you EVER had a Facebook account and deleted it?
How familiar are you with Facebook privacy settings?
1 (not at all familiar)
4 (somewhat familiar)
How often have you employed privacy settings yourself?
1 (never)
4 (sometimes)

NO
YES

NO

7 (very familiar)
7 (always)
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How often have you advised others to employ their privacy settings?
1
(never)
4 (sometimes)
7 (always)
Do you identify yourself in your Facebook profile (e.g., you indicate your real name vs. using a
fake name)
YES NO
How long have you been an active member of Facebook?
less than 3 months /3 to 6 months/ 6 months to a year /one to two years /over two years

SECTION 3
Public Self-Consciousness
Please select the response that best describes you
1 (not at all true of me)
7(absolutely true of me)
1.1 worry about what people think of me.
2.1 want to amount to something special in others' eyes.
3.1 feel threatened easily.
4.1 need reassurance.
5.1 need the approval of others.
6.1 am easily intimidated.
7.1 am not concerned with making a good impression
8.1 feel comfortable with myself.
9.1 am not easily bothered by things.
10.1 am not embarrassed easily.
11.1 seldom feel blue.
12.1 don't worry about things that have already happened.

Private Self-Consciousness
Please select the response that best describes you.
1 (not at all true of me)
7(absolutely true of me)
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1.1 am constantly reflecting about myself.
2.1 examine my motives constantly
3.1 look for hidden meaning in things.
4.1 try to examine myself objectively.
5.1 spend time reflecting on things.
6.1 like to get lost in thought.
7.1 don't try to figure myself out.
8 I rarely look for a deeper meaning in things.
9 1 seldom daydream
10.1 seldom get lost in thought.

Self-Disclosure

Please indicate the response that best describes you.
l(not at all true of me) 2

3

I am open about my feelings
1 am open about myself to others.
I disclose my intimate thoughts.
I show my feelings.
1 talk about my worries.
I am willing to talk about myself.
I don't talk a lot.
I reveal little about myself.
I bottle up my feelings.

4

5

6

7(absolutely true of me)
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I have little to say
I say little.
I am hard to get to know.
I keep thoughts to myself.
BIG FIVE: short version (TIPI) from Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number
next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.
You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one targetistic
applies more strongly than the other.
1 = Disagree strongly, 2 = Disagree moderately, 3 = Disagree a little, 4 = Neither agree nor
disagree, 5 = Agree a little, 6 = Agree moderately, 7 = Agree strongly
I see myself as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Extraverted, enthusiastic.
Critical, quarrelsome.
Dependable, self-disciplined.
Anxious, easily upset.
Open to new experiences, complex.
Reserved, quiet.
Sympathetic, warm.
Disorganized, careless.
Calm, emotionally stable.
Conventional, uncreative.

Internet Security Concerns and Behaviours
1.
Please rate how concerned you are about each item when online.
1 (not at all concerned)
7 (very concerned)
Viruses
Spam
Spyware
Hackers
Unauthorized access to personal information
Security
Identity theft
"Online stalkers"
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2
For each of the following, please indicate the degree to which you have used that
strategy to protect your privacy online.
1 (not at all true of me)

7 (very true of me)

Enabled Firewalls
Installed Antivirus software
Been extra careful about the kinds of information you submit online
Used a nickname, fake name, or false information pertaining to your true identity
Enabled strict privacy settings when using personal websites
Changed passwords frequently or used a strongly encrypted password
Enabled parental controls over Internet use
Password protected your computer log-in
Installed spyware or malware
Online Privacy Attitudes Scale
For each of the following questions, please indicate the response that best describes you.
1. Online sites seeking information should disclose the way the data is collected, processed and
used.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
2. A good online privacy policy should have wording that is clear and easy to understand
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
3. It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about how my personal
information will be used.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
4. Online sites should not use personal information for any purpose unless it has been authorized
by the individuals who provided the information.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
5. When people give personal information to an online site for a specific reason, the site should
never use the information for any other reason.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
6. Online websites should never sell the personal information in their databases to other parties.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
7. Online websites should never share personal information with other companies unless it has
been authorized by the individuals who provided the information.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
8. All things considered, the internet is capable of causing serious privacy problems.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
9.Compared to others I know, 1 am more sensitive about the way online websites handle my
personal information.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
10. To me, it is very important to maintain my privacy from online websites.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
11.1 believe other people are too concerned with online privacy issues.
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1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
12. Compared with other things on my mind or other aspects of my life, personal privacy is very
important to me.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
13.1 am concerned about threats to my personal privacy nowadays.
1 (strongly disagree)
7 (strongly agree)
14. In general, how experienced are you with using the Internet?
1 (not at all experienced)
7 (very experienced)
15. How frequently have you personally been the victim of what you felt was an invasion of
your privacy?
1 (not at all frequently)
7 (very frequently)
16. How much have you heard or read during the last year about misuse of information collected
on the internet?
1 (not at all frequently)
7 (very frequently)
Online Privacy Behaviours Scale
Please select the most appropriate response.
1( never)

7 (all the time)

1.
How often do you shred/burn your personal documents when you are disposing
of them?
2.
How often do you hide your bank account card PIN number when using cash
machines or making purchases?
3.
How often do you only register for websites that have a privacy policy?
4.
How often do you read a website's privacy policy before you register/disclose
your information?
5.
How often do you look for a privacy certification on a website before you
register/disclose your information?
6.
How often do you read website license agreements/policies fully before you
agree to them?
7.
How often do you watch for ways to control what people send you online (such
as check boxes that allow you to opt-in or opt-out of certain offers)?
8.
How often do you remove cookies?
9.
How often do you use a pop-up window blocker?
10.
How often do you check your computer for spy ware?
11.
How often do you clear your browser history?
12.
How often do you block messages/emails from someone you do not want to hear
from?
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SECTION 4
The Virtual Other
When you post personally revealing information in your profile, who are you thinking
about?
1 (not at all true of me)
7 (absolutely true of
me)
Myself
No one in particular
Friends
Family
Business associates
Employer
Romantic Partners
Instructors
Acquaintances
Ex-Romantic Partners
Strangers (whoever comes across it)
Anyone
BEDR Version 6 -Form 40A
Instructions Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate
how true it is.
1
not true

2

3

4
somewhat true

5

6

7
very true

l.My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
3.1 don't care to know what other people really think of me.
4.1 have not always been honest with myself.
5.1 always know why I like things.
6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
8.1 am not a safe driver when 1 exceed the speed limit.
9.1 am fully in control of my own fate.
10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
11.1 never regret my decisions.
12.1 sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
14.My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
15.1 am a completely rational person.
16.1 rarely appreciate criticism.
17.1 am very confident of my judgments
18.1 have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
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19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
20.1 don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
21.1 sometimes tell lies if 1 have to.
22.1 never cover up my mistakes
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
24.1 never swear.
25.1 sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
26.1 always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
27.1 have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back.
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
29.1 have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
30 1 always declare everything at customs.
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
32.1 have never dropped litter on the street.
33.1 sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
34.1 never read sexy books or magazines.
35.1 have done things that I don't tell other people about.
36.1 never take things that don't belong to me.
37.1 have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.
38.1 have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
39.1 have some pretty awful habits.
40.1 don't gossip about other people's business.
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Appendix H: Consent Form
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
CONSENT LETTER
Research Investigators
Dr Eileen Wood (PhD), Faculty, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University
Amanda Nosko, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University
Miranda Kenney, Undergraduate student, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to learn more about people's
perceptions of technology and the self
INFORMATION You will be asked to fill out an 18 scale online survey from a lab computer on campus. In
particular, you will answer questions about your self views, and about technology This session takes about 45 minutes
You will also be asked to read a brief statement, and then will be provided with a booklet containing another person's
personal information (e.g., job application, CV, personal photos, and personal story) We will ask you to create a Facebook
profile for this person using the information provided. The profile will be constructed either online (in Facebook) or m a
paper-and-pencil version of Facebook. Although the study cannot be fully explained at this time, full details will be
disclosed following the conclusion of the study Approximately 240 students will participate in this study. This research is
being conducted by R Eileen Wood, Amanda Nosko and Miranda Kenney as part of an ongoing research program and as
part of the research projects for these students.
RISKS The risks for this study are minimal. While you complete these questions about your perceptions of self
and technology, you may experience a range of emotions, some of them possibly unpleasant Remember, you can withdraw
from the study at any time without penalty. We emphasize that you are free to omit a response to any question you prefer
not to answer If answering some of the questions about yourself makes you feel anxious or concerned even after the study,
please be aware that Wilfrid Laurier University offers confidential counseling services to its students. An appointment with
Counseling Services can be made either by calling (519) 884-0710 extension 2338, email 22couns(g),wlu ca or by dropping
by their office, located in the Student Services building, across from Health Services. You may also contact Dr Eileen
Wood at ewood@wlu ca or (519) 884-0710 ext 3738, or at room N2074D in the Science Building, or Amanda Nosko at
nosk2123@wlu.ca or (519) 884-0710 ext 2303 or at room N2050 in the Science Building
BENEFITS Participating m this study will give you an opportunity to experience psychological research firsthand Your responses will also help researchers understand how people think about themselves and technology.
CONFIDENTIALITY Your data will be confidential and anonymous; meaning that no one but the researchers (Dr
Eileen Wood, Amanda Nosko, Miranda Kenney, Linzi Williamson, Vanessa Buote, and Amy Grant) will see your
responses and will have access to the data and that the information you complete will not have your name or other
identifying information on it. Please note, however, that while in transmission on the internet, your survey responses may
not be entirely secure, however, the information you provide cannot be traced back to you. All of the electronic data
collected will be stored on a password protected computer in a locked lab in the Science building No identifying
information will be present in the data, therefore ensuring complete anonymity of response Given the nature of the survey
tool we are using, all entered data will be stored and automatically added to a data file and because the information you
provide will be anonymous, it is important for you to withdraw participation before entering any answers if you do not wish
your answers to be included m this study. The data will be kept for approximately 8 years. All paper data (including consent
forms and data) will be stored by the researchers in a locked cabinet in a locked lab in the Science Building After 8 years,
the paper data will be shredded and carefully disposed of by the principal researcher

DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE

248

COMPENSATION For participating in this study you will receive 2 credits Other ways to earn credit is the
completion of a journal article review. Details can be found in the Psychology main office (N2006, second floor, Science
Building) If you withdraw from the study prior to its completion, you will receive the full amount of credit
CONTACT If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, (or you experience adverse effects
as a result of participating in this study) you may contact the researcher, Dr. Eileen Wood at ewood@wlu.ca or (519) 8840710 ext.3738, or at room N2074D in the Science Building, or Amanda Nosko at nosk2123@wlu.ca or (519) 884-0710
ext.2303 or at room N2050 in the Science Building This project has been reviewed and approved by the University
Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in
this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact
Dr Bill Marr, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, (519) 884-0710, extension 2468 or
email at bmarr@wlu.ca.
PART1CIPATION Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If
you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and without loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. You have the right to omit any question(s)/procedure(s) you choose
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION Results of this research may be published at conferences or in journal articles
Results will be reported only in terms of aggregated group scores The results of this study will also be posted on the Study
feedback board opposite of N2006 (Psychology Main Office) on October 30, 2009
CONSENT By signing this form you indicate that you have read and understand the above information, and agree
to participate in this study.
Name (please print your full name)Signature
Date
Researcher initials
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Appendix I: Debriefing Letter
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
DEBRIEFING LETTER
Research InvestigatorsDr. Eileen Wood (PhD), Faculty, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University
Amanda Nosko, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University
Miranda Kenney, Undergraduate student, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University

Thank you for taking part in this study! Your participation is sincerely appreciated, and we hope that you have
found your experience to be interesting. The current study was three fold.
The first line of investigation looked at a variety of issues, including privacy attitudes and behaviours both in
online and offline settings, self-disclosure, familiarity and comfort with technology, Facebook usage and privacy settings,
and the "virtual other" (who it is that you are thinking about when posting things on Facebook)
Second, this study examined how the wording of a privacy policy impacted on what people were willing to
disclose in a Facebook profile for another person. More specifically, we were interested in seeing whether a personalized
privacy statement depicting an actual invasion of privacy would result in lower levels of information disclosed when
compared to the commonly used privacy statements like those seen on the Facebook website In a third control condition,
participants read a statement outlining the history of the internet.
Third, we wanted to know more about how the methodology impacts on the content of a profile, that is, whether
the profile was completed onlme in an actual Facebook profile or on a comparable paper-and-pencil version, impacted on
disclosure of information. In this case, we asked you to fill out a profile for either Michael or Sarah We told you that they
were actual people who had submitted their information to us, but in reality, we generated all of the information about these
people. This concealment was necessary so as to encourage you to carefully consider what this person might want or not
want in a personal profile. If we had told you that these people did not actually exist and that all of the information was
generated, you may not have been as inclined to seriously consider the ramifications of the choices you were making while
constructing the profile.
This study will help us to better understand how people are using online social communication websites, and to
link various factors to one another. In addition, this study could inform policy makers on ways to more effectively tailor the
wording of their policies to reach as many of their users as possible, and in the most effective way Furthermore, very little
is known about how people are using Facebook, and what factors are related to their perceptions of privacy and actual
employment of privacy settings, and so this study will help answer some of these questions.
If you would like to learn more about self-disclosure online, please refer to the following paper:
Joinson, A.N., Paine, C , Buchanan, T., & Reips, U.D. (2008). Measuring self-disclosure online Blurring and non-response
to sensitive items in web-based surveys. Computers in Human Behaviour, 24, 2158-2171.
Answering some of the questions about your privacy in general and online may possibly have made you feel
anxious or concerned. Wilfrid Laurier University offers confidential counseling services to its students. An appointment
with Counseling Services can be made either by calling (519) 884-0710 extension 2338, email 22couns@wlu.ca or by
dropping by their office, located in the Student Services building, across from Health Services. You may also contact Dr.
Eileen Wood at ewood@wlu ca or (519) 884-0710 ext.3738, or at room N2074D in the Science Building, or Amanda
Nosko at nosk2l23@wlu.ca or (519) 884-0710 ext.2303 or at room N2050 in the Science Building. This project has been
reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. If you feel you have not been treated
according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of
this project, you may contact Dr. Bill Marr, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, (519)
884-0710, extension 2468 or email at bmarr@wlu.ca.
For feedback about the results of the study, please check the study feedback board opposite of N2006 Study
results will be posted as soon as they are available, by October 30, 2009. Thank you again for your participation1
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